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Prevailing studies of Islamic activism and the internet tend to evaluate the 
significance (or insignificance) of the internet for an Islamic movement as a 
unified whole, ignoring intra-movement heterogeneity and internal 
dynamics. By contrast, this study offers a pluralistic vision of Islamic 
activism, identifying separate streams or groups of a particular theological 
tradition within Islam. It therefore analyses the relevance of the internet for 
such Islamic groups in a more nuanced and variegated manner. To this end, 
drawing on resource mobilization theory, it analyses internet use by the 
Salafi movement with a specific focus of Salafists in Indonesia. It identifies 
resource inequality among different Salafi groups as accounting for intra-
movement difference and the varied significance of the internet for groups 
within the Salafi movement. The study demonstrates that although each 
Salafi group adopted the internet as a new important resource for their 
social, religious, and organizational interests, groups did not actually 
mobilize it for this purpose in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor 
Salafi groups tended to mobilize the internet more actively than the 
resource-rich ones. Different access to resources among Salafi groups 
contributed to these different levels of actual mobilization of the internet by 
the Salafi groups. Accordingly, the significance of the internet is not uniform 
across the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Rather, each Salafi group’s use of 
the internet was influenced by offline factors and particularly access to other 
organizational resources. Therefore, this study argues that the significance of 
the internet for Islamic movements is not uniform, but rather diverges due to 
intra-movement complexities and dynamics including internal fragmentation 
and the differential state of intra-movement organizational resources. The 
significance of the internet as a resource for an Islamic movement thus varies 
enormously across intra-movement factions or groups depending on access 
to other resources.  
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Transliteration and Indonesian Names  
 
For the transliteration of Arabic words, this thesis uses the system of Arabic 
transliteration adopted by the Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, with the 
following exceptions: 1) no line under th, kh, dh, sh, gh; 2) j instead of dj, q 
instead of ḳ. The article al is never assimilated (so, for example, al-shams, not 
ash-shams). The tā’ marbūṭa is not transliterated, except when followed by a 
vowel; it is then rendered t (so, for example, rabbat al-bayt). Transliterated 
words are rendered in italics each time they appear. The Indonesian personal 









Islamic Cyber Activism Studies 
The revolution in Information and Communication Technology has significantly 
transformed the face of the Muslim world over the last two decades. Indeed, 
according to Bunt (2006:153), the explosion of new media, particularly the 
internet, in Muslim countries has given rise to an “Islamic information 
revolution” and has particularly increased internet use by Islamic movement 
activists in cyberspace, which Bunt (2006:161) refers to as “cyber Islamic 
activism”. Various Islamic social movements have passionately embraced the 
internet technologies that provide the movement’s actors with opportunities 
that have not been previously available through traditional media. The actors in 
these Islamic social movements utilize the internet as a new, important resource 
to pursue their goals of social change.  
Scholars from various disciplines such as media and communication, 
sociology, political science and security studies have studied this use of the 
internet by a range of Islamic social and political movements. Many of their 
studies explore the significance or insignificance of this new medium for 
contemporary Islamic movements. However, the prevailing accounts tend to 
conceptualize this significance or insignificance of the internet by treating 
Islamic movements as monolithic entities. Implicit in this literature is the 
assumption that Islamic movements are homogeneous and coherent units. This 
is problematic because this literature fails to address the reality that Islamic 




aspects like constituency and resources, and even have differing interpretations 
of ideology that influences the extent of the significance of the internet for these 
movements.    
Thus, the prevailing studies on Islamic activism and the internet can be 
divided into two categories: studies that argue for the full significance of the 
internet for Islamic movements; and others that argue for only limited 
significance of the new medium for Islamic movements. In spite of their different 
arguments, both tend to present the Islamic movement under study as a unified, 
monolithic unit which results in the analyst’s failure to identify the varied 
significance of the internet for the movement.  
 
Full Significance of the Internet for Islamic Activism 
Initially most evident were those scholars of Islamic cyber activism who believe 
that the internet plays crucial roles in the rise and success of contemporary 
Islamic activism. Many of these cyber-enthusiasts examine the issues of 
terrorism and Islamic politics from the perspective of security studies focusing 
on the significant roles of the internet for Muslim terrorist and radical groups. 
The strategic interests in the global “War on Terror” may have contributed to 
these scholars’ and security analysts’ serious attention to the relationship 
between new media and terrorism and Islamic politics in the Muslim world and 
some Western countries where Islam is a minority religion. 
Whine (1999), for example, argues that internet technologies provide a 
new arena for Islamist political extremists and terrorist movements to operate 
and enhance their networks and communication capability amongst themselves 
and between themselves and the outside world. Through their websites, Muslim 
fundamentalist groups and Muslim extremist organizations formed an imagined 
community functioning within and beyond the nation state. They communicated 




glorified their actions (Khatib 2003; Janbek 2009 and 2011).  In this regard, 
many authors focussed on how Al Qaeda and its computer-savvy actors utilized 
the internet as an integral part of their strategy to promote violent jihadism, 
recruit new members, and organize actions within and beyond the nation state 
(e.g., Hoffman 2006; Brachman 2006; Michael 2009; and Keene 2011). As the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) made a shocking rise in global arena in 
the mid-2014, scholars and observers have presented detailed information and 
analyses of the historical development, organization, ideology and operations of 
this violent group (e.g. Cockburn 2015; Weiss and Hassan 2915; Stern and 
Berger 2015; Lister2015; Filiu 2015; McCants; Atwan 2015; and Takaoka 2016). 
Many of them studied ISIS media strategy, focussing their analysis on how the 
group employs internet-based social media like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram 
and internet forums and media sharing platforms like Youtube as essential tools 
for their global outreach (Bowyer 2015; Atwan 2015; Arnaboldi and Vidino 
2015; Klausen 2015; Berger and Morgan 2015; Farwell 2015; Behr et al 2015; 
and Blaker 2015).  Some analysed the use of websites and online games for 
propaganda purposes (e.g. Lombardi 2015). All these studies argue that the 
internet has played a crucial role in the success of ISIS in creating ‘cyber jihad’ 
and ‘digital caliphate’ aimed at disseminating their violent ideology, recruiting 
new local and foreign fighters, and inspiring and inciting terrorist attacks 
around the world.   
Other scholars have focused on the role of internet technologies, 
particularly social media like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, in the emergence 
and success of social activism during the Arab Spring that led to the fall of some 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in 2010 and 2011(e.g., Douai 2013; El-
Nawawy and Khamis 2012, 2013; Khamis and Vaughn 2011; Kuebler 2011; Root 
2012; Stepanova 2011; Schroeder et al. 2012; Root 2012; and Aouragh 2012). 




Arab Spring to develop new tactics for turning individualized, localized and 
communal dissent into movements with shared grievances and consciousness 
for collective action (Howard and Hussain 2011). Digital media during the Arab 
Spring played crucial roles never seen before in the success of social movements 
(Howard and Hussain 2013). Lim (2012) affirms that social movements during 
the Egyptian revolution, such as Kefaya, the April 6th Youth and We Are All 
Khaled Said, used social media to develop networks and connections between 
activists, and increase the ability of opposition leaders to reach a global 
audience. Social media provided opposition leaders with a means for shaping 
repertoires of action, framing issues, spreading unifying symbols and turning 
online activism into offline protests. Similarly, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) 
argue that social media had a significant impact on the success of the Egyptian 
uprisings that brought about the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the country’s 
authoritarian ruler.   
Studies also have been undertaken to examine how internet plays key 
roles for marginalized groups in Muslim countries. These studies suggested that 
this new medium has become a new tool for spreading a sense of community 
and collective identity, organizing collective action, creating less-confined space 
for the exchange of ideas, and establishing networks among women activists and 
opposition groups in the Middle East. Agarwal, Lim and Wigand (2012), for 
example, analyse how Saudi women who established Women’s Right-to-Drive 
Campaigns undertook collective actions through the internet against a ban on 
woman driving enforced by the Saudi kingdom on the grounds of “Sharia law”. 
Chraibi (2011) argues that the Saudi women’s denouncement of the ban on 
woman driving created an online “power play” between the Saudi religious 
authorities (who supported and gave religious legitimacy to the ban), the Saudi 




Moreover, other studies examine the use of the internet by opposition 
groups and political dissidents in non-democratic Muslim countries in the face of 
governments’ efforts to maintain the status quo and control resistance against 
repressive regimes. Exploring the use of the global flow of information by Saudi 
opposition groups, Fandy (1999:147) observes that “Saudi opposition may be 
virtual, but the dialectic of the local and the global is real, not virtual”.  
Teitelbaum (2002) studies the internet use by the Saudi opposition groups 
abroad in the face of the Saudi authorities’ efforts to harness the new media 
technology for modernization and business purposes, but to prevent it from 
undermining the kingdom’s authoritarian rule and conservative form of Islam. In 
Iran, the increasing penetration of internet technologies into everyday life 
facilitated the emergence of political opposition against the Iranian government 
after the contested 2009 presidential elections known as the “Twitter 
Revolution” and the “Green Movement”. Some scholars argue that cyberspace 
provides the opposition movement actors with a social space where their 
imaginaries of self, resistance and power form bonds of interactivity (Rahimi 
2011). This helped the political opposition groups and ordinary people to 
challenge the Iranian government’s monopoly of information and opened a 
global public sphere for Iranians around the world (Sohrabi-Haghighat 2011).  
 
Limited Significance of the Internet for Islamic Activism 
Other scholars, however, reject sweeping claims about the crucial roles of the 
internet for contemporary Islamic activism. Aday et al. (2012), for example, 
point out that enthusiasm for a social media-centric understanding of the Arab 
uprisings risks exaggerating the importance of the internet and blinding the 
public to other important causal factors or influential actors that led to the 
success of social protests during the Arab Spring. They assert that the role of 




played an important, but limited role. Wilson and Dunn (2011) suggest that 
social media use was not dominant in the social movements and protests during 
the Egyptian revolution of January and February 2011, but social media might 
have played an important role in connecting and motivating actors and 
participants. Likewise, Douai (2013) who focuses on how Twitter was used 
during the Egyptian revolution, asserts that “the seeds of change in the Arab 
Spring are both technological and human”.  
Other scholars of this strand criticize cyber-enthusiasts, arguing that the 
role of internet as an emancipating technology in the Iranian experience is not 
fully proven. Golkar (2011), for example, found that while the internet helped 
the Green Movement activists increase their capacity to mobilize and challenge 
government legitimacy, the new medium also enabled the Iranian authorities to 
increase their political control by creating a sense of fear among people, 
identifying and suppressing dissidents, and intensifying the presence of military 
and paramilitary forces in cyberspace.        
Furthermore, some scholars totally reject the sweeping claims about the 
full significance of the internet for contemporary social activism in Muslim 
countries. Cyber-sceptics argue that internet technologies like Twitter were not 
crucial factors in the success of the Arab uprisings. Malcolm Gladwell, for 
example, believes that “revolutions were driven primarily by traditional forms of 
political organization and motivated by familiar grievances. Revolutions and 
protests have happened for centuries without being updated in real-time on 
Twitter” (Gladwell 2010 in Aday 2012:4; Gladwell 2010).             
  
The Gap in the Prevailing Studies 
The prevailing studies noted above have certainly provided important insights 
into understanding the role and impact of the global rise of cyberspace on 




conceptualise the significance or insignificance of the internet for Islamic 
activism in a unified perspective by treating Islamic movements under study as 
monolithic entities. Accordingly, prior studies tend to present unitary findings 
regarding roles of the internet for monolithic Islamic movements. In their 
attempt to explain the crucial roles or limited roles of the internet for Islamic 
activism, most studies portray an Islamic movement under study as a 
homogeneous unit represented by single leaders, unitary ideology and unified 
constituents. Thus, when these studies argue for the significance of the internet 
for an Islamic social movement in this way, they tend to overlook the variations 
within an Islamic movement in terms of resources, constituencies, ideological 
streams, practice and institutions. The Islamic movement is often presented as a 
homogeneous and coherent entity whose internal dynamics and changing nature 
are often unquestioned.  
This unitary approach to the relationship between Islamic movements 
and the internet is problematic at least in two ways. First, it fails to read 
accurately the nature of contemporary Islamic movements. Just like social 
movements in general, Islamic movements are in reality far from unitary or 
monolithic entities. They are in fact dynamic entities with many faces, being in 
constant flow and motion. Islamic movements are differentiated by “dispersed 
emotions, ideas and activities ... whose activities, actors and constituencies were 
quite different in character and function, and detached from one another, 
although they often followed each other’s news and influenced one another” 
(Bayat 2005:899-900). 
 Second, it is primarily problematic because regarding Islamic movements 
as monolithic entities hinders an adequate understanding of the nuances of the 
internet’s significance for Islamic movements. In fact, the significance or 
insignificance of the internet for an Islamic movement is influenced by intra-




unified entity may prevent us from explaining and better understanding the 
nuanced roles and relevance of the internet for contemporary Islamic activism.      
What seems to be missing from the existing literature is an analysis of the 
significance of the internet for Islamic activism which takes into account intra-
Islamic movement heterogeneity and dynamics. In fact, the literature fails to 
address adequately the issues of diverse constituents, groups, orientations, and 
resources within Islamic movements and how such factors influence the extent 
of the significance of new media technologies like the internet for Islamic 
activism. 
In addition, the prevailing literature has predominantly focused on cyber 
Islamic activism in the Middle East. Consequently, it has not incorporated 
studies of other Islamic societies into the debate or addressed adequately the 
richness and complexity of the interaction between the internet and Islamic 
movements in other societies. Questions about the internet and Islamic 
movements in non-Arab countries remain relatively under-explored and little 
understood. This may be due to an assumption among some scholars, both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, and the public, which is articulated by media, that 
Islam is primarily manifested in the Arab world and Muslims are synonymous 
with Arab people. Non-Arab Muslims, who in fact constitute the majority of 
Muslims in the world, are often overlooked because they are considered to be on 
the periphery compared to the Middle East, which is traditionally regarded as 
‘the centre of the Muslim world’ from the Orientalist perspective. This 
overlooking may be part of a broader “disregard of the Muslim world in East and 
Southeast Asia” (Ho 2010:64) or “Ummah in the East” (Sevea 2007 in Ho 2010: 
64). In fact, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world and 
Southeast Asian Muslims represent the majority of the global Muslim population. 




has been focussed predominantly on Islamic radical groups and internet (e.g. 
Bräuchler 2003 and 2004; Lim 2005; and Hui 2010).  
There is a need to internationalize studies of cyber-Islamic activism by 
expanding their scope of study beyond the Arab world and Muslim minorities in 
Western countries. Studies on the internet and Islam also need to examine 
questions about cyber–Islamic activism in the so-called ‘periphery of the Muslim 
world’ such as Southeast Asia. This is an important attempt to better understand 
the variety of ways the internet works within various Muslim societies. 
Research on cyber Islamic activism also requires an extension of the 
subject of inquiry beyond its traditional focus, namely terrorism, radicalism and 
political Islam. To understand cyber Islam better requires more studies on the 
internet and Islamic activism over wider geographical areas, languages and 
cultural contexts addressing a broad range of issues beyond the Middle East and 
Arabic-English languages. For example, as Indonesian is the language of the 
largest Muslim country, the Indonesian cyber-Islamic environment deserves 
serious scholarly attention.   
 
Research Questions and Argument 
There is clearly a gap in the literature that this study can help address. In this 
regard, this study offers a pluralistic, fragmented vision of Islamic activism 
because it can help uncover the nuanced relevance of the internet for Islamic 
groups. To this end, it analyses internet use by the Salafi movement with a 
specific focus of Salafists in Indonesia by attempting to present an aspect of the 
movement that accounts for intra-movement differences and its implications for 
the varied significance of the internet for the movement. In this context, using 
resource mobilization theory, it suggests that resources constitute a crucial 
organizational aspect that defines the variations within the Salafi movement, 




movement. This study, therefore, does not attempt to address a comparison 
between the internet and other media as tools or facilities for dealing with 
problems facing Salafists. Rather, it analyses how internet use and the internet 
significance were influenced by internal dynamics within the Salafi movement, 
particularly its intra-movement resource variations.       
To pursue this goal, this study examines the significance of the internet 
for the Salafi movement in Indonesia by asking the following questions: Why did 
the Salafi factions embrace the internet as a new important resource? How did 
they actually mobilize the adopted internet to sustain their movement and 
achieve their social-religious change goals? What was the implication of this 
actual use of the internet for the Salafi factions? 
Suggesting that there is a close relationship between Islamic movements’ 
use of the internet and their resources as exemplified by the case of the Salafi 
movement in Indonesia, this study argues that the significance of the internet for 
Islamic movements is not uniform, but varied due to intra-movement 
complexities and dynamics including internal-fragmentation and the differential 
state of intra-movement organizational resources. The significance of the 
internet for an Islamic movement is mediated by intra-movement dynamics and 
differences such as constituent groups and organizational resources. In essence, 
the internet has enhanced the local and global presence of less well-resourced 
Salafi factions more than the well-resourced ones. The more resources to which 
a Salafi faction has access, the less it uses the internet or benefits from it.  The 
less resources to which a Salafi faction controls, the more it mobilizes the 
internet and the more significance the internet has for mobilization purposes.  
 
Focus of the Study 
Salafism is chosen as the focus of this study because it is a good example of a 




intra-movement fragmentation in terms of ideology, constituency, and 
organizational resources. It is one of Islam’s fastest growing transnational 
movements spreading beyond its country of birth, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle 
East to Europe, North America, East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Yet, as 
it spreads worldwide, Salafism is not a unified, monolithic movement as it 
divides into factions that are involved in intra-Salafi struggle over how Salafi 
doctrines are interpreted and applied by its supporters. It is a movement with 
fragmented faces and different voices, leaders, and organizations.  
Salafism also presents an interesting depiction of Islam’s contemporary 
religious movements. Although it is theologically ultra-conservative, Salafism 
confidently adopts the internet and is adept at taking advantage of this new 
media technology. Yet, it is a puritanical-scripturalist religious movement with 
literal understandings and strict application of religious texts. Its presence on 
the internet is highly visible, ranging from Arabic websites of literalist Salafi 
religious authorities (‘ulamā) in Saudi Arabia, English websites of the Salafi 
leaders in UK, to mailing lists operated by Salafi supporters in Southeast Asia. 
The internet is gradually being assimilated into the home, office and daily 
routines of the proponents and followers of the transnational Salafi movement. 
Indonesia is an appropriate place for investigating aspects of internet use 
by Islamic movements outside the Middle East and Western countries because of 
its large online user base. Over the past 10 years, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the use of the internet among Indonesians. With a population of 250 
million, in 2014, Indonesia was the 4th top internet country in Asia with 71 
million users and an internet penetration rate of 28 percent 
(http://www.internetworldstats.com). It was estimated that, with its dynamic 
future growth, Indonesia’s internet market will have reached the internet user 
base of 149 million users by the end of 2015 (http://redwing-asia.com/market-




its supporters in the online environment is demonstrated in hundreds of Salafi 
websites, blogs, internet forums, and online businesses written in the 
Indonesian language, operated by Salafi leaders or learning centres, and 
followed by Salafi supporters. Ironically, however, although Indonesia is a 
country with the largest Muslim population in the world and a large online user 
base, it receives little scholarly attention regarding how Islamic groups and 
movements, including Salafism, harness new media technologies like the 
internet. The existing studies on cyber Islam in Indonesia have mainly focussed 
on terrorism and Islamic radicalism (e.g., Hasan 2006; Lim 2005; Hui 2010; and 
Bräuchler 2003 and 2004) so that other significant issues remain unexplored 
and little understood.  
In addition, in regard to research on global Salafism, numerous studies 
have been devoted to analysing this contemporary transnational Islamic 
movement, particularly after 9/11. Most of these studies are general in scope 
including Salafism together with other Islamic movements in the Middle East, 
Europe and North America (e.g., Teitelbaum 2000; Fandi 2001; Roy 2002; Al-
Rasheed 2002; and Commins 2006). A significant contribution to the emerging 
scholarly literature on global Salafism is a collection of studies edited by Roel 
Meijer (2009). However, much of this research is concerned with the 
relationship between Salafism, terrorism and radicalism using a security studies 
approach as the dominant framework (e.g., Amghar 2007; Hegghammer 2006; 
Hasan 2006; and Lia 2007). Consequently, other important issues related to this 
global Islamic movement have remained under-examined and unexplained. For 
example, research about Salafism and new media has been largely neglected 
with the exception of Carmen Becker’s works on Dutch and German Salafists’ 
internet forums that focus on religious knowledge practices and rituals (2009 




Thus, Salafism, an ultra-conservative, fast growing, but fragmented global 
movement in contemporary Islam which proliferates in the country with the 
largest Muslim population outside the Middle East and extensively employs 
internet technology, undoubtedly deserves scholarly attention. This raises 
questions of why and how Salafi factions adopt and adapt the internet and what 
happens when the internet enters the Salafists’ daily routines and activities or as 
Michel de Certeau (1984:31 in Bakardjieva 2005:6) asked: “What do they make 
of what they “absorb”, receive and pay for? What do they do with it?” Studying 
the internet use by different Salafi factions in Indonesia is an important attempt 
to better understand what makes new media technology meaningful and 
significant for Islamic social movements outside the Arab world and Muslim 
minorities in the West.     
I limit the scope of this study to Indonesian Salafi websites, namely those 
that are (insofar as can be ascertained) set up and maintained by Indonesian 
proponents and followers of Salafism, and written in the Indonesian language. 
Most of these websites are operated by Indonesian Salafists in Indonesia, while a 
few are maintained by Indonesian Salafi supporters who are living or studying in 
some Middle Eastern countries. Websites are more widely used by Indonesian 
Salafists than other internet applications. The Salafi presence in the online 
environment is more visible and accessible in websites than in internet forums, 
for example, which are normally closed groups.  This may be attributed to the 
ability of websites to reach and be accessed by a wider audience in cyberspace, a 
characteristic that serves best the Salafists’ main purpose of propagating 
Salafism or da’wah Salafiyah as they call for online communities. Websites, then, 
are the most visible gate through which to access and understand Salafi 






Resource Mobilization Theory: A Theoretical Framework  
This study requires a theoretical framework suited to the task above, hence the 
attempt by some scholars like Wiktorowicz, ed. (2004) and Bayat (2005) to 
bring social movement theories to the realm of Islamic activism is taken up here. 
However, it then extends the use of social movement theory to explain cyber 
Islamic activism, which most scholars who apply social movement theory to the 
study of Islamic activism have so far failed to address.  
To this end, this study applies resource mobilization theory (RMT) to the 
analysis of internet usage by the proponents of Salafism in Indonesia. This 
theory is useful in explaining the adoption and usage of the internet as a new 
important resource by Salafi actors in Indonesia in their mobilization process. 
Drawing on this theory, this study examines the relationship between the 
internet and variations or dynamics within the Salafi movement in Indonesia. It 
particularly analyses the internet usage by Salafi factions in Indonesia and their 
intra-movement resource differences.  
This particular theory on the origins and growth of social movements 
developed during the 1970s in reaction to traditional social-psychological 
analysis of social movements as a new generation of social movement scholars 
attempted to explain the rise, development and effects of social movement of the 
1960s in a new perspective (Jenkins 1983; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; 
Edwards and McCarthy 2004; and Edwards and Gillham 2013). Social movement 
theories which are characterized by a social-psychological approach, such as 
relative deprivation theory, mass society theory and collective behaviour theory, 
tended to focus on personality traits, grievances, disillusionment and ideology as 
factors that influence and contribute to the emergence and development of 
social movements. These theories largely view participation in social movement 
as deviant and irrational behaviour, and social movement participants are often 




Resource mobilization theory, however, rejected these assumptions of 
the social-psychological approach to social movements. Based on their studies of 
social movements in 1960s such as civil rights, student, anti-nuclear and 
environmental movements, resource mobilization theorists offered an 
alternative approach to the study of social movements by emphasizing 
organizational, economic and political variables that actually play major roles in 
the formation and development of social movements (Flynn 2011:117-118). 
These scholars sought to explain how often marginalized, but rational, social 
movement actors mobilized effectively to achieve their desired goals of social 
change (Edwards and Gillham 2013; Freeman 1975; Gamson 1975; McCarthy 
and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Zald and McCarthy 
1987; Staggenborg 1988; and Tarrow 1994). Contrary to collective behaviour 
theory that views movement participants as irrational, resource mobilization 
theory argues that movement activists and participants are normal and rational 
decision-makers (Calhoun 1992 in Huang 2009).1  
A number of issues, however, have challenged the dominance of resource 
mobilization theory. The emphasis on materialist aspects has diverted resource 
mobilization theory from fully recognizing the importance of other factors like 
ideology and identities in the process of movement formation and development. 
The theory has therefore been criticized for its exclusive focus on centralized 
social movement organizations at the expense of decentralized social movement 
communities. It also pays no attention to the importance of collective identity 
and personal motivation in explaining the emergence and development of social 
                                                          
1There are alternative theories and approaches other than RMT to social psychological 
explanations of social movements. These include Marxist and neo-Marxist work that 
understands the origins of social movements in relation to capitalist dynamics. For recent 
Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives on social movements, see e.g., Colin Barker et al. (2013) 
Marxism and Social Movements, Leiden and Boston: Brill. It is not my intention here, however, to 
discuss these alternatives to social-psychological approaches to social movements. Instead I 
want to emphasize the suitability of RMT to the questions about why and how Salafism 




movements (Buechler 1993 in Flynn 2011:119). This focus on large scale 
analysis has led resource mobilization theory to discount micro-level processes 
of individual motivation, personal and cultural change (Jenkins 1983 in Flynn 
2011:119). Furthermore, resource mobilization theory has been criticized for its 
overemphasis on the importance of outside resources and its inability to 
adequately explain social movements with fairly limited resources and those 
that are established by small or minority groups (Jenkins 1983; Shin 1994; and 
Walsh 1981 in Eltantawy and Wiest 2011:1209).   
Notwithstanding the above theoretical shortfalls, resource mobilization 
theory has much to offer in attempts to understand Islamic activism in a 
contemporary context. This includes Islamic movements and their increasing 
engagement with information and communication technologies in recent years 
in their attempts to sustain activities after their formation phase. In particular, 
aspects of resource mobilization theory are potentially applicable to a study into 
the relationship between Salafism and internet technology. In what follows, I 
will describe some fundamentals of resource mobilization theory and their 
possible application to explaining the case of Salafism and the internet. 
 
Resources and the Formation of Social Movements 
According to traditional theories of social movements based on a social-
psychological approach, social movements form from grievances and discontent 
resulting from social and political change. By contrast, resource mobilization 
theory considers that it is not sufficient to turn to grievances to explain how 
social movements form and develop. While grievances are necessary for the rise 
of movements, they are secondary because they are “relatively constant, 
deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions” 
(Jenkins 1983:530). Resource mobilization theory’s central contention is that 




So, resource mobilization theorists argue for intermediary variables that 
significantly influence the personal discontent such that it is organized into 
collective action. For this purpose, they turn to organizational factors and 
infrastructures for the explanation of the emergence and development of social 
movements (Walsh 1981:2). These organizational factors and infrastructures 
include resources that are available to a social movement. Basically, resource 
mobilization theory holds that resources are critical for social movements. The 
availability of resources, especially cadres and organizing facilities, is the major 
factor in the formation of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973 and 1977 
in Jenkins 1983). Resources may vary among social movements in terms of size 
and type, but the availability of applicable resources and the ability of the 
movement actors to utilize them effectively determine the formation and 
development of their movement. Through resource mobilization theory, 
scholars attempt to explain the rise and development of social movements, 
including their success and failure, by emphasizing the importance of resource 
availability. They explain how social movements mobilize resources, internal or 
external, to achieve their goals (Jenkins 1983).     
Therefore, resource mobilization theorists argue that social movements 
form because of “the long-term changes in group resources, organization, and 
opportunities for collective action” (Flynn 2011:114; Jenkins 1983:531). This 
claim has received strong support from studies of public interest movements 
such as environmental, anti-nuclear, consumer-safety and civil rights 
movements. The majority of these movements were formed by public-minded 
and energetic entrepreneurs, rather than those motivated by personal 
grievances and discontent (Jenkins 1983; Flynn 2011).   
 




Furthermore, resource mobilization theory is concerned with the action of social 
actors after their movement has been established. When a social movement 
organization is formed, its actors and architects adopt a variety of strategies 
about structure and forms of collective action in an attempt to sustain their 
movement and achieve their goals. From the perspective of resource 
mobilization theory, this phase primarily involves mobilization. Mobilization is 
“a process by which a group secures collective control over the resources 
needed for collective actions” (Jenkins 1983:532). It refers to “a process by 
which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active 
participant in public life” (Tilly 1978:69 in Huang 2009:94). In this process, 
social movement groups examine the resources they have access to and control 
prior to mobilization efforts, determine their strategies to use these resources, 
gain new resources and direct them towards social change, and look at the 
extent to which potential participants can increase the pool of resources (Flynn 
2011; Jenkins 1983).  
Mobilization is aimed at persuading people to support and join a social 
movement utilizing material and non-material means. To achieve this, social 
movement actors are involved in undertaking two tasks: consensus mobilization 
and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization refers to a process through 
which a social movement attempts to spread its beliefs and gain support for its 
cause and goals (Klandermans 1984 in Huang 2009:94).  In this process, using 
resources available to them, the movement actors attempt to manage the 
promotional strategies, deal with opposition, and form collective goods. 
In addition, social movement actors are engaged in action mobilization. 
This refers to a process by which social actors and architects solicit active 
participation. Using the available resources, they develop strategies to motivate 
others to join their movement, make them see the benefits of participation and 




A major issue in this mobilization process is the movement actors’ 
decisions about “mobilizing technologies”, which is defined as “sets of 
knowledge about ways of accumulating the resources necessary for  production 
technologies”, which refer to “sets of knowledge about ways of achieving goals, 
such as lobbying, demonstrations, strikes or attending a public hearing” (Oliver 
and Marwell 1992:255). Mobilizing technologies here include sets of tools, 
techniques, crafts and methods of organization chosen and utilized in the 
mobilization efforts of turning bystanders (individuals who watch from the 
sidelines) into adherents (those who share a social movement’s set of 
preferences for social change), and ultimately into constituents (individuals who 
contribute resources to help a movement to mobilize) (Edwards and Gillham 
2013; Edwards 2007 and 2011).  
 
Resource Inequality and Resource Typology 
In spite of the importance of resources for the initiation and continuation of 
social movements, resources are varied within and among social movements. 
Accordingly, resource mobilization theory argues that resource inequality exists 
within and among social movements. Access and control of resources vary 
among the proponents of a social movement as well as from one social 
movement to another. Not all social movements have access to the same types 
and size of resources. The same is true for various groups within a given social 
movement (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:118).  
This resource inequality is linked, first, to spatial variation of resource 
distribution. Resources crucial to social movements tend to be concentrated in 
core areas and to be scarce in peripheral ones. In the context of a state, 
movements tend to emerge and develop in urban and metropolitan areas rather 
than in rural ones because a wide range of resources salient to the movement  




latter ones (MacCarthy et al. 1988 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:119). A 
similar case is found among nations. Movements in wealthy industrial 
democratic countries develop at a faster rate than those in developing 
authoritarian countries (Smith and Wiest 2003 in Edwards and MacCarthy 
2004:119).   
In addition, resource disparity within and among social movements has 
to do with varied ability of social movements to meet specific criteria set by 
resource redistributors. As resource redistributors, states provide resources 
such as monetary resources and technical assistance to social movement 
organizations or groups that meet specific terms and agree to operate within 
government guidelines (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:121). States generally 
determine to what extent they redistribute resources to social movements 
according to their policy and national interests. The US government, for 
example, redistributes quite extensive resources to environmental activists, but 
provides virtually nothing to peace activists and other groups that wish to 
influence US foreign policy (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:122). A similar 
dynamic operates with resource redistribution by organizations. Philanthropic 
foundations provide funds and legitimacy for movements that meet standards of 
organizational structure and social change purpose set by the foundations. 
Religious organizations are more likely to redistribute financial, moral and 
human resources to the movements for economic and social justice and anti-war 
activists (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:123). As a result, social movement 
actors who are able and, more importantly, willing to meet the criteria set by 
resource redistributors are more likely to have more opportunities to apply and 
be given grants and other necessary resources.             
Such differences in turn exert substantial impact on movement variations 
in terms of type and size of resources within and among social movements. In 




Resource-rich movements and resource-poor ones. Within a social movement, 
groups or factions can have different control and access to resources, creating a 
division between well-resourced and less well-resourced groups.       
The notion of resource inequality within social movements and among 
them requires an understanding of what resources may commonly be accessible 
to social movement actors. In spite of its importance in the analysis of social 
movements, the concept of resources remained poorly defined in the early 
1980s. Gamson, et al. (1982 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:125) viewed the 
concept of resources as “one of the most primitive and unspecified terms in the 
theoretical vocabulary of social movement analysts”. Even in the mid-1990s 
Cress and Snow (1996:1090 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:125) still believed 
that “little progress had been made in explicating resources conceptually or 
anchoring them empirically”. In response to this, Edwards and MacCarthy 
(2004), Edwards (2007), and Edwards and Gillham (2013) attempted to 
explicate resources more systematically and comprehensively drawing upon 
social movement scholarship by developing a typology of social movement 
resources. For this reason, in what follows, I will describe five types of social 
movement resources drawing upon their typology of resources: moral, cultural, 
social-organizational, human, and material resources.  
 
Moral Resources 
Moral resources refer to a type of resource that originates from outside of a 
social movement and is given by an external source recognized to possess them. 
These include legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, integrity and 
celebrity (Snow 1979; Cress and Snow 1996 in Edwards and McCarthy 2004). 
Social movements that closely meet the mainstream or institutionalized 
expectations gain more moral legitimacy resources than those that fit these 




public attention, increase media coverage and attract resource providers. 
Similarly, the receipt of awards or certification from credible bodies (like the 
Nobel Peace Prize) by movement activists provides a social movement with 
more support, integrity and legitimacy. However, because moral resources are 
derived from outside of a movement, outsiders who bestow these resources can 
also withdraw them from the movements such as through public acts of 
renunciation or backstage by spreading word informally to interested parties. 
Hence, in spite of their importance for mobilization purposes, moral resources 
are less accessible and proprietary than other types of resources (Edwards and 




This type of resource refers to artefacts and cultural products including 
conceptual tools, specialized knowledge and strategic know-how about how to 
carry out specific tasks like running a meeting, producing a protest event, 
establishing an organization, accessing new resources and utilizing new media. 
Different from moral resources, cultural resources are more widely available, 
accessible and independent from favourable judgments of those outside a 
movement. These cultural resources are important in that they help movements 
sustain their continuity and increase their capacity for collective action 




Human resources are resources that are inherent in individuals who typically 
have control over the use of these resources. Through participation, this type of 




resource types. These include resources like experience, skills, expertise, labour 
and leadership. The use-value of these resources depends on any social 
movement’s needs and particular situation. For example, the expertise of a 
prominent scientist or the participation of a celebrated social figure has little 
more to offer than a fresh information technology graduate when a social 
movement needs to fix the problems with its website or a high-school intern 
when the movement needs to distribute fliers (Edwards and McCarthy 2004: 
127-128; Edwards 2007:3904; Edwards and Gillham 2013:1099). By contrast, 
an environmental movement could make greater use of a prominent scientist to 
give authority to its cause. 
 
Material Resources 
This type of resource refers to financial and physical capital such as money, 
office space, equipment, property and supplies. Material resources gain the most 
attention because they are generally more proprietary and tangible than any 
other resource types. Perhaps, money is considered the most important resource 
because it can be utilized in a variety of ways to meet the movement’s needs and 
purposes (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:128; Edwards 2007:3904-3905; 
Edwards and Gillham 2013:1099).  
 
Social-Organizational Resources 
This resource type generally refers to three forms of resources: infrastructure, 
social networks and organizations. Organizational infrastructures are public 
goods that social movements need to facilitate the smooth functioning of 
everyday activities including the internet (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:127; 
Edwards 2007:3904; Edwards and Gillham 2013:1099). The resource form of 
social networks and organizations indicates the ability of a social movement to 




global societies. Access to these resources can vary among social movements 
indicating the existing inequalities among movements and groups in their ability 
to garner and utilize important resources for mobilization. Social movement 
organizations often form coalitions with other movements to overcome 
problems with resource insufficiency.   
 
Resource Mobilization Theory and the Case of Salafism and Internet 
It should be stated here that this study is not about the emergence or formation 
of the Salafi movement. Rather, it is concerned with how different Salafi factions 
have mobilized after their movement formed. The analysis of this issue, I argue, 
will benefit from resource mobilization theory’s approach to the study of tasks 
of mobilization like the ones undertaken by Salafi actors. Drawing on this theory, 
this study examines actions taken by Salafi factions to mobilize available 
resources that involve embracing internet technology as a new important 
resource in their mobilization efforts to advance their agenda and pursue their 
goals of creating ‘true Muslims’ according to their perception of ‘true Islam’ 
based on the Salafi ideology. It analyses the Salafi internet use to uncover the 
significance of the internet for Salafism, asking why the Salafi factions embraced 
the internet as a mobilizing technology and how they actually employed the 
adopted internet. In what follows, I briefly describe the application of the 
fundamentals or insights from resource mobilization theory to the case of 
Salafism and its internet use to show that the theory can shed important light on 
intra-Islamic movement dynamics and how these influence the significance of 
the internet they embrace.  
 The case of Salafism and its internet use, the focus of this study, can be 
fruitfully examined particularly through the above notions of resource inequality 
and mobilization process in order to adequately deal with the issue of the 




resource mobilization theory fundamental of resource inequality, I examine the 
state of resources within Salafism to uncover resource variations and limitations 
among the Salafi proponents that result in fragmentation that divides them into 
well-resourced and poorly resourced groups.  
Then, drawing on the concept of the mobilization process, I explain that 
resource inequality among Islamic movements in Indonesia encouraged the 
Salafi factions to mobilize new resources for the continuation and development 
of their movement. Realizing their lack of resources compared to other 
established Islamic groups and movements in Indonesia, the Salafi factions were 
motivated to overcome their lack of resources. They were involved in the 
process of mobilization in that they attempted to gain new resources, secure 
control over them, adopt various strategies of using them, and direct them 
towards social change goals. In this effort, they found the internet available and 
acceptable as a   new, important resource for mobilization purposes and used it 
as a coping strategy to deal with their lack of resources, making the new medium 
one of the Salafists’ mobilizing technologies. Here, resource mobilization theory 
basically helps better understand how Salafi factions are able to cope with 
prevailing patterns of resource inequality and limitation in their attempts to 
pursue social change goals.   
 Next, I show that resource variation also exists within Salafism in that 
Salafi factions have different access to resources and this intra-Salafi resource 
fragmentation influences the significance of the adopted internet for the Salafi 
movement. The intra-Salafi resource variation influences the extent to which 
Salafi factions mobilize the adopted internet as a new resource. The well-
resourced Salafi faction employed the internet less than the less well-resourced 
ones. Perhaps, on the one hand, a feeling of self-sufficiency within the well-
resourced group has caused its low usage of the internet. On the other hand, 




mobilize the internet more as a new, important resource, as a coping strategy to 
overcome their lack of resources. Although all Salafi factions took the same 
decision to adopt the internet and developed the same religious legitimacy of the 
internet as an acceptable resource, they differed in their actual mobilization of 
the internet due to their different access to, and control of, offline resources. As a 
consequence, this in turn has created varied, not uniform, significance of the 




Sources of Information  
This study uses a qualitative case study method, which is a useful tool for 
developing a deep understanding about a particular case, its features and its 
impacts (Stake 2005). The richness of data gathered through this method was 
required to explain the relationship between the internet and Salafism in 
Indonesia. Information required for this study was obtained through online 
investigation that involved crawling websites (Garrido and Halavais 2003) for 
samples of Indonesian Salafi websites using search engines, tracing hyperlinks 
from each website to create a snowballed sample, and collecting materials from 
the selected Salafi websites for themes, topics and tones related to the research 
questions. This was used particularly to gather data related to the question of 
how the Salafi factions actually utilize the internet as a resource for mobilization 
process.  
The websites used in this study were collected through the top search 
engine Google, which was voted “Most Outstanding Search Engine” and ranked 
as the preferred search engine by www.searchenginewatch.com (Castle and Lee 
2008:110-111). As this study focuses on the Salafi movement in Indonesia, 




to generate the sample of Salafi websites for the purposes of this study. Using 
these search terms, over 4 million results were yielded by the Google search 
engine. Another search engine, Yahoo, and a web information and traffic 
website, Alexa, were also used to see whether there was a significant difference 
in the results yielded by these search engines and the web information website. 
The result showed that recorded Salafi websites were relatively the same among 
these search engines and the web information website.  
Due to a large number of records generated by using the terms “Salafi 
Indonesia” and “Salafy Indonesia”, only the first 200 websites were selected for 
examination. Websites were selected for inclusion in this study if they associated 
themselves with Salafism, were written in the Indonesian language, and were (to 
the best of my ability to determine) administered by Indonesians, either living in 
Indonesia or abroad, who support and promote Salafism. Due to its loose 
organizational structure, rather than being unified in terms of website 
representation, the Salafi movement in Indonesia, just as in other countries, is 
represented by a variety of web presence; it is a movement with many websites. 
During this selection, I found a Salafi start page (salafi.ws) very useful because it 
provided a directory of Indonesian Salafi websites and their links with local and 
global Salafi websites. Based on this, I developed a list of Salafi websites for 
observation. Overall, 60 websites met the requirements and were examined for 
content and structure.  Then, I conducted an online investigation of these 
websites and collected data by archiving web contents and features for five 
months. In total, around 1700 relevant postings and articles were collected and 
archived from the selected websites.2  
In addition, this study is based on in-depth interviews with the 
proponents of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. These interviews were aimed 
                                                          
2Given the nature of websites, it cannot be guaranteed that the websites selected for this study 
remain active now; some might have closed or become inactive since the data collection for this 




at investigating why Salafists are engaging with the internet and, more 
specifically, answering questions about the Salafi discourse of the internet that 
justify their uses of the internet, an important issue which was left unanswered 
by online investigation of Salafi websites.  
I attempted to interview Salafi leaders or senior individuals, who were 
also recognized as supervisors of Indonesian Salafi websites, from three Salafi 
factions who were identified from the selected Salafi websites. Interviewing 
these leaders was necessary for they were the representative voices of Salafism 
in Indonesia. I also interviewed administrators of the Salafi websites as I wanted 
to gain views from ordinary Salafists who are professionally committed to the 
use of technology so that the data collected were diverse and reliable in nature. 
Interviews were successfully conducted with Salafi leaders and administrators 
from two Salafi factions (Yemenists and Harakists), but not so with the third 
group (Violent Jihadists) due to the closed nature of their organization. In total, 
personal interviews were conducted with 35 leading Salafi figures and web 
administrators.  
The interviews were conducted in cities considered to be the centres of 
Salafi dissemination in Indonesia or where the presence of the Salafi movement 
with strong engagement with the internet could be identified. To maintain 
diversity of participants and gain representative views, I took the geographical 
division between Java and outer Java into consideration. So, the interviews took 
place in a number of cities in Java (Jakarta; Bogor, Bekasi, and Bandung in West 
Java; Yogyakarta; Salatiga, Solo, and Sleman in Central Java; Gresik and Jember in 
East Java) along with Balikpapan and Bontang in East Kalimantan; and Makassar 
in South Sulawesi.  
The cities were selected because they were identified as having a greater 
Salafi presence than other cities or rural areas. Cities, rather than rural areas, 




has more access to financial and human resources to utilize the internet in cities. 
An average of two interviews with two or four respondents was conducted in 
each city.  
Most of these interviews took place in the Salafi learning centres, while a   
few occurred in the interviewees’ houses or public places. Interviews averaged 
about one hour in length. In most cases, a single individual participated in a 
single interview while in some interviews two or three participants were 
interviewed on a single occasion. 
The participants in this study could be considered to be in a young and 
productive period of their lives. They ranged in age from 27 to 41, with those in 
their 30s constituting the majority or 57% of the total respondents. The 
interviewees come from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The highest proportion 
of the participants (38%) was Javanese. Others were identified as Sundanese 
(seven participants), Makassarese (six participants), Betawi, Minang and Bugis 
(one participant for each). No female Salafists were interviewed for this study. 
This is because, according to the Salafi teachings, women do not participate in 
public life, hold strategic positions in the Salafi movement, meet a man, or go out 
without a religiously-endorsed guardian (mahram).   
Analysis 
The interviews were transcribed and subjected to a grounded and textual 
analysis for qualitative evaluation (Lindlof and Taylor 2002; Berger 2000). In 
transcribing the interviews, I have reproduced the original language in 
Indonesian as closely as possible to the spoken words.  
Analysis involved developing categories and themes to which the 
collected data were coded in accordance with research questions. Relevant 
collected data in the form of web articles, postings and interviews transcripts 
were analysed for topic, tone of arguments, and type of response. Units of 




involved textual analysis of the collected data to uncover the agency of Salafists 
in the relationship between religion and the internet technology, and the Salafi 
discourses of the internet.  In this study, text comprises the Salafi websites--in 
the form of web articles and postings--and interview transcripts.   
The analysis involved the first step of initial reading or a “long 
preliminary soak” (Hall 1975; Hall 1975 in Fursich 2009) of the collected data to 
develop a general sense of the web contents and interview transcripts. The next 
step was to develop categories of the Salafi use and narratives of the internet to 
answer the research questions.  Then, I reread the data and placed them into one 
of the defined categories. When a posting or interview transcript reflected two 
or more categories, I placed it into a category based on its most appropriate 
content. 
 These analytical stages used the original web contents and interview 
transcripts in Indonesian. When quotations from the interviews and web 
contents are presented in this thesis, they have been translated into 
grammatically correct English. To maintain anonymity, the names of all 




This study is structured as follows. After this Introduction, Chapter Two 
introduces Salafism by describing its shared doctrines, goals, emergence and 
development in Indonesia. It argues that intra-movement contention divides the 
proponents of the Salafi movement in Indonesia into three factions, which 
provides the foundation for understanding the motivations for different Salafi 




The next two chapters examine the question why Salafists embraced the 
internet. Chapter Three highlights limitations and variations in resources 
available to Salafi factions and how they attempted to overcome this. This state 
of Salafi resources created intra-Salafi resource inequality dividing the 
proponents of Salafism into well-resourced and poorly-resourced groups. It 
argues that lack of resources has motivated Salafi factions to embrace the 
internet as a new, important resource for collective action.  
Chapter Four looks at how Salafi factions defined and interpreted the 
internet as a new adopted resource in a communal discourse inspired and 
supported with references to religious texts. It suggests that Salafi factions 
legitimised and heralded the internet as a new resource of collective action 
through narratives informed and guided by Islamic texts and Salafi world views. 
Together these chapters argue that Salafi factions were encouraged by the same 
motive of overcoming the lack of resources and the shared narratives of the 
internet in their decision to embrace this new mode of communication 
technology as a new, important resource for mobilization purposes. 
The later chapters of this study analyse how the Salafi factions with 
different access to resources actually mobilized the adopted internet as a new 
resource for collective action. For this purpose, certain types of internet use by 
the Salafi factions were identified, enabling the development of a typology of 
internet mobilization salient to the Salafi movement. Chapter Five analyses a 
strategy adopted by Salafi factions with varied access to resources to mobilize 
their websites, as instrumental resources for constructing and promoting the 
ideology of Salafism. This ideology includes the view of Salaf supremacy as a 
perfect model of understanding and practicing Islam, and other common Salafi 
doctrines. It is argued that although all Salafi factions have adopted the internet 
as a new resource for constructing the ideology of Salafism, they did not actually 




factions (Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists) tended to mobilize the internet to 
construct the ideology of Salafism more actively than the relatively resource-rich 
one (Haraki Salafists).       
Chapter Six examines how the Salafi factions in Indonesia have mobilized 
their websites as resources for setting boundaries in an attempt to assert the 
right to sacred authority and guardianship of ‘pure Islam’. It shows that poorly-
resourced Salafi factions, as represented by Yemeni Salafists, mobilized the 
internet as an instrumental resource for setting boundaries more actively than 
the well-resourced Haraki Salafi faction.  
Chapter Seven analyses the Salafi strategy of internet use for building 
networks through link creation. It presents the typology of links created by the 
Salafi factions in Indonesia and explores factors that might have influenced the 
linking practices among the Salafi factions. The chapter suggests that the 
resource-poor Salafi faction (Yemeni Salafists) mobilized the internet to create 
more links than the resource-rich one (Haraki Salafists).  
Chapter Eight looks at the last identified strategy of Salafi factions to use 
the internet adoption as a coping strategy to deal with the lack of resources as 
manifested in their mobilization of the web for responding to current issues. It 
shows that the relatively less well-resourced Salafi factions (Yemeni Salafists 
and Jihadi Salafists) employed their websites more actively to respond to 
current issues than the well-resource one (Haraki Salafists).  
Together these chapters argue that Salafi factions’ actual use of the 
internet varies due to each group’s differential access to offline resources. Salafi 
factions with limited access to resources were engaged more actively in 
mobilizing the internet as a new important resource for achieving their 
movement’s purposes and interests than the Salafi factions with a good access to 
resources. The presence of the internet was relatively minimal in the actual 




opportunities for constructing ideology, setting boundaries, establishing 
networks, and responding to current issues. By contrast, the internet has played 
a significant role in providing the less well-resourced groups with a platform 
where they were able to articulate their ideology, set boundaries, build linkage, 
and respond to current issues to a wider audience.  
Lastly, Chapter Nine, the conclusion to this thesis, returns to the 
assessment of the nature and extent of the internet significance for Islamic 
activism with special reference to Salafism in Indonesia. It lends support to the 
main argument that the significance of the internet for Salafism was not uniform, 
but rather differentiated due to intra-Salafi factionalism and differential access 
to resources. Actual mobilization of the internet among the Salafi factions was 
closely related to the offline contexts where it operated, namely the state of the 
groups’ resources. The internet might have partially influenced and facilitated 
the Salafi movement in the contemporary Muslim world. Nevertheless, the rise 
and development of Salafism can be traced in cyberspace. The different ways the 
Salafi factions have used the internet have intensified national and global 
attention to the cause and ideas of Salafism. Thus, the emergence and 
development of Salafism cannot be fully understood without reference to this 
new media technology. Regardless of its varied significance, the internet cannot 
be ignored in any attempts to understand the contemporary development of the 







Salafism in Indonesia: Spread, but Fragmented 
 
 
Salafism is one of the prominent Islamic movements in contemporary 
Indonesia that (re)-emerged after the fall of the authoritarian rule of Suharto 
and his New Order regime in 1998. Its origin and expansion are linked to 
global Salafi da`wah (calling or propagation) that originated from Saudi 
Arabia and then spread worldwide in both Muslim countries in Africa and 
Asia, and non-Muslims countries in Europe, North America and Australia. 
This chapter examines the political opportunity structures that gave rise to 
Salafism in Indonesia and the social basis of its proponents. More 
importantly, it identifies fragmentation within the Salafi movement in 
Indonesia, which characterizes its contemporary development, as a 
foundation to understand how and why different Salafi factions embraced the 
internet.  
Salafism as a Global Islamic Movement 
Salafism (Arabic: al-Salafiyyah) is a global Islamic movement which aims to 
implement the ‘pure’ teachings of Islam as prescribed in the Qur’an and the 
Prophet Muhammad’s tradition (Sunnah) according to the understanding and 
practice of al-Salaf al-Ṣālih (the Pious Predecessors) by claiming to reject any 
external influences and human involvement in the interpretation of religious 
texts.1  To achieve this, it calls for a strict following in the footsteps of the 
                                                          
 
1
Contemporary Salafism should not be confused with Islamic modernism in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries pioneered and associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), 
Muhammad Abduh (d.1905) and Rashid Ridha (d. 1935), which was also referred as 
‘Salafiyyah’. For further discussion, see Lauzière (2010). For an excellent scholarly work that 
brings together scholars of different disciplines and approaches to global Salafism, see  Roel 




Salaf as the best reference and model for understanding and practicing Islam 
in modern life.  
The proponents of Salafism identify themselves as, and are proud to 
be, “Salafists” (Arabic: al-Salafiyyun), the followers of al-Salaf al-Ṣālih.  For 
them, the term “Salaf” or “al-Salaf al-Ṣālih” refers to the first three Muslim 
generations in early Islam, namely the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions 
(Aṣhāb al-Nabiy), the Followers of the Prophet (al-Tābi’īn), and the Followers 
of the Followers of the Prophet (Atbā`u al-Tābi`īn). These three generations 
were considered to be the purest Muslims as they were directly guided by the 
Prophet Muhammad. This self-ascription is based on the belief that their 
understanding and practice of Islam is in complete accord with the method of 
the Salaf (manhaj al-salaf).  `Abd al-`Azīz ibn Bāz, one of the main authorities 
of global Salafism, said that Salafi ideology is “derived from the Qur’an, the 
Sunnah and Consensus (ijmā`) which govern the method of acquiring din 
(religion) and understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah according to the 
principles agreed upon by the righteous predecessors (salaf)” (cited in 
Duderija 2011:54). Due to this strong emphasis on the Salaf as the only 
model of understanding and practicing Islam, Salafism is referred to as a 
movement of “return to the forefathers” (Marshallsay 2004).   
The Salafists also claim to be the inheritors of the pre-modern Ahl al-
Hadīth (People of the Prophet Muhammad’s Tradition). In their view, Ahl al- 
Hadīth was the only school of thought and Muslim group that remained 
faithful to the ‘pure’ teachings of Islam as prescribed in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah and hence it was considered the saved sect (al-firqat al-manṣūrah). 
They base their claim on a hadīth (a report of the sayings and doings of 
Prophet Muhammad) in which the Prophet Muhammad was reported to have 
said that there would always be a group of his people who remain committed 
to the truth ‒a group that is identified by the Salafists as the Ahl al-Hadīth 
(Duderija 2011). By claiming to be following in the footsteps of Ahl al-




guardians of the ‘pure’ Islam in the modern period. For this reason, as Jahroni 
(2004) points out, Salafism is more than a movement to purify Islam; it is an 
ideology that is committed to fight against any ideas and practices that are 
not in accordance with written religious texts as its proponents understand 
them.    
Salafism and Wahhabism 
The origin and spread of global Salafism cannot be separated from 
Wahhabism (Wahhabiyyah), an official Islamic school of thought (madhhab) 
of Saudi Arabia. The term “salafism” is, therefore, used to refer to intellectual 
hybrids that developed from Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s and 
thereafter (Lacroix 2009:62). Though the Wahhabists in early 20th century 
had referred to themselves as Salafists, the term Salafism was not associated 
with Wahhabism until the 1970s. Through social and political processes, the 
proponents of Wahhabism co-opted the language and symbolism of Salafism 
so that in the 1970s Wahhabism and Salafism became practically identical 
and interchangeable (El-Fadl 2003:57, 74). 
The co-optation or takeover of the Salafi epithets by the Saudi-backed 
Wahhabi proponents has made some scholars conceive of Salafism as 
identical to Wahhabism in its contemporary development.  Noorhaidi Hasan 
(2007 and 2009), for example, conceptualizes Salafism “as a form of 
reconstituted Wahhabism”. This view is supported by the fact that the 
proliferation of Wahhabism in the world has been fully backed by the Saudi 
government using the banner of da`wah Salafiyyah (the propagation of 
Salafism). This use is not only because the Wahhabists turn to the Salaf as a 
perfect model, but also because it is politically convenient to adopt the term 
“Salafism” as the term “Wahhabism” has developed a pejorative connotation 
among Muslims (Hasan 2007; El-Fadl 2003; and Duderija 2007). Modern 
Salafism spread when Wahhabism as a Salafi strand was endowed with 




and regional legitimacy as well as its hegemonic interests to expand beyond 
its small and local original base in the desert of Hejaz (Hashem 2006).       
The conception that Salafism is reconstituted Wahhabism can also be 
found in the fact that the proponents of this movement are determined to 
spread the thoughts of pre-20th century authorities of Wahhabism, namely 
Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn al-Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, and 
Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb, as well as contemporary Wahhabi 
authorities such as the grand Mufti of Saudi `Abd al-Azīz ibn Bāz and 
Muhammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albani (Hasan 2007). In addition, contemporary 
Salafism shares the same methodology of the interpretation of religious texts 
and basic doctrines with Wahhabism that spread across the Muslim world 
under the banner of Salafi epithets (Duderija 2007). This blending of 
Wahhabi ideas and the belief in the supremacy of the Salaf as a perfect model 
has brought about the birth of what Abou El-Fadl calls “Salafabism”, a 
“supremacist puritanical orientation” that was made by the Saudi religious 
authorities hand in hand with political authorities “as a primary mode of 
responding to the challenge of modernity” (2003: 43).  
  
Major Authorities  
Within the global Salafi movement, the most influential authorities are the 
Middle Eastern Muslim scholars (‘ulamā`) with Saudi nationality or who are 
Saudi-educated at university level, many of whom gained PhDs in Islamic 
sciences from Saudi universities. These include Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albani (d. 
1999), `Abd al-`Azīz ibn Bāz (d. 1999), Muhammad ibn Ṣālih al-`Uthaymīn (d. 
2001), Muqbil ibn Hādi al-Wādi`i (d. 2001), Rābi’ ibn Hādi al-Madkhali (b. 
1931), Yahya’ al-Hājūri, and Ṣalih al-Fawzān. The dominance of Saudi Arabian 
or Saudi-educated religious scholars asserts the centrality of Saudi Arabia as 
the birthplace of Salafism. As the main representatives of the Salafi 




Salafi leaders and ordinary followers in the Muslim world turn for guidance 
and advice in their lives.  
  Outside the Middle East, leading personalities of Salafism in Western 
countries, such as Jamal Zarabozo and Bilal Philips (Duderija 2011), 
primarily become the mouthpiece of these Middle Eastern Salafi authorities, 
translating their messages for the Salafi followers in the West. In Indonesia, 
most of the Salafi leaders are graduates of Saudi and Yemeni universities, 
particularly Medina Islamic University, or informal Islamic religious learning 
institutions (ma`had) including Dār al-Hadīth in Dammaj.  These include Abu 
Nida, Ahmad Faiz, Yusuf Baisa, Jafar Umar Thalib, Ayip Syafrudin, Luqman 
Baabduh and Muhammad Umar Sewed (Hasan 2007 and 2009). Compared to 
locally trained Salafi leaders, these Saudi and Yemeni Eastern graduates 
commonly enjoy more authority and recognition from their followers due to 
their highly-esteemed learning in Mecca or Medina, the two holy cities of 
Islam. Yet, all the Salafi leaders and followers in Indonesia regard the Saudi 
and Yemeni Salafi authorities as the major, and, often, the only references in 
learning and preaching Salafi ideas among Indonesian Muslims.            
The Middle Eastern Salafi authorities write treatises on Salafi ideas 
exclusively in Arabic. However, this is not a major barrier for Salafi followers 
from non-Arabic speaking countries who seek to understand the messages of 
these Salafi scholars. Non-Arab Salafi leaders and sympathizers have 
attempted to translate the works of these Middle Eastern Salafi authorities 
into local languages. For this purpose, in Western countries, they have 
established publishing houses, including Tarbiyyah Publications in Toronto, 
Invitation to Islam and Al-Khilafat Publications in London, and Salafi 
Publications and Maktabah Darussalam in Birmingham. Mobilizing 
information and communication technologies, they have created websites 
such as www.salafipublications.com, www.tarbiyyahbookstore.com, 
http://sunna.com, www.salaf.com, and www.fatwa-online.com (Duderija 




the Salafi supporters, such as www.binbaz.com (on the works of `Abd al `Azīz 
ibn Bāz), www.rabee.net (on the works of Rābi ibn Hādi al-Madkhali), and 
www.ibnothaimeen.com (on the works of Muhammad ibn al-`Uthaymīn) 
(Duderija 2011). In Indonesia, to spread the Salafi messages, Salafi 
proponents published Salafi journals such as Majalah An-Nashihah in 
Makassar, Majalah Asy-Syariah in Sleman, and Majalah As-Salam in Depok. 
They also established publishing houses such as Pustaka Qaulan Sadida in 
Malang, Al-Atsary in Bogor, and Pustaka Al-Rayyan in Solo and created 
hundreds of Salafi websites such as www.salafy.or.id,  
http://www.darussalaf.com,  and http://asysyariah.com. 
 
Transnationalization of Salafism 
The transnationalization of Salafism, its spread to Muslim and non-Muslim 
countries beyond Saudi Arabia as its country of birth, has to do with the 
absence of strong counter-forces against Salafism and a crisis of religious 
authorities  within mainstream Muslim society. The leaders of the established 
Muslim institutions and Muslim civil society have lost their authority in the 
face of growing demands of contemporary Muslim society, particularly 
Muslim youth. They have failed to counter the growth of Salafism in an 
appropriate way.  In the words of Adraoui (2009:375), the spread of Salafism 
is due to the “loss of authority of counter-forces in the religious market” 
within the Muslim ummah.  
The global spread of Salafism has also been made possible by the long 
tradition of the student-scholar relationship in Muslim countries. After their 
return to their countries of origin, graduates of the Middle East universities 
or informal learning institutions, particularly in Saudi Arabia, maintain their 
networks with the religious scholars with whom they studied. In doing so, 
these graduates are committed to spreading Salafism by lecturing, 
translating, and publishing the works of their teachers. The Middle East 




exportation. The Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, for example, is 
actively involved in the global dissemination of Salafism, including in 
Western countries (Lacroix 2009:70-79).  
In addition, the financial support provided by some Middle East 
countries has accelerated the export of Salafism. Saudi Arabia has made the 
dissemination of Salafism in the Muslim world one of its main foreign policies 
in order to maintain its central position in the Muslim world as well as to 
counter the effect of the Iranian revolution on the political domination of 
Saudi family. To achieve this, Saudi Arabia, together with Kuwait, has 
provided Salafi followers around the world with considerable financial 
support through their charitable and da’wah organizations such as Al-
Haramayn Foundation and Jamiyyah Ihya al Turath (Noorhaidi 2005, 2007, 
2009; and Haykel 2009). 
Finally, communication and information technologies have opened up 
opportunities, as well as challenges, for the proponents of Salafism to 
propagate their ideas. Within the last decade, the internet has played a 
crucial role in facilitating the spread of Salafism globally. While keeping the 
old media as a means of dissemination, contemporary Salafists employ the 
internet to further propagate Salafi thoughts and maintain linkage among 
Salafi supporters. Through this, as Paz (2009:26) argues, they have 
established open universities of Salafism and created virtual communities of 
Salafi ikhwan (brothers).  
   
The Rise of Salafism in Indonesia  
In the Indonesian archipelago, the emergence of Salafism is closely connected 
with three external changes that enhanced Salafism’s opportunity to organize 
and mobilize: a post-Iranian Islamic revolution change in Saudi’s foreign 
policy, the Reformasi movement in 1998, and social changes within Muslim 





Iranian Revolution and Saudi Arabia’s Obsession  
The first notable change in the political opportunity structures for 
Salafism came with the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. The success of this 
revolution particularly posed a serious challenge to Saudi Arabia in that it 
could provide all Islamists with a model for the establishment of the ideal 
Islamic state that they had long sought, which, in turn could possibly wipe 
out the Saudi monarchy. As a response, Saudi Arabia contained the growing 
impact of the Iranian revolution by intensifying its political and religious 
influences over the Muslim world through various aid programs and the 
spread of its Wahhabism under the banner of Salafi da`wah (Noorhaidi 
2005:31).  
In Indonesia, this attempt began with the Saudi government’s support 
for DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [Indonesian Council for Islamic 
Propagation]), an Islamic missionary organization established in the 1970s 
by former leaders of Masyumi party.2 The DDII’s anti-Shiite campaign was in 
line with this Saudi government’s policy of containing the global effect of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran whose official state religion is Shi’a Islam and 
whose population was around 90% Shi’ites. As a result, it benefitted from the 
Saudi government’s generous financial support through Islamic charitable 
organizations such as Hai’at al-Ighathat al-Islamiyyat al-‘Alamiyyah 
(International Islamic Relief Organization), al-Majlis al-‘Alami li al-Masajid 
(World Council of Mosques), Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic 
Charity) and al Nadwat al-`Alamiyyat li al-Shabab (World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth) (Hasan 2007).  With this considerable financial support, DDII 
was well equipped to realize projects such as construction of mosques, 
                                                          
2
Founded in 1945, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia; Council of Indonesian 
Muslim Associations) was the largest Islamic party during Indonesia’s Liberal Democracy 
Era, which included Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyyah and Nahdhatul Ulama. It 
won the second place in the 1955 election, gaining around 20% of popular vote and 57 seats 
in parliament. Due its involvement in the PRRI rebellion against Sukarno in 1958, Masyumi 




orphanages, hospitals, madrasah (Islamic schools), distribution of free copies 
of the Qur’an and Islamic books, and training of preachers who were then 
sent to remote transmigration areas (Hakiem and Linrung 1997 in Hasan 
2007:88). 
  The DDII activities had significant impact on the increase of Islamic 
propagation among Indonesian Muslims, especially in triggering Islamic 
activism on university campuses (Noorhaidi 2005:36). These activities 
provided Saudi Arabia with opportunities to strengthen its politico-religious 
influences among Indonesian Muslims. With this aim, the Saudi government 
established LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab 
[Institute of Islamic Knowledge and Arabic Language]) in Jakarta in 1980. As 
it is directly linked with Imam Muhammad ibn Sa’ud Islamic University of 
Riyadh, the LIPIA director, a position that is normally held by an individual of 
Saudi nationality, is appointed by the university. Lecturers are recruited from 
Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries as well as from Indonesia. 
LIPIA is actively engaged in introducing Wahhabism, the official school of 
Islamic thought of Saudi Arabia, to its students through the nature of the 
syllabus as well as to wider communities through distribution of free books 
in line with politico-religious interests of the Saudi government, such as the 
works of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb, the founder of Wahhabism, to 
hundreds of Islamic educational institutions and religious organization 
(Hasan 2007:89-90).   
In addition, the Saudi government’s foreign policy of maintaining its 
political interests was intensified through scholarships provided to talented 
LIPIA students and those from wider Islamic educational institutions and 
organizations to pursue further studies of Islamic knowledge at Saudi 
universities. Around 30 LIPIA graduates receive grants each year to pursue 
further studies in Saudi Arabia, particularly at Imam Muhammad ibn Sa`ud 





These scholarships have attracted many Indonesian Muslims as the 
opportunity to study in the country of the birth of Islam constitutes a 
privilege and a source of great pride (Hasan 2007). For many centuries, 
Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia and Cairo in Egypt have been the major 
destinations for Indonesians who want to study traditional Islamic 
knowledge creating the scholar-student networks between the Malay-
Indonesia archipelago and the Middle East (Azra 2004). As a result, since the 
opening of LIPIA, the number of Indonesians students at Saudi universities 
has increased significantly from year to year and this in turn helped intensify 
the influence of Saudi and Salafi ideology among Indonesian Muslims. 
The return of such students to their country in 1980s was especially 
important to the emergence of Salafism in Indonesia. Having studied Salafi-
Wahhabi ideas, these graduates were committed to the Islamic revivalism 
calling for a return to a ‘pure’ Islam as understood and practiced by the Pious 
Ancestors. To them, the decline of the Muslim ummah (global community) 
was attributed to Muslims ‒including Indonesian Muslims‒ not 
understanding and implementing Islam in correct ways as prescribed and 
exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslim generations. These 
Saudi graduates were obsessed with the purification of Indonesian Islam 
from what they considered un-Islamic beliefs and practices that had 
contaminated the purity of Islam.  Not only did they apply Salafi ideas in their 
lives; they also attempted systematically to mobilize people to join their 
Salafi da’wah activities (Hasan 2007). 
The early 1990s witnessed the fruitful efforts of the Saudi graduates 
to spread Salafism in Indonesia. These early Salafi preachers succeeded in 
attracting followers who were mainly students of universities in Central Java 
and Yogyakarta. Their activities were seen initially at mosques located at 
universities in Yogyakarta, Solo and Semarang.  Then, after another cohort of 
Saudi graduates returned home (such as Jafar Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul 




and Muhammad Zaitun Rusmin) Salafism quickly spread to other cities in 
Java including Cirebon, Bandung and Jakarta as well in outer Java cities such 
Makassar, South Sulawesi, and Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (Noorhaidi 2005: 
44-48 ).   
In addition to leaders’ and followers’ commitment to Salafi 
propagation, the establishment of Salafi foundations played a key role in 
intensifying the spread of Salafi ideology among Indonesian Muslims, 
particularly urban youth and university students. These include Al-Majlis al- 
Turath al-Islami, Al-Sunnah, Al-Sofwah, Al Huda, Nida al-Sunnah, Lajnat al- 
Khayriyyah al-Musharakah, and Wahdah Islamiyyah. To support their 
projects, these foundations received considerable financial support mainly 
from Saudi and Kuwait charitable organizations including al-Muassassat al- 
Haramayn al-Khayriyyah (Haramayn Charity Foundation) and al-Jam’iyyat 
Ihya al-Turath al-Islami (Society for Reviving Islamic Heritage) (Hasan 
2007:91-92).     
Reformasi in 1998 
The second change in the political opportunity structure for Salafism in 
Indonesia was the Reformasi movement in 1998. Political change in 1998 
that led to the fall of Suharto and his New Order regime, which was known as 
the Reformasi movement, following his regime’s failure in overcoming Asian 
economic crisis in 1997 created a new political landscape in the form of a 
post-authoritarian state. This has provided Islamic activists with 
opportunities to (re)emerge and develop in ways that were previously 
restricted by the state. Taking benefit from the dynamics of this new socio-
political life, such Islamic activists made use of the new freedom and 
opportunities to organize and consolidate their power to pursue their 
interests and aspirations.  
 As a result, the post-Suharto regime Indonesia has witnessed the rise 
of Islamic activism by various Muslim groups with diverse ideological and 




movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Liberation Party), 
Jama`ah Tabligh (Community of Islamic Propagation) and Ikhwanul Muslimin 
Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood). Others are home-grown ones 
including Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Assembly of Indonesian Jihad 
Fighters), Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah (Communication 
Forum of the Followers of the Propthetic Tradition and Muslim Community) 
with Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troopers) as its paramilitary wing, Front Pembela 
Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front) and Laskar Jundullah (God’s Soldiers).   
 These Islamic groups enjoyed the relative absence of state control 
over civil spaces, particularly over Islam as the religion of majority. Suharto 
had viewed Islam as a principal source of inspiration and identity that could 
be mobilized by its adherents to challenge his rule. As a result, he attempted 
to control Islam by undermining its political expression in public life and 
using Islam for his political purposes (Effendy 2004). This can be seen, for 
example, in the ban on political parties whose ideology was based on Islam 
and the regulation of political parties that forced all parties with Islamic 
backgrounds to fuse under one party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the 
United Party of Development). But, this policy of containing Islam ceased 
when Suharto and his New Order regime collapsed in 1998. The state lost its 
powerful control of socio-political life and was forced to relax policies that 
had controlled civil spaces.  
It was in this context that Salafism began to (re)emerge and develop. 
It became one of the fastest-growing contemporary Islamic movements in 
post-Suharto Indonesia. Salafi identities and activities that had previously 
operated in semi-clandestine ways became more visible and public. This 
experience of the Salafists, as well as that of other Islamic groups, in the post-
authoritarian Indonesia confirms the assumption among sociologists that 
social movements are primarily found in democratic societies that permit 





Social Transformation of Muslim Society and Contradictions of Development 
 
An important change in the political opportunity structures for Salafism in 
Indonesia came about with the social transformation of Muslim society as a 
result of the contradictions of economic development. As state projects of 
mass education and economic development have expanded in most parts of 
Indonesia since Suharto’s New Order era, many young Muslim villagers had 
to move to cities or towns to pursue higher levels of education due to the 
absence of high schools, colleges and universities in many rural areas. Living 
in a new, alien environment quite different from their rural experience 
presented challenges for these young Muslims, including harsh competition 
for education and jobs. Many of these new lower middle class youth were 
educated, but found themselves constrained within lower levels of socio-
economic and political structures. These young Muslims remained on the 
margins of society though they had attained relatively high levels of 
education and employment. They found their social position was only slightly 
better than that of the mass of urban poor. Their material conditions of life 
could be quite unstable, a condition that was quite contradictory to their 
aspirations. These Muslim youth had generally no formal or extensive 
religious education since their childhood, but rather were educated in 
‘secular’ schools and universities.  
In this context, certain interpretations of Islam appeared attractive to   
these newly urbanized Muslim youth, providing them with an alternative 
framework to understand their society and place within it as well as answers 
to their grievances. In short, social transformations linked to modernization 
in contemporary Indonesia affecting a newly urbanized middle class 
provided a social base for Islamic activism, including Salafism.  
Salafism offered these new Muslim lower middle classes an 
alternative community and justified their alienation from the society that 
surrounded them through doctrines of submitting only to God and fighting all 




urbanized Muslims with a new and holy identity and pride which 
significantly changed their lives, as they claimed, from individuals who lived 
on the fringe of society to the “the saved ones” (al-ṭāifat al-nājiyat) and “the 
victorious group” (al-ṭāifat al-mansūrat) who were rewarded with a sense of 
sacred mission and identity. This case is supported by the experience of 
Muslim minority migrants in the West. For Salafists in France, for example, 
the community of Salafi brothers has replaced the secular and alien French 
nation and the Salafi way of life has supplanted secular and un-Islamic 
Western culture. Instead of integrating into the national society, through 
Salafism these alienated Muslim migrants attempt to separate themselves 
from a society they regard as sinful and establish boundaries between “us” 
and “them” as they claimed to be reborn with a new identity of “super 
Muslims” who were superior to the rest of society (Adraoui 2009:367-373). 
Moreover, Salafism was appealing to certain groups of these newly 
urbanized Muslim youth for they found it providing answers to their 
economic problems. It promised economic success by providing recruits and 
followers with economic networks among Salafi brothers. It was common for 
Salafists to establish businesses, mostly small and medium ones, to support 
each other financially. Like orthodox Jewish communities in US or Canada, 
the Salafists in Indonesia and elsewhere lived a separate life from the 
broader society setting up small businesses such as clothing and bookshops. 
Through their entrepreneurship, Salafists adopted economic values of money 
making and taking advantage of economic relations with people outside the 
Salafi movement regardless of their political and religious affiliation. This 
economic relationship was the only aspect in which the Salafists were 
allowed to maintain connection with secular societies and non-Salafi 
communities (Adrauoi 2009:374-375). Here, Salafism provided these Muslim 
youth with opportunities to live a devout life, not only for the hereafter but 




a sign that one has been saved and rewarded with wealth for joining Salafism 
as the true path.  
 
Social Basis of Salafism in Indonesia 
According to Hadiz (2014:133-135), Islamic populism in Indonesia mobilizes 
a cross-class constituency in an attempt to pursue power and to control the 
state and its resources. Such Islamic populism generally finds support among 
middle class, urban poor and petty bourgeoisie. In the 1950s, the Masyumi, 
for example, attracted support from old petty bourgeoisie based in small 
trade and manufacturing until it was banned by President Sukarno in 1960 
because some of its leaders were involved in separatist rebellions and 
because of its opposition to the left-leaning policies of Sukarno. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the ideas of former Masyumi leaders continued to attract 
members of the urban poor and educated middle class (Hadiz and Teik 
2011:471). Similarly, the proponents of radical Islamist groups in Solo, 
Central Java, and militia-type groups in other cities after the fall of the 
Suharto in 1998 came from diverse social backgrounds. Their leading figures 
were school teachers, small businessmen in textiles, and former activists of 
HMI (Islamic Students Association). None of them received formal religious 
training in pesantren. Most rank-and-file in these groups were irregularly 
employed street toughs and were not activists within existing Muslim 
organizations (Hadiz 2011:28-31).   
Salafism is no exception. Like Islamic movements in general, it is 
essentially a phenomenon of modern society in that it was born and 
developed in urban areas, usually capital cities in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi 
and Sumatra. It has attracted strong support in urban areas in an attempt to 
pursue social Islamization and social change goals. During the authoritarian 
rule of Suharto regime in the 1980s, Salafism was a semi-clandestine 




Order in 1998, it proliferated openly, broadening its appeal base and gaining 
support from a cross-class constituency comprising urban poor, middle class, 
and petty bourgeoisie.   
Thus, the constituency of Salafism comprises of a mixture of urban 
and newly or partially urbanized groups; the middle and lower middle 
classes; students and dropouts of secular schools, universities and traditional 
Islamic educational institutions.3 The leaders and intellectual vanguards of 
Salafism have their roots in modern societies. They are generally urban 
educated middle class that has played a key role in initiating and organizing 
broad-based support in an attempt to create a society of ‘true Muslims’ based 
on ‘true path’ of Salaf. They are the direct product of economic development 
and the growth of educational institutions, no matter how uncertain and 
problematic their economic circumstances may be at times.   
While the rank-and-file Salafists generally did not come from a strong 
religious educational background as noted above, these Salafi leaders had 
different elementary and secondary educational backgrounds; some went to 
secular middle and high schools, while other studied at religious ones. The 
majority, however, received formal training in religious knowledge at Islamic 
universities or traditional learning institutions in the Middle East, especially 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, or Saudi-funded Islamic colleges in Indonesia such 
as Jakarta-based LIPIA (Institute of Islamic Knowledge and Arabic Language). 
Few graduated from national, state-run Islamic universities or institutes (UIN 
[State Islamic University] and IAIN [State Institute of Islamic Studies]) which 
were long established at various capital cities in Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra 
and Sulawesi.  
The cadres of Salafism are often young (in their twenties and thirties), 
distinctly urbanized (mostly in capital cities), and well educated (university 
students and graduates), at ease using modern technology, but precariously 
employed. The majority originated from rural areas or from families that 
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were recently urbanized. Some came from families related to modernist and 
puritanical Islamic organizations, while others came from those of nominal 
Muslims with syncretic backgrounds that incorporated local customs, 
Hinduism and Buddhism or might be categorised as abangan according to 
Clifford Geertz’s typology of Javanese society (Geertz 1960). To these young, 
urbanized and educated individuals, Salafism provided concepts of a ‘true’ 
Islam, of being ‘true’ Muslims, and of social justice that provided them with 
an explanation for their relative marginality and offered a framework of 
endorsed actions and responses. 
Students were a core component of this broad social base of Salafism, 
having access to a modern, secular education and living in urban areas. 
Although some Salafi followers are high school students, the majority are 
students or graduates of secular universities often enrolled in technical fields 
or natural sciences such as engineering, physics and medicine. As noted 
above, generally they have not received formal training in religious education 
at state-run Islamic schools (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri) and universities (UIN 
and IAIN) or at traditional Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).  
Other components of cross-class alliance that gave rise to Salafism 
were found in petty urban traders and merchants based such as in textile, 
housing, and herbal medicine. A local businessman sympathetic to the Salafi 
ideas may donate a piece of land or building blocks to a particular Salafi 
madrasah, become its regular donor, and serve as its protector against 
resistance from the surrounding community (Hasan 2010:697). Salafism also 
found support among the new urban poor and middle class like lower-ranked 
officials and civil servants whose aspirations had grown because of their 
access to education and economic development.  
Fragmentation within the Salafi Movement in Indonesia 
Salafists share common doctrines such as tawhīd (belief in the One God), 




walā’ wa al-barā` (alliance and disavowal), and the danger of bid’ah (religious 
innovations). They are also broadly united by the idea of return to an 
‘authentic’ Islam based on the Salaf’s understanding and practice as the only 
solution to social, economic and political problems facing the contemporary 
global Muslim societies (ummah).4 
However, Salafism is not a monolithic, unified movement as it tends to 
fragment over internal division and contradictions in doctrine and action that 
have significantly characterized its development in Indonesia. As it has 
proliferated in various cities and regions in Indonesia, its proponents are 
facing challenges and differ in their analysis and strategies to meet such 
challenges.  
Roots of the Internal Division 
The internal divisions within the Salafi movement have to do with ambivalent 
doctrines adopted from Wahhabism. Salafi factions interpreted these 
doctrines in different ways. Certain groups radicalised the doctrines after 
having escaped the state control of the Saudi Kingdom and official religious 
establishment known as the Committee of Senior Religious Scholars (Ha`iat 
al-kibar al- ‘ulamā`).  
First, intra-movement division is rooted in Salafism’s doctrinal 
ambivalence in that the Salafists call for a strict return to the Qur’an and 
Sunnah as the only solution to issues facing contemporary Muslims, while 
they in fact adhere to the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence5 and its 
scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and Muhammad ibn `Abd al- 
Wahhāb (1703-1792). Even Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albani (d. 1999),6 one of the 
prominent authorities of contemporary Salafism, realised this contradiction 
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when he pointed out that Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb, the founder of 
Wahhabism from which modern Salafism takes sources, was not a true Salafi 
because he actually followed the Hanbali School (Meijer 2009b:9). His self-
criticism sparked controversy among the Salafi followers and has created a 
stream of Salafism that claims to be the pure form of Salafism, radicalises the 
doctrine of hizbiyyah (partisanship), and readily accuses other Salafi factions 
of breaching the Salaf way.   
The second source of the internal conflict is the doctrine of al-walā` 
wa al-barā` (alliance and disavowal). It not only regulates the relationship 
between Muslims and non-believers, but also between Salafists and non-
Salafists. Through this doctrine, the Salafists are called upon to distance 
themselves from Muslims who do not follow Salafism by showing hatred and 
enmity toward them. The doctrine has been radicalised by some Salafi 
leaders who apply it not only against outsiders but also insiders, such as 
other Salafi proponents who are regarded as having deviated from the Salaf 
system. In its extreme form, this doctrine provides an ideological basis for 
Juhayman al-Utaybi (d. 1980), who led the occupation of the Masjid al-Harām 
(Grand Mosque) in Mecca in 1979, to assert that Muslims should renounce 
the rulers including the Saudi government that makes alliances with non-
believers.  It provides the basis also for Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to declare 
the Saudi state to be ‘non-believing’ (takfīr) for its close relations with the 
West (Meijer 2009b:10).7   
Thirdly, the internal tension lies in the Salafi doctrine and practice of 
hisbah, commanding right and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi al-ma’rūf wa al-
nahy ‘an al-munkar). This doctrine is interpreted in different ways by various 
Salafi leaders. Some understand it as an instruction to apply strict moral 
codes on individuals and society, and correct what are considered religious 
deviations such as the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday 
(mawlid) and communal prayers and Qur’anic recital on certain days after 
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one’s death (tahlilan and tawassul). Others interpret it more radically by 
openly correcting rulers and even declaring them to be kafir (disbelievers) 
for their deviation from Islamic values or unwillingness to apply Islamic law.8  
In addition to doctrinal ambiguity, political issues become sources of 
intra-Salafi fragmentation. This is clearly seen in the Salafi movement’s 
encounter with politics, as is evident in the case of the Saudi government’s 
decision to allow the US to station its troops on holy soil during the Gulf War 
in 1990. A group of Salafi authorities linked to the Saudi’s official religious 
establishment issued a fatwa9 approving the kingdom’s decision as necessary 
to defend the country from the enemy’s invasion. This fatwa was certainly 
not popular among the Saudi people and sparked strong criticism from 
Muhammad al-Surūr and his politically oriented Salafi followers who accused 
those who supported the Saudi’s decision of being ignorant of contemporary 
politics and current affairs so that their fatwa was invalid. Another Salafi 
faction went further by declaring that a ruler who makes an alliance with 
Islam’s enemies is a kafir (disbeliever) and any political action to replace 
such a ruler with a true Muslim ruler was necessary, by resorting to violent 
means if necessary (Noorhaidi 2005; Hasan 2007; Wiktorowicz 2006).  
Lastly, another factor that contributes to the fragmentation of Salafism 
is interaction with local issues when Salafism goes global. Local 
circumstances clearly have contributed to the growth of Salafism. Yet, they 
also have hampered its development. Global Salafism is able to make inroads 
when local structures or nationalist movements have failed and society 
becomes individualised. However, when society still strongly embraces local 
beliefs and practices, and local socio-political institutions are successful in 
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fulfilling what communities expect, transnational Salafism is unable to take 
root (Meijer 2009b).  
When Salafism becomes more global, it becomes more diverse, 
contradictory and fragmented in its local expressions. Encounters with local 
beliefs and practices have created different currents of Salafism. In Egypt, 
Jama’a Islamiyya has mixed Salafism with the thought of Sayyid Qutb 
(Qutbism) and Muhammad al-Surūr in Saudi Arabia has blended Salafism 
with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
has created an ideology that combines political and jihadi Salafism and Arab 
nationalism. Some proponents of Salafism in India have even attempted to 
merge Salafism with Sufism, one of its main enemies (Meijer 2009b).    
 
 
Typology of Salafi Factions in Indonesia 
As highlighted above, internal division is evident within the Salafi movement 
in Indonesia. However, it is not easy to make clear cut distinctions between 
the Salafi factions because they overlap, share the same creed, practice the 
same strict rituals, and adopt the same dress code. In addition, the Salafists 
deny the existence of division or conflict within Salafism in Indonesia, and 
instead claim that they are united in terms of thought and practice. They even 
refuse to identify Salafism as a movement (harakah), a term which is often 
used by their detractors and analysts. To them, labelling Salafism as a 
movement or organization with structures or formal leadership is 
contradictory with their doctrine of anti-hizbiyyah (partisanship). They 
prefer to refer to Salafism simply as a manhaj, which is understood as a true 
path and correct way of understanding and practicing Islam for Muslims 
according to the Salaf. 
Nevertheless, a close examination of, for example, its presence on the 
internet, reveals that factionalism is palpable within the Salafi movement in 




A faction is “an identifiable subgroup within a movement that is opposed to 
other movement subgroups” (Zald and McCarthy in Benford 1993:681).  A 
Salafi faction, then, is an identifiable subgroup within the Salafi movement 
that is opposed to other movement subgroups.  
In identifying this factionalism, I took into consideration the local 
nature of Salafi development in Indonesia, rather than simply following 
Wiktorowicz’s often-quoted typology of Middle Eastern Salafism 
(Wiktorowicz 2006), in which he classifies the Salafists into three factions: 
purists, politicos and jihadis. However, I do not think Wiktorowicz’s typology 
is an adequate classification for the contemporary Salafi movement, in 
particular his third category: jihadi Salafists. It assumes that only the first 
faction (purists) is concerned with the purity of Islam and only the third 
category (jihadis) is engaged in jihād. All Salafists, in fact, share the belief in 
the necessity for purification of Islam, particularly the main doctrine of 
tawhīd from un-Islamic elements, and in the religious obligation of jihād, 
though they may differ in the interpretation of what jihād is and in the 
practice of how and when jihād should be implemented.  
Likewise, I do not simply follow Hasan’s typology that classifies 
Indonesian Salafi proponents into two factions: “Sururis” who are regarded 
to be deviant faction as they are influenced by the ideas of Muhammad al-
Surūr and “Non-Sururis” who claim to be consistent with the ‘authentic’ 
nature of apolitical Salafism (Hasan 2007). In his other works, Hasan (2009 
and 2010) uses different labels to refer these factions: “Yemeni Salafi” and 
“Haraki Salafi” respectively. The Haraki label is also used to designate Yemeni 
Salafists’ rivals in general who are associated with political activism.  
However, I think Hasan’ typology is incomplete because it fails to include the 
radical-violent stream of Salafism, which is evident in contemporary Islamic 
activism in Indonesia.        
Therefore, I identify three factions that are involved in the internal 




Salafists, and Violent Jihadi Salafists. The first faction represents mainstream 
Salafism, while the latter two factions are considered to be dissident Salafi 
factions with Violent Jihadists as the smallest, but most infamous faction.  
This factionalism within the Salafi movement in Indonesia became 
publicly known when debate emerged regarding the influence of Sururiyyah 
incited by Jafar Umar Thalib10, one of the most famous Salafi personalities. 
Thalib accused Abu Nida, a pioneering figure of Salafi propagation, and his 
colleagues of being followers and sympathisers of Muhammad al-Surūr, the 
key figure in a politically-inclined stream of Salafism, who criticised the Saudi 
government and Saudi official religious institutions following their approval 
of the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom from 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1990 (Hasan 2010). This implies that Thalib 
considered Abu Nida and his cohort to have deviated from the true Salafi 
system, an accusation that was certainly rejected by Abu Nida and his 
supporters. Undoubtedly, this Sururiyyah issue exposed the open division 
within the Salafi movement in Indonesia.      
 
Yemeni Salafists 
This Salafi faction is derogatorily labelled as “Yemeni Salafists” (Salafi 
Yamani) by its detractors because of its strong student-scholar network and 
ideological connection with Salafism in Yemen. Most leading figures and 
preachers (dā’i; plural: du’at) of this faction pursued Salafi knowledge at the 
Salafi learning institutions in Yemen, primarily the Salafi madrasa of Dar al-
Hadīth in Dammaj, or follow the ideas of Salafi authorities in Yemen. Its most 
prominent leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, studied with Muqbil al-Wādi’i,11 a Salafi 
authority who held the honorific title “Muhaddith al-Yaman” (the expert in 
the prophetic tradition in Yemen), in the early 1990s (Hasan 2002:153). 
Thalib also sent his students to these Salafi madrasa to study Islamic 
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knowledge with Yemeni Salafi authorities including al-Wādi’i and his 
prominent students, Abū ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Hājūri and Abū Hasan ‘Ali `Abd 
al-Hamīd (Hasan 2010:695). After their return, they maintained their 
relationship with their former Yemeni teacher-mentors by spreading their 
ideas, asking for fatwa when they had complex issues at home, and inviting 
them to give lectures in Indonesia. This labelling, in fact, is not entirely 
appropriate because this Salafi faction also turn for reference to other Salafi 
authorities from other Middle Eastern countries such as Naṣir al-Dīn al- 
Albani from Syria, and  Zayd Muhammad al-Madkhali, Rābi al-Madkhali, ‘Abd 
al-Razzāq al ‘Abbād, and Muhammad Aman al-Jami from Saudi Arabia (Hasan 
2010:695; Hasan 2009:177).  Despite this, the term ‘Yemeni Salafists’ is used 
in this dissertation to characterise those mainstream Salafists, whose 
practice is substantially influenced by such Yemeni associations. 
Like the proponents of Salafism in general, the Yemeni Salafists are 
minority compared to traditional Muslim majority in Indonesia. The actual 
number of the Yemeni Salafists cannot be accurately estimated because there 
is no system of registered membership and they are not easy to penetrate for 
they live in enclave and tight-knit communities in urban areas and city 
outskirts in Java, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Sumatra. However, their presence 
is visible and their growth is evident around campus mosques of ‘secular’ 
universities or in religious lectures held in local mosques. They can be 
recognized from their outward appearance: men wear Saudi or 
Pakistani/Afghan dress style with calve-length trousers and white or black 
cap, grow beards and shave their moustaches, while women wear long and 
loose jalabiyya, normally black or dark brown, that covers the whole body, 
with a long headscarf and cadar (face veil; burqa).  
The emergence of Yemeni Salafists was closely connected with 
Jam’aah Ihya’ al-Sunnah (Community for Reviving the Prophetic Tradition), a 
Salafi community and madrasa, which was established and led by Ja’far Umar 




studies from this madrasa as well as those who had returned from studies at 
Salafi madrasa in Yemen were encouraged by Thalib to organize Salafi 
propagation in various urban and rural areas in Indonesia (Hasan 2010:696). 
This new generation of Salafi preachers founded their own Salafi madrasa or 
pesantren to support their Salafi da’wah activities. Yemeni Salafi madrasa and 
pesantren flourished in many cities including Bekasi, Cirebon, Solo, 
Yogyakarta, Lombok, Makassar, Balikpapan, and Pekanbaru. As a result, this 
created a strong network of Ihya’ al-Sunnah and Yemeni Salafists who were 
connected with Jafar Umar Thalib as the main mentor. In its development, 
this network played a very important role in the proliferation of Yemeni 
Salafism in many cities in Indonesia (Hasan 2005 and 2010).      
However, the central role of Ja’far Umar Thalib began to diminish 
when he decided to bring his followers in the Ihya al-Sunnah network around 
Indonesia to wage armed jihād in Maluku (Moluccas), the eastern islands of 
Indonesia, supporting Muslims against Christians in communal conflict that 
broke out from 1999 until 2000.12 In January 2000, he established FKAWJ 
(Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah; Communication Forum of 
the Followers of Prophet’s Tradition and Community) with Laskar Jihad as its 
paramilitary wing.13 He then mobilised thousands of his Salafi followers and 
sympathisers and trained them as jihād volunteers without approval from 
President Abdurrahman Wahid, a legitimate ruler whose permission should 
be sought before jihad can be conducted according to the Salafi doctrine 
(Hasan 2009).   
Thalib’s decisions not only attracted criticism from other Salafi 
factions, who accused him of conducting political activism, an issue that he 
previously condemned, but also incited tensions with his fellow Yemeni 
Salafists. His deputies and high-ranked officers of the FKWAJ and Laskar 
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Jihad began to doubt Thalib’s consistency in following the Salafi teachings 
and question the sincerity of his intention in mobilising his Salafi followers to 
fight jihād in Maluku. As part of his strategy he met members of the 
Indonesian political and military elite and even appeared on television, a 
worldly distraction that is forbidden according to the Salafi doctrine. These 
political manoeuvres prompted them to withdraw their support for Thalib’s 
jihād in Maluku and, in a national meeting in Makassar, they sent a petition to 
him to disband the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad. They believed that Thalib had 
involved them in political practices, which contradicts the Salafi doctrine, and 
they claimed to be victims of his political manipulation. After Laskar Jihad 
was disbanded in October 2002, the Yemeni Salafists  asked for a fatwa on 
Thalib’s political manoeuvres from Rābi’ al-Madkhali, a Salafi authority in 
Saudi Arabia, who then stated that Thalib was no longer considered a true 
Salafi. After this, they abandoned Thalib (Hasan 2009:185). 
Consequently, this distrust of Thalib’s consistency and sincerity 
brought about the demise of Thalib’s Ihya’ al-Sunnah community for he lost 
his students who moved to other Salafi communities in Solo, Central Java, 
such as Minhaj al-Sunnah and Ibn Taymiyya Salafi learning centres.  Thalib 
attempted to revive his Ihya al Sunnah without much success (Hasan 
2010:703).   
More importantly, this intra-factional rift gave rise to a new 
leadership within the Yemeni Salafi faction with Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, 
the leading figure of Dhiyaus Sunnah pesantren in Cirebon, and Qomar Suaidi 
of Al-Atsariyyah pesantren in Temanggung, as its leading figures (Hasan 
2009:185). Other leaders include Luqman Ba’abduh, the director of 
Pesantren As-Salafy in Jember; Abu Hamzah Yusuf of Adhwa’ al-Salaf 
pesantren in Bandung; Abu Mundzir Dzul Akmal of Ta’zhim al-Sunnah 
pesantren in Riau; Dzulqarnain, the director of As-Sunnah pesantren in 
Makassar; and Abu Karimah Asykari of Ibn al-Qoyyim pesantren in 




return to the ‘true Salafi way’ by focusing on Salafi propagation (da’wah 
salafiyyah) and avoiding political activities. In spite of losing strong figures 
like Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yemeni Salafism continues to proliferate and remains 
vocal in its harsh criticism of other Salafi protagonists and other Muslim 
groups who the Yemeni Salafists consider to have deviated from the Salaf 
way.      
Ideologically, the Yemeni faction constitutes mainstream Salafism that 
follows Wahhabism’s strict and literal interpretation of aqidah (creed) and 
religious texts, avoids politics, and separates itself from broader society by 
living in an enclave and tight-knit community. Its proponents claim to be the 
only true bearers of da`wah salafiyyah, who call for the ‘true’ understanding 
and practicing of Islam according to the Salaf. Consequently, they tend to 
vilify other factions as the bearers of da`wah hizbiyyah, those who advocate 
for a party, group or school of thought, rather than the Salaf. They belong to 
what Sadek Hamid (2009) calls “Super Salafis” because of their self-
righteousness and claim to be pure and unadulterated Salafists.  
Perhaps, what clearly distinguishes the Yemeni Salafi faction from 
other factions is its attitude towards politics. In terms of politics, Yemeni 
Salafists adopt a passive stance arguing that any forms of open political 
activities and organization, whether violent or non-violent, are religiously 
prohibited because they can bring about social-political disorder and division 
among Muslims (fitnah). To them, obedience to Muslim rulers, even the 
unjust ones, is religiously ordered. Instead of paying serious attention to 
Muslims’ political affairs, the Yemeni Salafists are obsessed with purification 
of beliefs and rituals, application of strict practice, even trivial ones such as 
growing beards, and condemning of those who are considered to have 
deviated from ‘the true Islam’ according to the Salaf system (Haykel 
2009:49).        
Yemeni Salafists claim that purifying contemporary Muslims from un-




the Salaf system (tarbiyyah) must be a high priority. This re-islamization of 
modern Muslims according to the Salaf method, or what I call ‘Salafization’, 
necessitates avoidance of politics. The Yemeni Salafists are reluctant to 
discuss politics, let alone be involved in political activities. They contend that 
Muslims should focus on da’wah and avoid politics because any political 
activities will concentrate their thought and energy on achieving political 
interests rather than on educating society about true Islam and purifying 
them from religiously forbidden beliefs and practice (bid’ah). Before he set 
up Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib believed that politics had caused bloody 
conflict among Muslims and the political idea of the revival of Islamic 
caliphate would cause Muslims to focus their minds and energies on political 
interests (Hasan 2002:155). 
Consequently, this apoliticism prompts Yemeni Salafists to argue that 
personal purification and educating Muslims through Salafi da’wah are much 
more important than the establishment of an Islamic state or a global Islamic 
caliphate (khilāfah). As represented by Thalib’s Ihya al-Sunnah community, 
they believe that application of Islamic laws by individuals is much more 
important than political attempts to establish an Islamic state (Hasan 2002: 
155). Creating Islamic individuals, families and societies according to the 
Salaf system has priority over involvement in political activities, such as the 
establishment of Islamic parties aimed at reviving an Islamic caliphate. In 
dealing with the rulers, according to Yemeni Salafists, Muslims should not 
oppose, rebel, or overtly criticise their ruler, no matter how unjust or 
repressive the ruler. They must obey their legitimate ruler as long as they are 
not commanded to contravene Islamic law and teachings. They are only 
allowed to give advice behind the scene, for example by sending letters, to 
prevent social-political chaos that may disadvantage Muslims.  
Unlike most Islamic reformist currents, Yemeni Salafism characterizes 
what Olivier Roy (1996) calls “neofundamentalism”, an Islamic movement 




Neofundamentalism spread partly as a response to the failure of political 
Islam that aspires to apply Islamic law and create an idealised Muslim society 
and Islamic state through political actions and revolutionary strategies. To 
some extent, Yemeni Salafism is like PERSIS (Persatuan Islam), an Islamic 
revival organization founded in 1923,14 that pays no attention to social and 
political activities and focuses more on strict application of Islamic teachings 
in personal and societal life. PERSIS struggles to purify Indonesian Muslims’ 
beliefs and rituals from what it considers as reprehensible religious 
innovations, a practice that is in line with Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism (van 
Bruinessen 2002:125-126).         
Given this firm apolitical attitude, it is not surprising that Yemeni 
Salafists strongly criticise other Salafi individuals and groups as well as other 
Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
which incline toward politics or aspire to make Indonesia an Islamic state. 
They particularly condemn activists associated with Jama’ah Islamiyyah, an 
underground violent Islamic organization widely believed to be involved in 
terrorism in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, whose members included Imam 
Samudra and other Bali bombings perpetrators. They label the proponents of 
Islamism that openly criticise legitimate rulers and rebel against them “neo-
Kharijites”, the contemporary followers of Khawarij, a rebellious group in the 
first century of Islam.  
 
Haraki Salafists 
The proponents of this faction do not identify themselves or like to be 
identified to be “Haraki Salafists”. Rather, they just prefer to be identified as 
“Salafists” arguing for the unity of all Salafi proponents. The label “Haraki 
Salafists” (Salafi Haraki) comes from their critics, particularly the Yemeni 
Salafists. They are also pejoratively labelled with other epithets by their 
detractors such as Sururists (the supporters of Muhammad al-Surūr), 
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Sahwists (the supporters of Saudi’s Sahwah movement), Neo-Kharijites 
(contemporary followers of Khawarij, a rebellious group in the early Islam) 
and Qutbists (the followers of Sayyid Qutb, an ideologue of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood movement).  
Criticising Yemenis’ apoliticism, the Haraki faction attempts to 
combine Salafi doctrines with the Muslim Brotherhood’s activism, which 
resulted in a hybrid of Salafism that views activism (harakah) as an 
important medium to realise its religious goals. So, the proponents of this 
faction advocate political activism, primarily in non-violent ways, in Muslim 
and non-Muslim countries. They are referred to as haraki (activist) Salafists 
by their opponents due to their political consciousness and activism adopted 
from the Muslim Brotherhood.  
This tendency towards politics manifests in various forms of activism 
ranging from managing Salafism as an organised movement and showing 
interest in political issues to involvement in political activities. ‘Abd al-Khāliq, 
one of the leading personalities within global Haraki Salafism, believes that 
Salafists should organize in order to gain political power and influence. As a 
result, this version of Salafism is also referred to as “organised Salafism” (al-
salafiyyat al-tanzhīmiyyat) (Haykel 2009:48).   
The Haraki faction consists of covert Harakists, those who profess 
quietism, but act politically while condemning the open political involvement 
as religiously forbidden according to the doctrine of hizbiyyah, and open 
Harakists, namely Salafists who are openly active in politics and call for 
political reform. In general, the Haraki Salafi faction represents what 
Wiktorowicz (2006) calls “the politicos”, the more politically minded Salafi 
scholars and proponents.     
As seen in the writings of Safar al-Hawali, “the locus classicus” of the 
politico Salafists, Haraki Salafists are engaged in takfīr, declaring Muslims 
who do not observe obligatory acts required by faith and Muslim rulers who 




tolerate such regime “Murjiists”, the followers of Murjiah, a group of Muslims 
in the early centuries of Islam and a school of theology, which is regarded to 
have deviated from the ‘true’ Salaf way (Haykel 2009).  
The leading ideologues of Haraki Salafism are Muhammad al-Surūr, a 
Syrian who had lived in Saudi before he was expelled from the country in 
1974, re-established in Kuwait before leaving for UK, and has been living in 
Jordan since 2004;15 Salman al-‘Awdah and Safar al-Hawali, two prominent 
figures of post-Gulf War Saudi Islamic dissent; and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al 
Khaliq, an Egyptian who graduated from Medina Islamic University and a 
prominent figure in a charity and Salafi da’wah organization known as 
Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Association for Reviving the Islamic 
Heritage  in Kuwait) (Haykel 2009:48).  
In Indonesia, a hybrid made up of Salafism and activism occurred 
when Salafists and Ikhwanists (the Muslim Brotherhood activists) formed a 
coalition during the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1980s and 1990s. 
They organized joint study groups and activities on university campuses 
under the slogan Aqidah Salaf, Manhaj Ikhwan (Salafi creed, Muslim 
Brotherhood’s method) (Hasan 2009:179). This attempt attracted strong 
criticism from other Salafi factions, particularly from the Yemeni Salafists.  
Haraki Salafism in Indonesia is not easily identified because its 
proponents do not use the self-descriptor ‘Haraki’, and only claim to be 
Salafists. Some even refuse to identify themselves as Salafists so that the size 
of this faction cannot be accurately estimated. This reluctance may be related 
to Indonesia’s campaign against terrorism, which has created uneasiness 
within this faction as well as the Salafi community in general. They have 
become the target of suspicion, police interrogation and intelligence force 
surveillance so that they opt to keep a low profile and refrain from overt 
political activism.  
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Nevertheless, among other ways the presence of Haraki Salafists can 
be recognized through the financial support they receive to fund their 
activities. To support their activities and establish foundations and learning 
centres, these Salafists receive donations from local supporters and 
sympathisers. However, a large proportion of their financial sources, at least 
those allocated for infrastructure like school buildings and mosques, comes 
from Middle Eastern charitable organizations, some of which are affiliated 
with leading personalities of Middle Eastern politico-Salafism. These donors 
include Jami’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath, a Kuwaiti-based charity and Salafi da’wah 
foundation with ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq as its director, a critic of the 
Saudi Mufti Ibn Baz and supporter of Muhammad al-Surur, a prominent 
leader of global politico-Salafism. Through this Arabian financial support, the 
Haraki Salafists have been able to maintain and expand their pesantren and 
madrasa with better building, facilities, management, and relatively generous 
salaries for staff members (Noorhaidi 2005). By contrast, most pesantren and 
madrasa linked to Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yemeni Salafi network look poor 
and ill-managed because of a lack of financial support from Arabian donors. 
They have stagnated, with students relocating to other pesantren after the 
dissolution of Laskar Jihad in 2002, when Thalib lost his leadership of 
Indonesia’s Salafism due to the growing distrust of his consistency and 
sincerity in following the Salafi system as explained above (Hasan 2010).    
The leading personalities of Haraki Salafists, many of whom graduated 
from Saudi Arabian universities, include Ja’far Thalib’s rivals such as Abu 
Nida, the prominent figure of Bin Baz Salafi foundation in Yogyakarta;  
Ahmad Faiz, the prominent figure of Imam al Bukhari Salafi pesantren in Solo; 
Yusuf Baisa, the director of Al-Irsyad organisation;  Kholid Syamhudi of Ibn 
Abbas Salafi learning centre in Sragen (Hasan 2009 and 2010); Abu Qotadah 
and Abdul Hakim Abdat  of Al Sofwah foundation; Abdul Qodir Jawwaz of 




Ihya al Sunnah foundation in Bandung; and Zaitun Rusmin, the founder of 
Wahdah Islamiyyah Salafi organization in Makassar.   
    One of the prominent Haraki Salafi organizations is Wahdah 
Islamiyyah (Islamic Unity) with its central office in Makassar, South Sulawesi. 
The development of Wahdah Islamiyyah cannot be separated from Zaitun 
Rusmin, its current leading figure. After he returned from his study at Medina 
Islamic University in 1995, Rusmin founded Wahdah Islamiyyah with a 
strong commitment to the purification of Islam and Muslims from un-Islamic 
influence, such as Sufism, according to the Salaf manhaj. In doing this, he 
received financial support from some Middle Eastern charity organizations 
such as al-Mu’assasat al-Ḥaramayn al-Khayriyyat, Jam‘iyyat Ihyā’ al-Turāth 
and Jam‘iyyat Dar al-Birr. He took advantage of political changes in post-
Suharto Indonesia to strengthen Wahdah Islamiyyah’s influence and make it 
the driving force of the Salafi movement in South Sulawesi (Jurdi 2006 in 
Nisa 2012; ICG 2003).        
       
Violent Jihadi Salafists 
Discontented with Yemeni Salafists’ apoliticism and lack of interest and skills 
in contemporary politics, a faction of Salafists emerged who understood 
Salafi doctrines in a highly politicised way and interpreted jihad as warfare or 
violence, which they believed provided the only solution to the problems 
facing the Muslim world. This has resulted in the emergence of the faction of 
Violent Jihadi Salafists. Considering the modern world corrupt and un-
Islamic, this faction calls for violent action against the existing rulers in the 
Muslim countries who refuse to implement Islamic law as well as countries 
or groups regarded as the enemies of Islam. They aspire to establish an 
Islamic state at individual country level and an Islamic caliphate as a unitary 
state for Muslims at global level. Gaining political power through any efficient 
means is considered a religious obligation and an important vehicle for 




groups are the quintessential example of this Salafi faction in today’s Islamist 
movements.       
The Violent Jihadi Salafi faction appears to be the smallest, but the 
most noticeable and infamous subgroup of the Salafi movement due to their 
violent action and extensive media coverage. The proponents of this Salafi 
faction live in a highly closed community and many operate clandestinely. A 
substantial number of studies have been conducted to uncover the ideology 
and practice of the jihadi Salafists in both Muslim and non-Muslim 
countries.16  
Contrary to Yemeni Salafists, the Violent Jihadi Salafists are not only 
concerned with the purification of creed and rituals while separating 
themselves from broad society and avoiding politics, but also concentrate on 
the analysis of political reality, reject the current world as corrupt, and seek 
to change it according to their idealised vision. Inspired by Sayyid Qutb 
(1906-1966), the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, they analyse political 
reality and formulate strategies and practises to change it by highly 
politicising and radicalising the Salafi doctrines. Their ideologues, such as 
Yusuf al-‘Uyairi,17 combine a highly politicised interpretation of the doctrines 
of tawhīd, al-walā` wa al-barā` and hisbah with an analysis of reality of 
contemporary politics leading to the understanding of violent jihad as a 
strategy, thus, producing “a revolutionary Salafi praxis” (Meijer 2009b:25). 
The radicalised Salafi doctrines and the Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
ideology combined with the political background of its proponents produce 
the Violent Jihadi Salafi movement.  
The proponents of Violent Jihadi Salafism include individuals or 
groups who had contact with Al-Qaeda and mujahidin during the Afghan war 
in the 1980s and early 1990s or who are inspired by Al-Qaeda leaders such 
as Osama bin Laden and revolutionary Salafi ideologues such as Abu 
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Muhammad al- Maqdisi and Abu Mus’ab Zarqawi.  In the mid-1980s, 
hundreds of Indonesian recruits were sent to Afghanistan to fight with 
Afghan mujahidin against Soviet invasion as part of non-Afghan mujahidin 
recruitment, which was channelled and funded by Saudi-funded agencies 
such as Rabithat al-‘Ālam al-Islami (The Muslim World League).18 After the 
Afghan war ended, these Indonesian Afghan war veterans19 returned home 
and were, and are still, committed to continue political jihad in their 
homeland. Upon their return, they established local and regional jihadi 
groups and networks which primarily operate independently though they 
share jihad ideology with Salafi revolutionaries and receive financial support 
from global jihad organizations such as Al-Qaeda.    
The notorious figures of this Violent Jihadi Salafi faction include the 
members of Jama’ah Islamiyyah which is believed to operate in Southeast 
Asia; the perpetrators of Bali bombings, notably Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron 
and Amrozi; and the proponents of Laskar Jundullah in Makassar with Agus 
Dwikarna as its leading figure.   
In his book Aku Melawan Teroris (I Fight against Terrorists) (2004), 
Imam Samudra, who was sentenced to death in 2003 and executed in 2008 
by a firing squad along with Amrozi and Ali Ghufron, claims to be a true Salafi 
who truly defends Islam and Muslims from what he regarded as “the real 
international terrorists, America” (Samudra 2004). He regards other Salafists 
as Salafi imposters for their unwillingness to fight jihad, and supporting or 
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being indifferent toward their corrupt Muslim rulers. In response, the Yemeni 
Salafi faction published articles and books counter-attacking Samudra’s book. 
In his book Mereka Adalah Teroris (They are Terrorists) (2005), Luqman 
Baabduh, Ja’far Thalib’s deputy in the dissolved Laskar Jihad, strongly 
criticises Samudra for deviating from the Salaf way in his understanding of 
jihad. He regards Samudra and those who inspired him as terrorists, not 
mujahid (fighters in the name of God).       
Supported by Muchtar Daeng Lao and Syawal Yasin, Agus Dwikarna 
separated from Wahdah Islamiyyah under the leadership of Zaitun Rusmin 
and established Laskar Jundullah (Brigade of God’s Soldiers) in 1999 (ICG 
2003). The background to the split was a differing analysis of the conflict in 
Maluku that raged during 1999-2000. The Rusmin faction believed that the 
conflict was between kafir (infidels), namely the Maluku Christians, and 
mushrik (idolators), the Maluku Muslims who were regarded as having 
deviated from the true Islam. By contrast, the Dwikarna faction argued that 
waging jihad in defence of Muslims is a religious obligation for mujahidin in 
spite of the impurity of the Muslims’ creed and practice. To realise this, 
Dwikarna founded Laskar Jundullah, a militia separated from Wahdah 
Islamiyyah and an official security arm of KPPSI (Komite Perjuangan 
Penegakan Syariat Islam; Committee of Struggle for Implementation of 
Islamic Sharia), an organization that encourages the implementation of 
Islamic law in Sulawesi. The Laskar Jundullah was infamous for its members’ 
involvement in the Makassar bombings on 5 December 2002, which wrecked 
a McDonald’s restaurant and a car showroom, and killed three people. These 
cases indicate that the violent Salafi factions share the same ideology, learn 
from the same Salafi revolutionaries, and may cooperate with each other, but 
they operate independently and are not united under a single leadership.  
The Violent Jihadi Salafists, as pioneered by Abu Muhammad  al- 
Maqdisi and Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, were among the first Islamist groups who 




University for jihad studies” and establish a “virtual community” of brothers 
who are concerned with, and dedicate their lives to, global jihad. Their 
presence in Indonesian cyberspace can be seen in some websites that 
consistently support jihad and promote the implementation of an Islamic law 
and the establishment of Islamic state such as Almuhajirun 
(http://almuhajirun.net), Arrahmah (www.arrahmah.com), and Voice of al-
Islam (www.voa-islam.com).   
It is worth noting here that the factionalism within the Salafi 
movement should not be regarded as rigid. Rather, it is like a “sliding scale” 
in that the Salafi tendency can be expanded from quietist-apolitical stance to 
an active-political, even violent one (Meijer 2009b). Leaders’ personalities 
and interests, doctrinal ambiguities, social-political change and radicalization 
play a key role in this intra-movement dynamics. The proponents of apolitical 
Salafism that mainly focus on spreading the ideology of Salafism (da’wah) can 
get actively involved in political activities, even violent jihadi activities, when 
certain Salafi doctrines, particularly al-walā` wa al-barā` (loyalty and 
disavowal) and hisbah (commanding right and forbidding wrong) are 
expanded and radicalised by their leaders in response to socio-political 
changes. Similarly, politically oriented Salafists can transform into violent 
jihadists when they highly politicise and radicalise these doctrines. The 
proponents of Salafism, particularly those who are apolitical with the focus 
on da’wah, are like a dormant volcano; they can transform into a political 
group or explode violently when political changes and leaders’ personalities 
encourage this.       
 This transformation or tension from the ideal of focusing on Salafi 
da’wah and the temptations of politics is best exemplified by the case of Ja’far 
Umar Thalib above. In the early years of his involvement in Salafism at the 
end of 1980s and early 1990s, Thalib focused on Salafi da’wah activities and 
held an apolitical stance. But, he then turned to political activities by 




his followers and supporters to wage jihad in Maluku when communal 
conflict broke out there in 1999-2000. To give religious legitimacy of his 
action, Thalib sought for fatwa from Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia, 
ignoring the orders of Indonesian government under President 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Noorhaidi 2005).   
This tension or ambiguity is also apparent in the case of Yemeni 
Salafism’s Middle Eastern authority, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i, Ja’far Umar 
Thalib’s teacher and a leading authority of global apolitical Salafism. Muqbil 
al-Wadi’i publicly maintained an apolitical stance and condemned groups 
that overtly involved in politics such as the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia. 
But, in fact, he worked with the Yemeni government to repress groups such 
as the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood and Zaydis, two groups considered to 
have deviated from the true Islam and seen as the enemies of Salafism 
(Haykel 2009:49).     
Moreover, this phenomenon in fact can be traced back to the attitude 
of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), one of the main authorities of 
apolitical-purist Salafism. In the mid-18th century, the founder of the Saudi 
dynasty, Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), sealed a pact with Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab in Nejd. He agreed to grant Ibn Abd al-Wahhab protection, 
support his teachings and guaranteed him control over religious matters. In 
return, Ibn Saud was acknowledged as political leader of the Muslim 
community. This alliance helped the Saudi family expand its political 
influence and territories and, at the same time, provided a political vehicle for 
spreading Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s puritanical religious ideas, 
which remain the religious basis of Saudi Arabia today (Al-Rasheed 2002:16-
18).  
From another perspective, the apolitical Salafists are actually involved 
in politics in the form of promoting political quietism through which they 
silently support the authority of the ruling government and condemn any 




then, is not a permanent feature of the Yemeni Salafi faction. The proponents 
of this faction are not pacifists either. Rather, they can be best characterised 
as “obedience-minded people” who are ready to engage in activism if they are 
religiously ordered by their leader or ruler to do so (Haykel 2009:49). This is 
in contrast with Jamaah Tablig da’wah movement, for example, which 
remains the adopter of quietism and focuses on peaceful da’wah activities 
because they believe that the true solution lies in strengthening one’s faith 
and in returning to God.20           
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has provided an introduction to Salafism in Indonesia as one of 
the fastest-growing Islamic movements in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It 
has pointed out that the rise and expansion of the Salafi movement in 
Indonesia is closely connected with the following notable changes in the 
political opportunity structures: the intensification of Saudi Arabia’s religious 
and political influences in the Muslim countries in an attempt to contain the 
impact of Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979; the Reformasi movement in 
1998 that led to the fall of the authoritarian rule of Suharto and his New 
Order regime; and social transformations of Muslim societies including 
urbanization, which resulted from the contradictions of economic 
development in Indonesia.  
In its attempt to pursue its goals, the Salafi movement in Indonesia 
developed a cross-class constituency. Its broad social base comprises of a 
mixture of urban, newly or partially urbanized, the middle class and lower 
middle class, and small businessmen with students or graduates of secular 
schools and universities as the core component. 
Particularly, this chapter has shown that Salafism in Indonesia is not a 
unified movement as it is characterized with internal fragmentation over 
‘true’ representatives of Salafi ideology. Intra-doctrinal ambiguity and 
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different ways of responding to current socio-political issues contributed to 
this intra-Salafi division. Three factions can be identified from this internal 
conflict: Yemeni Salafists, who represent the mainstream Salafism, primarily 
focus on propagation and avoid politics; Haraki Salafists who are politically-
minded, but are basically engaged in non-violent political activism; and 
Violent Jihadi Salafists who highly politicize and radicalise the Salafi 
doctrines and are engaged in jihad as warfare and violent actions. The latter 
two factions constitute the dissent Salafists.    
 As it developed in the era of the revolution of information and 
communication technology, the Salafi movement embraced the internet as a 
new, important resource. However, each Salafi faction mobilizes the internet 
to present and articulate its own version of Salafism, and analyse the 
contemporary state of Muslim societies. This certainly has raised questions: 
What is the significance of the internet for the Salafi movement? Why did the 
Salafi factions embrace the internet as a new resource? And how and to what 
ends did they actually mobilize the adopted internet? The following two 





Internet Adoption and Salafi Resources  
    
 
 
The Salafi factions in Indonesia have embraced the internet and integrated it 
as a new acceptable resource into their socio-religious practices. They use 
various internet applications including websites, weblogs, emailing lists, 
internet forums, and online business. Their presence in cyberspace is seen in 
hundreds of these applications written in Indonesian, operated by Salafi 
individuals or organizations, accessed and followed by Salafi adherents and 
activists. This poses a basic, but important question: Why have the Salafists 
embraced the internet as a useful and acceptable resource, despite it being a 
product of Western secularist economy and society? Most observers 
generally turn to the specific nature and characteristics of the internet to 
answer this question focusing on the issues of what this new media 
technology can and will do. This perspective, focussing on the medium, 
suggests that individuals and groups use the internet because, among other 
factors, it is faster, cheaper, and has wider outreach than ‘old’ media 
technologies such as print and TV broadcast.           
It is argued here, however, that significant answers to this key 
question are to be found by looking at the users, and what they can or cannot 
do with the internet. This user-centred perspective suggests that the 
harnessing of the internet is influenced by user-related issues including the 
extent to which users have access to resources pertinent to distinguishing 
and promoting particular theological positions. The argument here is that a 
lack of applicable resources has encouraged and motivated the Salafi factions 
to adopt the internet as a new important resource that is in line with their 




As explained in the introductory chapter, resource mobilization 
theory (RMT) argues that although the availability of applicable resources ‒
such as legitimacy, celebrity, networks, labour, skills, money and buildings‒ 
is crucial to the initiation and continuation of a social movement, the 
presence of these resources and their potential to be mobilized varies among 
social movements. Therefore, resource inequality is palpable among social 
movements and within a social movement in that different component 
groups have varying degrees of access to types and amount of resources. 
Some are well-resourced, while others are poorly resourced. RMT is helpful 
here as it is “at root aimed at better understanding how groups are able to 
overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in their efforts to pursue 
social change goals” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:118). Drawing on this 
insight, this chapter highlights limitations and variations in resources 
available to Salafi factions and how they attempted to overcome this.  It 
suggests that a lack of resources applicable to the struggle with competing 
theologies of Islam has motivated the Salafi factions to mobilize the internet 
as a new resource for collective action. The Salafi factions have used new 
opportunities and facilities provided by the internet to realize their 
organizational needs and ideological purposes. In particular, Salafi factions’ 
adoption and mobilization of the internet constitutes a new resource for 
da’wah Salafiyyah, promoting Salafi ideas to a wider audience.  
Resources of the Salafi Factions 
Drawing closely on the typology of resources developed by Edwards and 
McCarthy (2004) as described in the introductory chapter, the following is an 
examination of the nature of the various resources at the disposal of Salafi 
factions and how this relates to their adoption of the internet. As has been 
outlined in the previous chapter, Salafism is divided into three Salafi factions 
that are spread across various cities in Indonesia with each Salafi faction 




following investigation was focused on one selected Salafi community from 
each of the three factions, which collectively represent the range of different 
Salafi factions in Indonesia. Thus, case studies have been selected from each 
of the three previously identified factions of Indonesian Salafism, namely 
Adhwa’us Salaf of the Yemeni Salafi faction, Imam Bukhari of the Haraki 
Salafi faction, and Arrahmah of Violent Jihadi Salafi faction. 
Adhwa’us Salaf is a Yemeni Salafi community that is located in eastern 
Bandung, West Java province. It is named after the community’s modest 
traditional learning centre (ma’had), which provides lectures on Salafi views 
and functions as a boarding house for students. It is situated in a local 
neighbourhood, but appears detached from it. Most of constituents and 
students, aged teens to adults, are not local people, coming from outside the 
centre’s neighbourhood through personal or informal networks of the 
Yemeni Salafists. The community leaders and a number of active participants 
live in a separate community in a local housing compound close to their 
community learning centre, while other adherents live outside, only going to 
the centre to attend the movement activities such as religious lectures, study 
circles, and prayers. The number of Adhwa’us Salaf community membership 
is estimated to be around one hundred people.   
Imam Bukhari is a community of Haraki Salafists named after its 
Islamic boarding school. Located in Solo, Central Java province, it is a 
successful Salafi community with access to modern facilities including 
permanent school buildings and a large mosque. Like Salafi communities in 
general, Imam Bukhari is located in a local neighbourhood, but not strongly 
attached to it. Most active participants, teachers and students come from 
outside the local neighbourhood, but live inside the community. Compared to 
other Salafi communities, it is a large Salafi community comprised of 
students, teaching staff, and ma’had organizers numbering around eight 




The last community chosen as a focus of analysis is Arrahmah of Jihadi 
Salafism. Unlike the other two communities, it was named after its active 
news website that strongly promotes jihadism (www.arrahmah.com). In 
addition to updating and maintaining the website, its activities are centred in 
a local community mosque, which was established by the residents of a local 
housing compound in South Tangerang, Banten province, but is controlled by 
the Arrahmah community. Of these chosen communities, Arrahmah is the 
smallest community numbering a few dozen people.       
Moral Resources 
Moral resources refer to legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, 
and celebrity (Snow 1979; Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 
2004). These resources generally come from outside a movement as they are 
given by an external source such as a public figure and a prestigious 
institution recognized to possess them. Gaining moral resources is a difficult 
task because this type of resource is less accessible and proprietary than 
other resources. Even once these resources are bestowed on a social 
movement, the external source that possesses them can retract them 
(Edwards and McCarthy 2004:126).  
My study found that there were no public figures, either local or 
national, that showed their ideological or financial support to Adhwa’us Salaf 
of the Yemeni Salafi faction. No established Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia publicly supported its ideology and particular interpretation of 
Islam. There was no presence of a celebrity at religious lectures or any other 
activities organized by Adhwa’us Salaf community. The external support that 
Adhwa’us Salaf gains might be ‘a good relationship’ with local security 
officers who let the community freely carry out its socio-religious activities, 
due to its apolitical stance and opposition to terrorism.1 A fact that some of 
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its leaders studied Salafism at Dar al-Hadith, a leading Salafi ‘university’ in 
Dammaj, Yemen, also provided legitimacy for this Yemeni Salafi faction.    
In spite of the relative absence of external moral resources, Adhwa’us 
Salaf was not without moral resources at all. But, it obtained most moral 
resources from an internal source, namely its members’ strong belief and 
commitment to Salaf ideology (manhaj al-salaf). This provided them with a 
strong moral resource to live and spread a life of ‘true Islam’ according to the 
Salaf in ‘un-Islamic’ contemporary society.        
The state of Adhwa’us Salaf’s moral resources was comparable to that 
of Imam Bukhari community of Haraki Salafism. Like Adhwa’us Salaf, the 
Imam Bukhari community gained no access to external moral resources in 
the form of support and legitimacy from public figures or celebrities. Yet, its 
receipt of grants from international Salafi-oriented charitable institutions in 
the Middle East, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, served as a source of 
important legitimacy for the community. The most important source of moral 
resource for Imam Bukhari community was also internal rather than 
external, namely its strong belief in ideology of Salaf supremacy and sacred 
duty to spread it among Muslim societies, and supportive networks with 
other communities of Haraki Salafism.  
Likewise, the lack of external moral resources was also experienced 
by Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism. Because of the community’s radical 
interpretation of jihad, no well-known personalities or organizations have 
provided the community with moral support. Security concerns might have 
prevented them from publicly showing their support to the community. 
Again, like the other two Salaf communities above, their strong belief in Jihadi 
Salafism and networks with the supporting communities have served as 
important sources of moral resources for the Arrahmah community.        
In short, all three Salafi factions suffered from the lack of moral 
resources in that they had limited access to legitimacy from prestigious 




them did not come from external sources, but rather from internal ones, 
namely strong belief and commitment of each faction’s adherents to the 
ideology of Salaf supremacy.     
Cultural Resources 
Cultural resources are cultural products or artefacts that are widely known, 
though not universally available or evenly distributed. These include 
conceptual tools and specific knowledge about how to carry out discrete 
tasks such as organizing a meeting, enacting a protest, establishing an 
organization and utilising media. Different from moral resources, cultural 
resources are widely available, accessible for use, but less proprietary. Yet, 
not everyone possesses these special competencies and knowledge so that 
gaining access to this type of resource is of value to a social movement or 
group (Edwards 2007:3904). 
 The Adhwa’us Salaf community of the Yemeni Salafi faction generally 
had access to this type of resource through its active participants who are 
mostly educated. Many of them graduated from universities, while others 
finished high school. This was clearly seen in their ability to organize a 
meeting and recruit volunteers to fight for Muslims in the Maluku conflict in 
1999-2000, in which Adhwa’us Salaf was one of the points of volunteer 
recruitment.2 The community’s access to these resources was also proven in 
its efforts to accomplish scheduled religious lectures (daily, weekly, and 
monthly) in the community’s learning centre or places outside the centre 
collectively organized with other Yemeni communities. Furthermore, the 
access to these resources was identified in the ability of the community’s 
active participants to utilize media for propagation purposes like establishing 
and maintaining the Adhwa’us Salaf website (http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id). 
Similarly, these cultural resources were available to the Imam Bukhari 
community of Haraki Salafism. The community had access to conceptual 
tools, knowledge and skills of carrying out its activities and utilising 
                                                          




information and communication technologies such as radio and internet. All 
this was due to the availability of another type of resource to the community, 
namely human resources whose number was relatively larger than other 
Salafi factions and many of whom are university graduates (as will be 
explored later in this chapter). Similar cultural resources were accessible to 
Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism although the number of its participants and 
constituents is the smallest among the Salafi factions selected for analysis.  
All Salafi factions gained access to cultural resources in the form of 
conceptual tools, skills and knowledge of how to accomplish their tasks and 
programs. Although their number varied, the constituents contributed to the 
each faction’s access to this type of resource. This was also due to the 
characteristic of cultural resources as publicly available resources.     
Social-Organizational Resources        
There are three kinds of socio-organizational resources: infrastructure, 
network, and organization. Equivalent to public goods for a society such as 
roads, infrastructure refers to physical resources that facilitate the everyday 
operation and functioning of a movement. Network and organizational 
resources include linkages and relationships with other groups that a social 
movement is able to establish either within or outside the movement 
(Edwards and Gilham 2013:4).  
 The Adhwa’us Salaf was a Yemeni Salafi community with a modest 
learning centre. It had no access to various organizational infrastructures 
that facilitated the smooth functioning of daily activities. The learning-
teaching activities, which are mostly conducted in the form of face-to-face 
lectures, were not supported by modern technologies like computers and 
projectors. Instead, computers and access to internet were only available to 
the Yemeni active participants at home, particularly those appointed 
organizing committee members of the learning centre, whose jobs, among 
other tasks, include establishing and maintaining the community’s website 




 The Adhwa’us Salaf community had access to social networks with 
external organizations, but this was mostly limited to other communities of 
Yemeni Salafism in Indonesia and related Salafists in the Middle East. The 
community’s strongest network was informal and personal networks 
between its members with other Yemeni Salaf communities, which in turn, 
among others, supplied new students to study at the community’s learning 
centre. This type of network was also manifested in the teacher-student 
relationship which the Adhwa’us Salaf leaders maintain after their return 
from their studies with Salafi religious scholars (‘ulamā`) in Yemen.                        
 Quite a similar state of social-organizational resources characterised 
the Arrahmah community of Jihadi Salafism. The community had access to 
information technologies including computers and the internet, the crucial 
organizational infrastructure that facilitates its main activity of operating and 
updating its online news portal. As for Adhwa’us Salaf, Arrahmah’s most 
developed social-organizational resource involved its networks with local 
and global communities and organizations that shared the same ideology of 
jihadism, which in turn provided it with moral and, probably, financial 
resources.  However, it had relatively little access to other resources in the 
form of social movement organizations except majlis ta’lim (religious 
learning and lecture ‘hall’) for committed followers and adherents.    
 By contrast, my study of the Imam Bukhari community of Haraki 
Salafism revealed that it had more social-organizational resources than the 
other two Salafi communities. The community’s active participants had 
access to organizational infrastructures that help the smooth functioning of 
day-to-day tasks and programs including computers and an internet 
connection that are available at the community’s main office. Other 
organizational resources available to the community included social 
movement organizations such as   school buildings, a mosque, a medical 
clinic, security services, and a publishing house. Like the above two 




networks with other local Haraki Salafi communities and learning centres 
(ma’had) and with former teachers in the Middle East. But, unlike the above 
communities, the Imam Bukhari developed a formal network and 
cooperation with Salafi-oriented universities such as International Madinah 
University in Saudi Arabia and its branch in Malaysia. The graduates of the 
Imam Bukhari ma’had had opportunities and access to pursue higher Islamic 
education at this university.  
Such a pattern of available resources was not unique to this Imam 
Bukhari community. Another Haraki Salafi community, Al-Irsyad Tengaran, 
located in Semarang, Central Java, generally shares the same access to social-
organizational resources. Networks with the Middle Eastern charitable 
organizations and learning institutions may have contributed to their access 
to more social-organization resources than other communities of Yemeni and 
Jihadi Salafism.      
Thus, we can draw two themes from the above. First, Yemeni and 
Violent Jihadi factions lack access to crucial organizational infrastructures, 
but have good access to informal and personal networks with communities 
and individuals who share the same Salafi ideology as seen, among others, in 
their web links. Second, by contrast, the Haraki faction is better off in that it 
gains not only access to social networks with those who share the same 
ideology, but also appropriate organizational public goods or infrastructures.     
Human Resources 
Human resources are more tangible than other types of resources above. This 
type of resource refers to capabilities that inhere in human individuals 
including labour, skills, expertise, experience and leadership. Since 
individuals have a proprietary control over their resources, a movement or 
social movement organization needs their participation and co-operation to 
make their resources accessible and usable to its specific needs and interests. 
The ability of social movement actors to aggregate human resources will 




and the degree to which skilled individuals can be deployed for the 
movement. Yet, once new participants are recruited, to what extent the 
availability of their human resources can enhance mobilization depends on 
how these resources fit a movement’s or group’s needs. For example, the 
presence of a famous politician may have little more to offer than a high 
school intern when a social movement organization needs to recruit 
volunteers to distribute fliers (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:127).        
 Perhaps human resources were the most accessible type of resources 
for the Adhwa’us Salaf community of Yemeni Salafism. These resources were 
gained through the presence of the community’s teachers, students, leaders, 
active participants, and adherents. Yet, as a total number of the community 
members were around one hundred people, the Adhwa’us Salaf community 
gained relatively small access to this labour resource. It was considered a 
small community compared to the communities of the Haraki Salafi faction 
like Imam Bukhari, and was vastly smaller than other established Islamic 
organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama, whose membership is estimated to be 
tens of millions.  
Nevertheless, the Adhwa’us Salaf community obtained good access to 
skills and expertise. The Adhwa’us Salaf community was proud to have 
teachers and leaders whose expertise in Salafism was highly recognized as 
they had studied with leading Salafi authorities in the Salafi learning centres 
in Salafi-exporting countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Those who gained 
Islamic knowledge in such Middle Eastern countries were still highly 
appreciated among Salafist as well as Muslims in Indonesia in general. For 
example, the presence as a teacher-leader of Abu Yasir, who graduated from 
a leading Salafi centre in Dammaj, Yemen, provided the Adhwa’us Salaf 
community with access to expertise and knowledge about Yemeni Salafism.  
The Adhwa’us Salaf also gained access to skilled active participants. 
Many of them graduated from universities with various skills and knowledge 




to medicine and engineering. They were responsible for the daily operation 
of the community learning centre and accomplishment of other activities 
related to the Salafi propagation. They were aware of the importance of 
technology and, in particular, the use of information technologies including 
computers, mobile phones, and the internet. In addition, the Adhwa’us Salaf 
had access to potential resources of labour, skills and expertise from its 
committed adherents. These adherents had different educational 
backgrounds including high school graduates, university students and 
university graduates. Their occupational backgrounds also varied, ranging 
from small business entrepreneurs to civil servants and employees at private 
companies.            
  Likewise, Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism was a community with a few 
dozen adherents making it the smallest community of Salafists discussed 
here. Some adherents were local residents of a housing complex in South 
Tangerang, Banten province, where the community’s mosque was located, 
while others came from outside the housing. This means that it had a limited 
access to labour and its constituency. The community’s strength, however, 
actually lies in the adherents’ militancy in their belief in the ideology of Jihadi 
Salafism and their commitment to implement it in personal and socio-
political life in the society or country where they live. As in the cases of the 
above two communities, these active participants provided the Arrahmah 
community with skills and expertise required to carry out its activities 
including promoting the ideas of Jihadi Salafism. Yet they differed from the 
others in that they were spirited and militant young activists equipped with 
skills of how to access and utilize information and communication 
technologies like the internet. These were crucial skills in creating and 
maintaining the community’s online news magazine (www.arrahmah.com) 
dedicated to Jihadism that required daily updating and maintenance. It was 
through this website operated by skilled active participants that Arrahmah 




By contrast, the Imam Bukhari of Haraki Salafism had many 
constituents, making it the largest Salafi community discussed here. Its 
constituency included around eight hundred people consisting of students, 
their parents, and other active participants and adherents. As a result, this 
Haraki Salafi community had access to potential sources of a large amount of 
labour, skills, expertise, and money required for pursuing its social-religious 
goals.  
Most Imam Bukhari teachers or leaders held bachelor degrees from 
Islamic higher education institutions in the Middle East or graduated from 
‘secular’ universities, then went to informal Islamic learning institutions in 
Indonesia (pesantren) or in the Middle East (ma’had). Similarly, many active 
participants or those who were in charge of the day-to-day operations of the 
boarding school graduated from universities or high schools. They were tech- 
savvy and aware of the importance of information and communication 
technologies like mobile phones and the internet. Consequently, these 
educated people provided Imam Bukhari with access to skills and expertise 
crucial to carry out its activities. In short, the Haraki Salafi faction had the 
greatest access to human resources among the three Salafi factions in terms 
of labour, skills, and expertise crucial to the faction’s continuity.      
The issue of human resources was the first point where resource 
inequality and lack among Salafi factions was evident. The Yemeni Salafi 
faction had more access to labour and constituencies than the Violent Jihadi 
faction, although human skills and expertise needed to carry out activities 
were available to both of them. But, the Haraki Salafi faction had the best 
access to both a large number of adherents and human skills and expertise 
among the Salafi factions.    
 
Material Resources 
This kind of resource warrants close attention because it is generally the 
most tangible and proprietary of the resource types. It refers to two forms of 




money, which is likely the most transferable of the resource types. Physical 
capital refers to office space, property, equipment, and supplies (Edwards 
and McCarthy 2004:128). 
 Regarding this resource, Adhwa’us Salaf was a Salafi community with 
limited financial capital. Its main source of financial capital came from 
donations given by individual constituents and supporters. The adherents, 
constituents, and even students who stayed at the community’s boarding 
house were not asked to pay regular organizational dues, but they felt 
religiously obliged to participate financially by giving infaq and shadaqah 
(charities) in accordance with their financial abilities. For a small community 
like Adhwa’us Salaf, these individual donations played a significant role in 
accomplishing routine activities like paying electricity bills and maintenance 
of the learning centre. Sometimes, Adhwa’us Salaf obtained donations from 
its constituents and supporters in response to appeals for particular events it 
organizes. It was also quite common for the constituents and supporters to 
give money personally to the community leaders.  
 Furthermore, Adhwa’us Salaf had no access to grants from state 
agents and institutions, from either the local or central government. It was 
likely that the face of Islam promoted by this community, which was different 
from that informally supported by the government through the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, prevented their access to state funds. The willingness to be 
a self-resilient community, free from state control, also contributed to this 
Yemeni Salafi community’s lack of access to the state-related grants.    
Though it had an ideological relationship with global Salafi authorities 
in Yemen, Adhwa’us Salaf received no financial grants from foreign donors 
including Salafi-oriented charitable organizations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia   
or their representatives in Indonesia. This can be explained by the fact that 
these Middle Eastern donors have been quite selective in providing financial 
support to the Salafi proponents in Indonesia. So far most grants given to the 




organizations in Kuwait that tended to support the Haraki Salafi faction. The 
fact that Adhwa’us Salaf is a community of the Yemeni Salafist faction, which 
is to some extent in conflict with other Salafi factions like the Harakists, may 
explain the absence of access to financial resources, at least in large amounts, 
from Kuwaiti-based charitable organizations like Jam’iyyah Ihyā` al Turās.  
 Consequently, this lack of financial resources caused Adhwa’us Salaf 
to suffer from poor physical resources. Perhaps the most significant material 
resource for this Yemeni Salafi community was a modest multi-purpose 
building. Located on a piece of land donated by individual constituents and 
supporters, this building was used for prayers, a students’ boarding house 
(pondok santri), and religious lecture hall (majlis ta’lim). Attached to the 
building was a room with modest furniture purposed as an office. Other 
property resources available to the Adhwa’us Salaf community included 
some rooms made from bamboo, built next to the multi-purpose building, 
provided for teachers and senior students.  
This was quite similar to other Yemeni Salafi communities such as As-
Sunnah, in Makassar, South Sulawesi province, whose material resources 
included a half-finished mosque and three small modest dormitories; Ma’had 
Ibnu Taymiyyah in Solo, Central Java province, which is located in a closed 
compound, with a modest mosque which functions as the centre of activities 
including learning and teaching Islamic knowledge, a small office, and a 
poorly equipped dormitory; Ihya al-Sunnah in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta 
province, with a simple mosque and two cramped student boarding houses 
with walls made of bamboo and floors covered with plastic mats (Hasan 
2008:258; 2010:690) built on a site of around 300 square metres; Minhaj al-
Sunnah in Magelang, Central Java, with a modest mosque which was also 
used as a centre of learning and teaching activities and the corners were 
occupied by students as their dormitory (Hasan 2008:258; 2010:690); and 




simple mosque which serves as the place of learning and teaching and a 
dormitory of less than twenty students (Hasan 2010:691; 2008:258).         
Likewise, Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism had limited access to financial 
resources. It mostly relied on donations from the readers of its news website, 
adherents and sympathizers to fund its activities and jihad campaign. On its 
website, Arrahmah called for readers to donate money needed for the web 
maintenance and other regular expenses. In addition to some national bank 
accounts, readers or adherents can send money to Arrahmah via PayPal.  
 In regard to property resources, perhaps the most accessible resource 
to the Arrahmah community was a local mosque located in a housing 
compound in South Tangerang, Banten province, where the members lived. 
The mosque played an important role in the development of the community 
as it became the community activity centre functioning, among other 
purposes, as a religious lecture hall (majlis ta’lim) where its leaders taught 
their adherents general Islamic teachings and their particular interpretations 
of jihad. The mosque was established by the local residents of the housing 
compound, but then the committed adherents of Arrahmah, who mostly came 
from outside the compound, succeeded in taking control and making it a 
centre for promoting jihadism.  
 By contrast, the Imam Bukhari community of Haraki Salafism in Solo, 
Central Java, enjoyed good access to material resources to support its 
activities. As seen in inscriptions on the walls of some building units that bear 
the names of their foreign donors, the community gained financial support 
from Saudi and Kuwaiti-based Salafi propagation and charitable 
organizations, at least during its emergence and early development, aimed at 
establishing basic organizational infrastructures. Imam Bukhari also received 
more financial resources from students’ parents and committed adherents 
including school fees and voluntary contributions (infaq and shadaqah). In its 
attempt to maintain its credibility and transparency, it often published a 




 The Imam Bukhari community occupied a two hectare piece of land 
and had access to properties that facilitated the smooth functioning of its 
tasks and programs. Unlike the other Salaf communities, Imam Bukhari had a 
spacious and clean office, which was equipped with a small library, computer 
and the internet. Other resources available to this Haraki Salafi community 
included school buildings, a library, a large two storey mosque, student 
boarding houses, and housing facilities for its teachers or leaders, which 
looked modern and were of permanent construction.         
 This was similar to the conditions of Bin Baz community which 
occupied one hectare of land in Bantul, Yogyakarta. It looked prosperous with 
permanent buildings including schools for kindergarten, elementary and 
primary students, a mosque, an office, a dormitory and teachers’ housing 
facilities. Like the Imam  Bukhari, the Bin Baz had received financial support 
from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait donors as demonstrated by plaques on the 
walls of its buildings that bear   the names of its Middle Eastern donors 
(Hasan 2010:699; 2008:257).   
 This type of material resource was another point where resource 
inequality could be clearly identified within Salafi movement in Indonesia. 
Both Yemeni and Jihadi factions had limited access to financial support and 
property, relying on donations and charities from their adherents and 
participants to carry out their activities. By contrast, the Haraki faction 
gained much better access to material resources as it had appropriate 
physical facilities and receives donations from adherents and grants from 
ideologically linked external organizations. 
Lack of Resources and the Adoption of Internet 
The above investigation of Salafi resources reveals that the state of Salafi 
resources was mainly characterized by a lack of resources and resource 
inequality among the Salafi factions.  All Salafi factions (Yemenists, Harakists 




and support bestowed by external sources. This might be due to the nature of 
Salafism as an uncompromising Islamic movement in moderate Muslim 
society in Indonesia, to which public figures or established organizations 
might be reluctant to provide open support. But, the three Salafi factions had 
the same access to cultural resources including skills and knowledge about 
carrying out specific tasks and programs which are publicly available. 
In other types of resources, the Salafi factions had different access to 
types and amount of resources. The Yemeni Salafi faction had limited access 
to social-organizational, human, and material resources. The Violent Jihadi 
Salafi faction also lacked the same resources. But, the Yemeni Salafi faction 
was slightly better than the Jihadi Salafi faction in that it had access to a 
larger constituency. This lack of resources might have become a constraint on 
Yemeni and Jihadi factions’ development, but it also afforded the factions 
independence from co-optation and control by external groups, including 
financial donors.  
By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction gained more access to tangible 
resources. It had good access to social-organizational resources 
(infrastructure and social network), human resources (labour, skilled 
participants, expertise of teachers-leaders), and material resources (money 
and physical facilities).   
Overall, the Haraki Salafists were the best-resourced Salafi faction, 
while the Violent Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources. 
Nevertheless, the Salafi factions generally had limited access to resources 
when situated within the broader landscape of Islamic movements or 
organizations in Indonesia. They were poorly resourced, particularly in terms 
of external legitimacy, organizational infrastructure, and constituency, 
compared to major Muslim organizations in Indonesia like Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah, whose membership includes tens of millions of people.   
 Undoubtedly, the Salafi factions were aware of this lack of resources 




attempted to overcome it. They attempted to find new resources that could 
be mobilized to further their goals. In this context, they realized that 
information and communication technologies were important organizational 
infrastructures which modern social movements could harness. Therefore, 
the Salafi factions, including the resourceful Haraki Salafi faction, decided to 
turn to the internet as a new resource for mobilization. 
In particular, the Salafi factions argued for the adoption of the internet 
as a new resource for promoting and spreading Salafism to a wider audience. 
The Haraki Salafi faction believed that technological modernization should be 
appreciated by utilizing its benefits, though the faction recognised the 
potential harmful effects of the technology. Indeed, information and 
communication technology such as the internet could be used to greatly 
benefit religious interests. A Haraki Salafi leader said: 
According to Islam, basically, anything that has been developed in the 
era of modernity, like technology, transportation and 
telecommunication, is permitted. Thank God, now, we have many 
facilities, including the internet. The internet is a technology; it is a 
facility just like other technologies. I think there is no problem using it 
as long as it is used for good purposes like spreading Islamic values for 
the readers [of the articles on the websites].3  
Considering the fact that the number of internet users in Indonesia 
has increased significantly within recent years, as access to the internet is 
getting easier and relatively affordable, the Haraki Salafists stressed the 
internet is increasingly an integral part of their strategies of ideological and 
organizational development. They perceived that using the internet was a 
necessary strategy in order to stay up-to-date with modernity and advanced 
technological developments. Using the internet was considered an urgent 
way to keep informed with the “outer world” and contemporary issues. As a 
Haraki Salafi web administrator argued:  “Indeed, the internet is urgent for 
this era. I mean, in this modern era when technology develops rapidly, it is 
                                                          




regrettable when one does not know the internet; he will not know the outer 
world.”4   
Similarly, the Yemeni Salafi faction emphasized the need to embrace 
the internet, arguing that the new media technology had offered more 
possibilities and advantages than old media. The internet provided 
flexibilities and portability so people with access to this new media could use 
it anytime and anywhere. Through internet access, the users were able to 
acquire a wide range of information and share knowledge without spending a 
lot of money or even leaving their homes. Consequently, the Yemeni Salafists 
pointed out that the Salafi presence on the internet was necessary in order to 
provide a wider audience of internet users with information about Salafism.5  
This is also echoed by the Jihadi Salafi faction. Through its news portal, 
www.arrahmah.com, for example, the Jihadi faction declared that it used the 
internet as medium for providing “balanced information’ about Islam and 
Muslims, a space of “intellectual and spiritual struggle” to establish a better 
world, and a facility for spreading Islam in accordance with the Pious 
Predecessors (al-Salaf al-Ṣālih) (http://www.arrahmah.com/about).    
In other words, the internet adoption was a strategy and choice to 
overcome the Salafi factions’ lack of resources crucial for pursuing their 
movement’s goals. They generally perceived that the internet was a part of 
worldly affairs, which could be used as a new important resource in the light 
of Islamic norms and values. They believed that the internet was a useful 
medium for their movement’s purposes, particularly as a modern means of 
Salafi promotion to a wider audience. This positive view of the internet was 
related to the Salafists’ attitude toward modernity, that Islamic values are 
compatible with modernity.   
Our activity, among others, is to try to put the originality of Islam and 
modernization in harmony. I mean, we are not anti-modern people; 
we attempt to benefit from modernization, but we also try to avoid its 
                                                          
4Interview with Ishak, Bogor, 14 October 2010. 




disadvantages. The internet is inseparable from the activity of modern 
societies. If we are anti-internet, we will be restricted. So, we use the 
internet, while keeping its disadvantages to a minimum.6  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the Salafi adoption of the internet was closely 
related to the Salafi factions’ evaluation of how best to bolster or consolidate 
their organizational resources. The findings reveal that the state of resources 
among the Salafi factions was characterized by a general lack of suitable 
resources for collective action. However, different Salafi factions varied in 
their access to resources crucial for collective action. Indeed, lack of 
resources and inequality were noted among all three factions. This condition 
created a rationale for embracing this new mobilizational resource for 
pursuing the Salafi movement’s socio-religious goals. In their attempt to 
overcome the lack of, or to extend their, organizational resources, the Salafi 
factions turned to the internet to enhance collective action and reach a wider 
audience.  
However, since Salafism is a religious movement, theological 
rationales also loom large in legitimating such engagement. Consequently, 
references to religious tradition and religious texts have been integral to 
efforts by Salafists to embrace this technology as an important resource for 
achieving their goals. It is this aspect that is taken up in the next chapter.
                                                          











To better understand why the Salafi factions embraced the internet, this 
chapter examines further attempts by the Salafi factions to overcome their 
lack of resources. It particularly investigates how the Salafi factions defined 
and interpreted the internet as a new resource in a communal discourse 
inspired and supported with references to religious texts. The chapter argues 
that Salafi factions legitimised and heralded the internet as a new resource of 
collective action through narratives informed and guided by Islamic texts and 
Salafi world views.  
The Salafi factions needed to do more than simply justify their use of 
the internet as compensating for their lack of resources, as explained in the 
previous chapter. They required a theological legitimacy in order to engage 
fully with the internet as a new chosen resource. For this purpose, they 
turned to their religious tradition to give a sacred legitimacy for their 
embrace of the internet. The Salafi factions, therefore, framed this new media 
technology in a set of particular narratives in order to integrate it into their 
world view and socio-religious practices. In doing so, they used a set of 
resources of ideology, beliefs, tradition and history as a “cultural toolkit” 
(Benford and Snow 2000:629) to create a communal discourse on the 
internet to justify their embrace of this technology and validate their 
particular engagement with it. This involved a process of defining meaning so 
that internet use or non-use could be integrated into the Salafi factions’ needs 
and purposes.  
This interpretive work is an important step in the process of meaning 
making in that the Salafi factions redefine and reinterpret the internet 




and ideology. This communal discourse on internet is informed and guided 
by selected religious texts and Salafi ideology (manhaj al-salaf) lived out by 
the Salafists so that this new resource is given religious legitimacy and can be 
integrated into their daily socio-religious practices.  
 
A Double-Edged Sword 
The Salafi communal discourse on the internet is strongly characterized by 
the metaphor of a double-edged sword to determine the applicability of the 
internet as a new resource. The Yemeni Salafi faction stressed that the 
internet is like a sword, which can be useful or harmful and has good and bad 
effects; it can be used for good or evil, by good or bad people, in accordance 
with their purposes. The internet is useful and good as long as it is used for 
goodness and religious interests such as for Salafi propagation (da’wah) 
purposes. A leader of the Yemeni Salafi faction explained: 
Speaking about contemporary issues, we found that our ‘ulamā` 
regard the internet as a double-edged sword. It can be used for good 
or bad. The internet is permissible on the condition it is used for 
da’wah purposes and positive things. Do we have to walk while we 
have transportation facilities? It is a virtue if we use the internet and 
the facilities it offers, so our da’wah can reach many people. But, we 
are not allowed to turn a blind eye to the negative impacts the internet 
creates.1  
The Haraki Salafists shared this metaphor and advised users to be 
‘smart’ in using the internet in order to benefit from this technology and 
avoid its disadvantages.2 A Haraki Salafi leader said:  
In our opinion, the internet is a double-edged weapon; it has useful 
and harmful sides, negative and positive edges. So far we have used its 
positive side. It is like television. It is about how we benefit from its 
positive sides. For example, we use the internet for doing da’wah and 
writing articles [on Salafism]... And we see and hear that a number of 
people converted to Islam by virtue of the internet.3  
                                                          
1Interview with Ustadh Ahmadi, Bekasi, 13 October 2010.  
2Interview with Ustadh Satrio, Yogyakarta, 6 October 2010. 





The Salafi factions presented the internet as an acceptable new 
resource through the narrative of halāl (religiously permitted) internet. Yet, 
they also framed it to be a potentially unacceptable technology through the 
narrative of harām (religiously forbidden) internet by highlighting the 
internet’s ‘dangerous’ aspects in which its use could be in conflict with Salafi 
teachings and way of life. These two kinds of internet narratives play an 
important role in the Salafists’ engagement with the new medium because 
they guide the Salafi actors and adherents on how to talk, perceive, and use 
or not use it for the purpose of the Salafi movement. In practice, these 
narratives aim to direct a religiously justified pattern of use in the Salafists’ 
mobilization of the new resource.4    
 
Halāl Internet 
The Salafi factions developed the narratives of halāl internet with the aim of 
justifying this new medium as a new acceptable resource. This was 
illustrated by their perception of the importance of internet for 
contemporary Muslim societies. They believed that technological 
modernization should be welcomed by maximizing its benefits and avoiding 
its harmful effects in the light of religious values and purposes. Although it 
had no precedence in the era of Prophet Muhammad and his companions, 
information technology like the internet could be used for religious interests 
and purposes. 
According to Haraki Salafists, embracing the internet was necessary to 
keep abreast with the development of the “outer world” and contemporary 
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interview the proponents of Salafi Jihadism due to the nature of their organization as closed 
communities highly suspicious of non-members. So, the examination of Salafi factions’ 
narratives of the internet is mostly based on two Salafi factions, namely the Yemeni Salafists 
and the Haraki Salafists. Nevertheless, I assume that the Violent Jihadists generally share the 




issues.5 They argued that this new media technology has offered more 
advantages and possibilities than old media. The internet provides flexibility 
and portability so people with access to this new media can acquire a wide 
range of information about Salafism in efficient and cheap ways.  A Haraki 
Salafist, who worked for a Salafi foundation, stated: 
The internet is comfortable to use. It can be used anytime, anywhere. 
So, busy office workers can access our website anytime, anywhere. 
This access to the internet has helped people understand Salafism and 
opened their mind to accept Salafi da’wah.6  
 
This Haraki Salafists’ positive view of the internet can be explained in 
terms of an attempt to reconcile and harmonise modernity with Islam’s 
origins. A Haraki Salafi leader who graduated from Medina University in 
Saudi Arabia argued:  
Our activity, among others, is to try to put the originality of Islam and 
modernization in harmony. I mean, we are not anti-modern people; 
we attempt to benefit from modernization, but we also try to avoid its 
disadvantages. The internet is inseparable from modern societies. If 
we are anti-internet, we will be restricted. So, we use the internet, 
while keeping its disadvantages to a minimum.7  
 
Likewise, Yemeni Salafists perceived the internet as having more 
advantages than offline media in that it provides users with cheap and 
practical ways of gaining knowledge. A Yemeni Salafi leader said:  
In addition, the internet has more advantages than other offline mass 
media; readers (the internet users) do not need to buy or spend their 
money gaining knowledge, or leave their house to know about 
religious issues. So, compared to the other offline media of da’wah, 
the internet has special advantages.8  
 
Accordingly, the Yemeni Salafists pointed out that it was necessary for 
them to have a presence on the internet in order to provide a wider audience 
of internet users with information about Salafism. As a Yemeni Salafi leader 
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argued “I think the internet is more important than other media because it 
attracts more people to visit our website than face-to-face religious learning 
methods”.9 
 
Internet as Sarana    
The dominant narrative of the halal internet the Salafi factions developed 
was that the internet is a sarana (facility). The Salafists regarded the internet 
as a facility, which is believed to be inherently neutral and value-free so that 
it can be used for any purposes, good or bad. As an instrument, the internet 
can be utilised as long as its usage and effects are not in breach of Islamic 
values and teachings as understood by Salafists.  
According to Haraki Salafi faction, the internet is a useful facility for 
religious purposes, particularly as a modern means of propagation (da’wah) 
of Salafi ideology to a wider audience. They perceived that the internet is a 
part of worldly affairs which can be used in light of Islamic norms and values. 
A young Haraki Salafi leader stated:  
According to Islam, basically, anything that has been developed in the 
era of modernity, like technology, transportation and 
telecommunication, is permitted. Thank God, now, we have many 
facilities, including the internet. The internet is a technology; it is a 
facility just like other technologies. I think there is no problem using it 
as long as it is used for good purposes like spreading Islamic values for 
the readers [of the articles on the websites.10  
 
For the Haraki Salafists, the internet is not only a permissible 
technology, but also a compulsory means for advancing the Salafi 
propagation. A Haraki leader argued: 
We have to explain that the internet, radio, and any communication 
media are sarana (facilities). And basically, all kinds of facilities are 
permissible as long as they are not in contradiction with [religious 
values] or create negative consequences or cause more disadvantages 
than advantages. In line with this, it can be said today, the internet is a 
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necessary means for developing da’wah. If we do not use it, we will 
lose its benefits, which are actually useful for da’wah purposes.11  
 
This view is confirmed by Salafi web administrators who argued that 
the internet is a necessary means for contemporary Muslims because it has 
advantages including its ability to reach a wider audience in different places 
so that it can be mobilized for da’wah purposes.12 Due to its important role in 
global communication, the internet was considered an effective medium for 
spreading information about Islam and Salafi views to a wider audience.13 
Accordingly, the Salafi factions emphasized the good sides of the 
internet as a new useful resource for advancing their ideology and 
movement. The Yemeni Salafists reported that the internet is a modern tool 
that is useful for propagating Salafi ideas as it opens more possibilities for 
people to know about and join Salafism. They perceived that the internet has 
more advantages than print media such as the Salafi magazines that they 
publish monthly.14 They argued that the internet is an efficient medium by 
which the da’wah Salaf can reach a wider audience as it is not limited to time 
and space: it is fast, cheap, and can be done and accessed anywhere and 
anytime.15  
The Yemeni Salafists also regarded the internet as a new resource for 
gaining learning materials and references including books and articles on 
Salafism, to which the Salafi leaders consult for teaching and sermon 
materials. They referred to the websites created by, or dedicated to, the 
‘ulamā` of Salafism in the Middle East. These websites are highly appreciated 
as important resources from which they are able to download articles, fatwa 
and books written by Salafi ‘ulamā` for da’wah purposes. The internet, then, 
has equipped Salafi preachers with necessary knowledge and skills for 
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propagating Salafism. A Yemeni Salafi leader who studied with Yahya al-
Hājūri, a prominent Salafi leader in Yemen, said:  
The Salafi ‘ulamā` in Saudi Arabia and Yemen established their own 
websites. We have benefited from these websites; they are not only 
important as a means of doing the Salafi da’wah to ummah, but also 
beneficial for us, the Salafi preachers, the da’wah activists. These 
websites provide us with literature, references, in the form of books 
and articles, written by Salafi ‘ulamā`, either in Arabic or Indonesian. 
The Salafi preachers are equipped with these resources, which can be 
consulted easily when needed. Through advanced technologies, such 
as mobile phones, we are able to access these resources anytime. 
Praise to God, this makes it easy for us. We, the preachers, have 
benefited from them. We just click “search” for books on religious 
knowledge, then they appear before us. We then select books that we 
want. That is how the internet benefits us.16  
 
This narrative is also echoed by the Haraki Salafists. They contended 
that the internet has become an alternative medium for learning religious 
(Salafi) knowledge since the expansion of the internet into a wider 
Indonesian society in the 2000s. Traditionally held in mosques, pengajian 
(religious learning) can now be organized through the internet by using such 
avenues as Skype and streaming radio. By visiting the websites of local or the 
Middle Eastern Salafi authorities, those who feel uncomfortable or have a 
limited time to come to a religious learning centre are now able to read and 
download the learning materials.17  
The Haraki Salafists also believed that the internet is a tool for 
correcting ‘misunderstandings’ about Salafism. With access to the Salafi 
websites, users can ask questions about any issues related to Salafism so that 
existing misunderstandings and poor representation of “true Salafism” can be 
resolved.   
Through the internet, people can understand what the Salafi da’wah is. 
Undeniably, there are people who are new to Salafism and 
misunderstand the Salafi da’wah and there are those who attempt to 
damage the reputation of Salafism by presenting its image as a 
hardline da’wah. With the presence of the internet, we are able to 
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restore the broken image of the Salafi da’wah; that the Salafi da’wah is 
not an extreme or rigid da’wah.18  
 
Internet as a value-free tool   
Another common Salafi narrative of halāl internet, is the idea the internet is a 
neutral or value-free tool. This deals with the issues about values associated 
with this new media technology. This included the issue that the internet was 
invented and developed by non-Muslims in the West, particularly those in the 
United States of America, whose values and way of life are different from 
those of Muslims. Regarding this issue, the Salafi factions believed that there 
is no problem with the use of products made by non-Muslims provided the 
products are considered religiously lawful. For them, the internet is just like 
other technologies invented by non-Muslims such as cars or mobile phones. 
As explained above, the internet is then considered a tool, which is value-free 
and can be used by everyone, including the Salafists for their social-religious 
needs and purposes. What really concerned the Salafists was how to take 
advantage of the internet for pursuing their movement’s goals and avoid the 
aspects of the internet that are harmful to morality and Islam such as 
pornography and un-Islamic content.  
In this context, most proponents of both Haraki Salafism and Yemeni 
Salafism categorized the internet as part of mu’āmalah, an Islamic teaching 
on interaction and transaction among human beings. Based on this teaching, 
they argued that human interaction and transaction is not only religiously 
permitted among Muslims, but also between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Hence, they emphasised that Muslims are allowed to have mu’āmalah with 
disbelievers such as doing business with them and using their products 
considered lawful according to Islamic teachings. According to these Salafists, 
it is true that the internet was created by disbelievers, but it does not mean 
Muslims are prevented from using the technology because it constitutes a 
                                                          





part of worldly matters and human interaction in which Muslim can 
participate under the guidance of Islamic values.  
To support this, Yemeni Salafists referred to the prophetic stories that 
the prophet Muhammad did business with the Jews and Christians, including 
the report that he pawned his armour to a Jew in Medina.  A Yemeni Salafi 
leader who spent four years in Yeman studying with leading Salafi authorities 
explained:  
With respect to mu’āmalah, trade and the use of the non-Muslims’ 
products, the Messenger of God (Muhammad) did business 
transactions with the Jews and Christians of his time. So, it is not 
prohibited [for Muslims] to use [the products made by non-Muslims] 
provided they are halāl. In regard to the internet, it is allowed to use it 
based on the evidence that Prophet had business with a Jew.19  
 
Similarly, Haraki Salafists shared this view as one of their leader 
argued: 
We do not have a problem with products made by Americans or 
disbelievers. The internet is a technology; it is a worldly affair. The 
users are responsible for avoiding negative aspects of the internet and 
are obliged to add positive content to it so that it can be properly 
used.20  
 
Furthermore, the Salafi factions did not perceive internet use as 
against tashabbuh, a doctrine that Muslims are forbidden to imitate and 
follow particular ways of life of non-Muslims. According to Haraki Salafists, 
the internet is a matter of worldly affairs, not a matter of aqīdah 
(fundamental creed) in which Muslims are forbidden to imitate other 
religions’ beliefs and traditions. This argument reinforced the notion that the 
internet is neutral and value-free regardless of the fact that it was created 
and produced by non-Muslims. Again, Muslims are allowed to use the 
technology for their own purposes and needs in ways that are permitted by 
the Islamic teachings.21  
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To correct the misinterpretation of the doctrine of tashabbuh, the 
Yemeni Salafists interpreted tashabbuh as observing a typical way of life or 
belief lived by a religious faction other than Muslims.  Muslims are prohibited 
from imitating or doing this because it is considered an affirmation of other 
religious communities’ way of life and may jeopardise the purity of Islam 
according to the Salafi ideology. Yemeni Salafists argue it is true that in its 
initial development the internet was created and used by American non-
Muslims, but now it has been used and developed by anyone in the world, 
including Muslim societies. As it no longer belongs to a particular people or 
community, Muslims are allowed to utilise the internet for their own 
benefits.22  
     
Harām Internet   
Although they recognized the usefulness of the internet as a resource of Salafi 
propagation, the Salafi factions also developed narratives of religiously 
forbidden (harām) internet. In these narratives, they framed the internet as a 
danger to the purity of Islam and a threat toward Muslims’ morality. They 
particularly referred to what they considered un-Islamic use and content of 
this media technology. The forms of harām internet, they identified, include 
immoral content such as pornography, ideas regarded as destructive to 
Islamic faith, and harsh criticism and ‘attack’ from those regarded as the 
enemies of Salafism.  
Internet as Threat 
The common Salafi narrative of harām internet was that the internet is a 
dangerous medium in that users can use it to spread ideologies that have the 
potential to destroy Islam and Muslims such as those of Jaringan Islam 
Liberal (the Liberal Islam Network), which attack Salafism through web 
                                                          





content that vilifies the ‘true’ Salafi ideology, and engages in ma’shiyat 
(forbidden things according to Islamic values).  
As I explained, the internet is a technology with unlimited freedom. 
People can view many things that have the potential to distort our 
fundamental faith and ideology. For example, in Indonesia, Jaringan 
Islam Liberal spreads its liberal ideas that have the potential to 
destroy the Muslims’ faith. The internet is also used for spreading 
shirk (idolatry), which also destroys our faith. Moreover, the internet 
has the potential to distort akhlāq (Islamic morality), for example, 
through pornographic contents.23  
 
This was echoed by Yemeni Salafists who pointed to the same internet 
threats. A leader of the Yemeni Salafi faction emphasized:     
It is obvious that technological development does not always create a 
positive impact; it has disadvantages. This is also true for the internet. 
In particular, the internet can be used by anyone, believers and 
disbelievers, bad and good people. Here, the internet is a battlefield 
between good and evil. So, we are concerned with the use of the 
internet by those who intend to distort the Muslims’ faith and 
morality. The internet, and particularly websites, is a challenge to 
religion (Islam).24  
 
 In dealing with these internet dangers, the Salafi factions advocated 
some measures, ranging from providing religious guidance for users to the 
censorship of internet content by the government. Yet, they believed that 
using the internet in responsible and clever ways is the best protection 
against the threats and danger resulting from un-Islamic use and content on 
the internet. A Haraki Salafi leader stressed: 
We have been welcoming of the internet in a clever way. We use the 
internet to its maximum benefit. We should not maintain antipathy 
toward the internet. But, we also do not need to be euphoric. 
Otherwise, we can get trapped by the internet’s disadvantages like 
some cases of Facebook users who did not use the internet in smart 
ways.25  
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Other Haraki Salafists proposed some practical measures including avoiding 
placing a computer in a closed room.  
Faith and fear of God guide one’s use of the internet. There are some 
ways to prevent access to dangerous websites. First, use the internet 
moderately. Do not spend most of your time using the internet. This is 
wrong. Second, do not put your computer in a quiet place, but rather 
in a busy place, so that the user will feel uncomfortable accessing 
‘dangerous’ websites. The devil easily seduces a man in solitude.26  
 
It should be noted that in spite of their recognition of the internet’s 
advantages, the Salafi factions did not regard the internet as a new resource 
that could replace traditional means of religious learning. They believed that 
majlis ta’lim (venues including a mosque where face-to-face religious 
learning is conducted) and other face-to-face religious gatherings are still the 
most important media for transferring and gaining religious knowledge.  
According to Yemeni Salafists, majlis ta’lim remains advantageous in that it 
provides religious knowledge seekers with spiritual benefits which the 
internet is unable to give its users. For example, by attending a majlis ta’lim, 
one will have opportunities to have silaturrahim (maintaining “family bonds” 
among Muslims), one of the highly rewarded virtues in Islam. The internet, 
therefore, is regarded as complementary to the traditional media of religious 
learning and mission.  
Since the beginning, we have asserted that the establishment of our 
website was not aimed at replacing majlis ta’lim. Rather, it was just an 
important alternative or complementary to majlis ta’lim. We do not 
allow followers to learn religious knowledge from only the internet. 
So, majlis ta’lim is still the best means for gaining religious knowledge 
because not only is going to majlis ta’lim religiously rewarding, but it 
also provides an opportunity to maintain relationships among fellow 
Muslims.27  
 
The Salafists also believed that by attending a majlis ta’lim one will 
have a teacher who explains a subject of Islamic knowledge thoroughly so 
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that the listener will gain a “ripe knowledge of Islam”. Studying Islam without 
an instructor, such as by only reading books or articles on the internet, can 
cause learners to misunderstand “true” Islamic knowledge and prevent them 
from gaining barakah (God’s blessings), a spiritual reward believed to be 
given to those who attend majlis ta’lim.28  
Correspondingly, the Haraki Salafists pointed out that to some extent 
the internet is limited in that it is unable to assist Salafi activists to preach 
Salafi ideas in remote areas and proselytise marginalized groups such as 
prisoners without internet access. In these cases, they argued, majlis ta’lim 
and face-to-face religious lectures are the best media to deliver Salafi 
teachings.   
 We can download data and books on religious knowledge from the 
internet. However, we do not find on the internet someone who is able 
to explain those to us; to whom we can ask about those books; we 
often do not know who the authors are. The internet can reach people 
anywhere, including those in their private rooms. But, there are places 
that have no access to the internet and we have to come in person to 
reach them, such as prisons. We go to prisons every Friday to teach 
prisoners what Islam is. Our friends go to a remote area in Gunung 
Kidul (a district in south-eastern Yogyakarta province) that has no 
access to the internet. There are places where face-to-face da’wah is a 
more effective medium than the internet.29  
 
 
Religious Legitimacy of the Internet 
To fully understand this Salafi framing of the internet, it is necessary to 
consider Salafi tradition of religious texts by investigating particular 
ideological beliefs that underlie their narratives of the internet. My 
interviews revealed that the Salafi factions went beyond the idea of the 
internet simply as a useful tool; their narratives imply a religious mandate for 
the use of the internet. To understand more precisely the nature of this 
religious legitimacy requires an investigation of the Salafi religious beliefs 
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that provide the Salafists with a theological foundation for their engagement 
with internet. In this context, uncovering dalīl (evidence) from the Qur’an, 
hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and practices) and other Islamic 
resources that allow Muslims to use the technology, particularly internet, 
becomes indispensable.   
 
Internet Use as Non-Worship Act 
The Salafi factions affirmed that there are no Qur’anic verses or hadith texts 
that explicitly or specifically talk about the use of media technologies 
including the internet. Yet, they turned to some Islamic principles, which 
were derived from the Qur’an, hadith and ushūl al-fiqh (the principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence), believed to give religious legitimacy to their 
engagement with the internet. First of all, both Haraki Salafists and Yemeni 
Salafists based their decision to mobilize the internet as a resource on a 
principle that God has created everything on the earth for human beings so 
that everybody is allowed to use and take benefit from them in accordance 
with divine law. This, they said, includes technologies like the internet. To 
support this, the Haraki Salafi leaders quoted a Qur’anic verse: “It is He Who 
has created for you all that is in the earth” (Al-Baqarah: 29) and a hadith that 
says: “You know best your own worldly affairs (antum a’lam bi umūri 
dunyākum)”.30  
The same religious texts were referred to by the Yemeni Salafists to 
religiously justify their internet adoption. A Yemeni Salafi teacher said: 
Everything on earth is permitted for use, except the things where 
there is evidence from our religion to declare it as forbidden. This is 
based on a Qur’anic verse: “It is He who has created for you all things 
in the earth”. The words “created for you” indicate that we can use 
what has been created in the earth for us. This is evidence from the 
Qur’an that all worldly affairs are permitted until we find evidence 
that says they are forbidden. In the Bukhari’s collection of valid hadith, 
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the Prophet said: “You know best your own worldly affairs”. This 
shows us that he granted us permission to deal with worldly affairs. 
We can use positive aspects of a thing. When there is a revelation that 
forbids it, we stop using it.31  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
It is interesting that the main concern for the Salafi factions was not 
what dalīl (evidence) allows Muslims to use the internet for, but rather what 
dalīl forbids Muslims from using it. When there are no religious texts that 
forbid certain issues, it is permissible for Muslims to engage with them in 
light of universal Islamic values and principles. A Haraki Salafi leader 
explained:  
Instead of questioning whether dalīl allows the use of the internet, we 
are concerned with the issue of what dalīl forbids. As long as there is 
no such dalīl, we can use it because it is a facility that has to do with 
mu’amalah (human interaction). Da’wah is a ritual and religious 
activity, but means for doing da’wah can be anything provided it is not 
in breach of Islamic law. Some people say that there is something 
wrong with the internet. We say, yes, there is something wrong too 
with the telephone, radio and television. But, this does not mean that 
we cannot use them when we say there is a problem with them. 
Otherwise, there will be no communication media that we can use. We 
cannot direct the Muslim ummah to this narrow-mindedness. Instead, 
we see there is no prohibition against the internet. It is an effective 
means for providing da’wah information. So, today ‘ulama, Islamic 
organizations, with some exceptions, use the internet.32  
In this sense, the Salafi factions referred to the principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence to support the permissibility of internet use for their religious 
purposes. The Haraki Salafists supported their arguments by making 
reference to al-aṣl fi al-ashyā` al-ibāhah illa mā warada `an al-tashrī tahrīmuh, 
a principle that everything related to acts of non-worship is permissible 
except those things that Islamic law clearly prohibits them. Based on this 
principle, a Haraki Salafi leader argued that the use of the internet is 
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permitted because it is a non-ritual activity against which there has been no 
religious prohibition provided it is used according to Islamic values.33  
The Yemeni Salafists did the same, quoting another principle of 
Islamic jurisprudence lil wasāil hukm al-maqāṣid, which means the ruling of 
instruments is subject to what they are intended to be and the intention of 
their users. They explained that the internet is a waṣīlah (instrument) that is 
basically halāl, religiously permitted to be used by Muslims provided it is to 
do good things according to Islamic teachings. Yet, it can be harām, 
religiously forbidden, if it is used for doing things that breach religious values 
and ethical norms such as for viewing pornography.   
The Prophet Muhammad climbed to a higher ground to call Muslims 
for ṣalat (prayers) because there was no loud speaker in his time. 
Today we use a loudspeaker to call people for ṣalat. This is 
permissible. Rulings on instruments are determined by their usage. If 
an instrument is used for good, it will be a good; it is bad when used 
for doing evil. If the internet is used as a medium for facilitating 
da’wah, it is permissible.34  
 
 Internet as God’s Gift 
Furthermore, to provide religious legitimacy to their internet use, the Salafi 
factions went beyond the idea of the internet as waṣīlah (instrument); they 
even took the view that the internet is a gift from God (ni’mah). This implies a 
religious mandate to use the internet for good according to Islamic values 
and for religious missions. The Haraki Salafists explained:  
This (the internet) is a gift from Allah, which we have to use for good. 
Just like the radio and the microphone, it is an instrument. When we 
use it for good, it is permitted and even recommended.35 
 
Similarly, the Yemeni Salafists said: 
So, we view the internet as a gift from God given to human beings. We 
make use of it for good. We are aware of the fact that the internet can 
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be used for doing bad. Through the internet, we can call people to 
return to the truth or at least make them interested in it. That is the 
reason why we have engaged with the internet.36  
It is worth noting that the same religious basis of their acceptance of 
the internet caused the Salafi factions to respect human creativity and 
intellectual rights related to this technology. They reported that they are 
against software piracy so that they do not use pirated computer software, 
particularly operating systems. They maintained that using pirated computer 
software is disrespectful towards humans’ hard work. Instead, they use open 
source software or genuine copyrighted products.   
Islam highly respects humans’ work on worldly affairs. Therefore, in 
regard to the internet, we are against software piracy. We use Linux, 
instead of pirated Windows, which are commonly used in this country. 
There is a “Linuxisation” process here [in our Salafi learning centre]. 
Our web admin uses genuine Windows software.37  
 
The above Salafi narratives of the internet suggest that while the 
internet is a global information and communication medium, it operates 
within the confine of local and particular values and ethics shared by its 
users. Through their narratives of the internet, the Salafi factions developed 
“a prescriptive discourse” (Campbell 2010, 137) on the technology, framing it 
as a valuable tool that supports their ideology, core values and practices. In 
such communal discourse, though they disagree on some issues (as discussed 
in Chapter Two), the Salafi factions shared the same narratives of the 
internet. Notwithstanding some variations over when the internet can be a 
religiously and morally forbidden medium, the Salafi factions have largely 
shared positive ideas about the internet as a new resource for propagating 
Salafism (da’wah salafiyyah).  
Emphasizing the instrumental nature and functional utility of the 
internet, the Salafi factions in Indonesia have developed narratives of halāl 
internet with full references to religious texts of the Qur’an, hadith, and 
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Islamic jurisprudence principles. They framed this new media technology as 
not only acceptable but also a valuable instrument which is inherently 
neutral so that it can be used in light of their religious values and 
organizational purposes including dissemination of the ideology of Salaf 
supremacy for a wider audience. The same holds true when they attempt to 
frame narratives of harām internet. Drawing on certain Islamic texts, the 
Salafis have warned Muslims of the potential dangers and actual threats of 
un-Islamic internet use to what they consider ‘pure Islam’. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the Salafi embrace of the internet is closely and 
explicitly linked with the Salafi religious world view and ideology. To 
embrace the internet fully as a new resource, the Salafi factions needed more 
than an organisational justification as explained in the previous chapter. As 
religious text-based and oriented factions, the Salafists sought to claim 
theocratic legitimacy for their internet use through a communal discourse of 
the internet with strong references to religious texts. This provided the 
proponents of the Salafi factions with a framework of how to perceive and 
utilize the internet, and more importantly a religious legitimacy for their 
adoption and mobilization of the new medium as an acceptable new resource 
for promoting Salafi ideology. 
 These narratives demonstrate that religious ideology plays a key role 
in Salafi factions’ adoption of the internet. Religious values and tradition 
provide a theological foundation for the Salafists’ responses to the 
introduction of the internet into their socio-religious practices. Since 
religious texts play a central role in formulating their ideology and guiding 
their practice, the Salafists depend heavily on the Qur’anic texts, hadith, and 
the Salafi ‘ulama in giving legitimacy to the internet use. Not only do the 




legitimising their mobilization of the medium for their religious needs and 
purposes. At this point, we see a spiritually-rich engagement with the 
internet technology, which distinguishes religious users like the Salafists 
from non-religious ones, such as a football club or a corporation, for example.  
The Salafi framing of the internet suggests that the Salafi factions are 
not passive receivers or blind rejecters of the internet. Their engagement 
with the internet involves processes of negotiation with opportunities 
opened by the internet in light of Salafi ideology and beliefs. Given such 
specific motivations, the Salafi factions are involved in a technological 
practice in which they attempt to religiously shape the meaning and purpose 
of the internet.   
As a whole, this chapter and the previous one have addressed the 
question of why the Salafi factions embraced the internet, by examining the 
connection between the Salafi factions’ internet adoption, their resource 
availability, and their religious framing of the internet. Both argue that lack of 
resources combined and supported with theological legitimacy have 
encouraged and motivated the Salafi factions to adopt the internet as a new 
important resource that is in line with their organizational goals of 
promoting Salafi ideology to a wider audience. 
This begs important questions. How have the Salafi factions actually 
mobilized the internet as a new resource? Is their shared positive attitude 
toward the internet reflected in their actual mobilization of new medium? 









Having discussed why the Salafi factions have embraced the internet in the 
previous chapters, this study now addresses how these factions actually 
mobilized this newly adopted resource. Salafists claimed that they used the 
internet to accomplish the religious obligation of da’wah salafiyyah, namely 
propagating Salafism to a wider audience. How did they actually mobilize this 
new resource to achieve this goal?  To answer this question, this chapter and 
the following three chapters examine how Salafi factions with different 
access to resources mobilized the internet for collective action. To this end, 
certain types of internet use by the Salafi factions are identified, enabling the 
development of a typology of internet mobilization salient to the Salafi 
movement. Most importantly, these chapters demonstrate that the internet 
has varied and differentiated significance for the different factions of the 
Salafi movement by showing that the less well-resourced Salafi factions 
mobilize the internet more than those with good access to resources.    
This chapter initially begins by identifying and describing the type of 
Salafi use of the internet as an instrumental resource for constructing and 
promoting the ideology of Salafism as a collective identity. This ideology 
includes the view of Salafi supremacy as a perfect model of understanding 
and practicing Islam, in addition to other common Salafi doctrines. Second, 
the chapter analyses the linkage between the Salafi factions’ actual 
mobilization of websites for constructing and promoting the ideology of 
Salafism and the state of resources among the factions, highlighting the 
possible implications of this internet use for the Salafi factions. It is argued 




constructing the ideology of Salafism, they did not actually mobilize it for this 
purpose in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi factions tended 
to mobilize the internet to construct the ideology of Salafism more actively 
than the relatively resource-rich ones. The different states of resources 
among the Salafi factions contributed to this varied actual mobilization of the 
internet by the factions.       
In this chapter, I confine my analysis to the way the Salafi factions 
mobilized the internet to spread and promote the ideology of Salafism 
because ideology, just as for other movements in general, plays a core role in 
the rise and development of Salafism, and is thus, deserving of serious 
attention. Hence, though they present information which would be valuable 
for future scholars to analyse, other promotional uses of websites such as 
announcements and promotions of the activities of Salafi foundations, were 
not regarded as pertinent to the line of analysis of this thesis.    
The analysis of this Salafi use of the internet to promote ideology was 
mainly based on texts in the form of articles posted on Salafi websites. This 
has to do the fact that Salafi websites are generally text-based as Salafists 
tend to avoid the usage of images and visuals in their websites, particularly 
those of living creatures, since these would be considered religiously 
forbidden. The analysis, then, was based on, and supported with, textual 
quotes from web articles and interviews, instead of visual texture and 
imagery. 
Drawing on the framing process theory (Benford and Snow 2000; 
Snow and Benford 1988), this chapter examines the extent to which Salafi 
factions with different access to resources used websites to construct the 
collective identity of the Salafi ideology. The chapter does this by identifying 
diagnostic (that is, what the problem is), prognostic (how to address the 
problem) and motivational (why the problem should be addressed) framing 
tasks in regard to ideational views and beliefs of Salafism. Oliver and 




in the analysis of ideology. They suggest that ideology is a system of beliefs 
that underlies framed events and views, whereas a frame represents 
ideological content put into practice in attempts to interpret an event (Oliver 
and Johnson 2000). When extended to media texts, the concept of frames 
helps explain the integration of factors related to discourse, ideology and 
material power (Budarick and King 2008). It can be used to investigate the 
way the news workers interpret an event and frame it discursively in the 
media product (Gitlin 1980 in Budarick and King 2008). 
Within the context of the internet and the Salafi movement in 
Indonesia, the Salafi websites provide texts which can be analysed to 
determine the movement’s framing of its religious ideology. In the analysis 
which follows, articles and postings from selected Salafi websites were 
analysed in order to identify how each of the Salafi factions used the web for 
ideological construction and promotion. Those websites included for analysis 
were selected based on their content dealing with the ideas of Salaf method 
(manhaj al-salaf) and common Salafi doctrines including tawhīd, sunnah, 
bid’ah, and al-walā` wa al-barā`, which refer to the construct of Salafism as a 
religious ideology.  This will reveal the extent to which each Salafi faction 
mobilizes its websites as new important resources to construct and promote 
its religious ideology on the World Wide Web, according to that faction’s 
access to resources.   
 
 
Salafi Interpretation of the Eclipse of the Muslim World:  
A Diagnostic Framing 
In pursuing their goals, Islamic movement activists are commonly involved in 
the identification of problems facing the Muslim ummah (global Muslim 
society) and their causes. They attempt to provide answers to the questions 
“What’s wrong with the Muslim ummah?” and “Who or what to blame?” or 
“Who is responsible for problems facing the Muslim ummah?” This diagnostic 




supporters. They attempted to diagnose the eclipse of Islamic civilization 
over the last three centuries by providing answers to what exactly is 
happening in the social and political life of Muslim societies, and why they 
experience this misfortune. 
This attempt consitutes a diagnostic framing. It refers to a process in 
which social movement activists uncover and describe an event, an aspect of 
socio-political life or a system of government as problematic so that it is in 
need of solution, change or transformation. After problems are diagnosed, 
the next task entails attributing blame and responsibility (Benford and Snow 
2000:615-616). 
Accordingly, as a contemporary Islamic movement, Salafism founded 
its ideology on the realities of Muslim societies in the contemporary world. 
The Salafi ideology, then, is a form of the Salafists’ responses to social, 
economic, political and religious problems facing the contemporary Muslim 
ummah. Diagnosing these problems, the Salafists believed that a variety of 
factors have caused the socio-political-religious problems experienced by 
Muslim societies. These include internal factors that have to do with what the 
Salafists regarded as un-Islamic beliefs and practices long adopted by the 
Muslim ummah, such as reprehensible religious innovation (bid’ah), blind 
imitation of the long established schools of thought (taqlīd), and the 
involvement of human desire and intellect in understanding and practicing 
religious texts. External factors were also thought to have contributed to 
contemporary Muslims’ socio-religious problems including Western 
civilization and its by-products such as rationalism, secularism, feminism and 
democracy.  
 
What is Wrong with the Muslim Ummah? 
The Yemeni Salafists used the internet to express their views on the 
challenges and problems facing the contemporary Muslim ummah. Through 




in the context of the global eclipse of Islamic civilization experienced by the 
Muslim world. They diagnosed the problems as multi-dimensional crises 
endured by global Muslim communities, rather than as a sectoral or partial 
misfortune. These crises have caused Muslims not only to lose their glory in 
the form of religious, political and scientific dominance they achieved in the 
early centuries of Islam until the Middle Ages, but also to fall under the 
domination of the unbelievers (the West) over the last three centuries.  
As to what it was about these multi-dimensional crises that brought 
about the eclipse of the Islamic world, the diagnosis proposed by the Yemeni 
Salafi faction and projected through its websites was that these are moral and 
faith crises rooted in religious and moral degradation. These crises have 
made Muslims vulnerable to the attacks of external un-Islamic ideologies and 
practices such as liberalism and internal ones like Shiism. Luqman Ba’abduh, 
a prominent leader of Yemeni Salafi faction, explained:   
Today, Islam is experiencing various forms of crisis.  The Muslim 
ummah is experiencing religious degradation so that many Muslims 
do not observe prayers. The morality of Muslim youth is no longer 
guided by Islam; they tend to follow and imitate the unbelievers. 
Muslims are also undergoing faith degradation. Many anti-Islamic 
creeds are emerging; Shiites openly propagate their evil; books on 
communism are freely sold in bookstores; and liberalism is being 
actively disseminated among the Muslim youth. It is difficult to block 
this. All this has done damage to the Muslim ummah.1 
 
For the Yemeni Salafists, this religious degradation was manifested in 
the fact that although quantitatively their population is large, Muslims are 
qualitatively ignorant of their own religion. Rather than holding to ‘the true 
Islam’, the majority of contemporary Muslims practice bid’ah (reprehensible 
religious innovations) and get involved in beliefs and practices of shirk 
(deification or worship of anyone or anyone other than the One God; 
polytheism), both regarded as capital sins in Salafi Islam. A Yemeni leader 
                                                          
1“Memahami dan Mengamalkan Islam secara Kaffah”, 
Http://mimbarsunnah.org/Memahami-Dan-Mengamalkan-Islam-Secara-Kaffah-1, accessed 




said: “It is true that the total population of Muslims in the world is huge. But, 
we regret that the majority of Muslims do not understand the Islam that was 
brought by the Prophet [Muhammad] and disseminated by his companions”.2  
Due to their ignorance of the principles of understanding and observing 
Islamic teachings, contemporary Muslims were regarded as having fallen to 
taqlīd, the practice of following blindly the rulings of their religious leaders or 
scholars of Islamic law schools. The practice of taqlīd does not require 
Muslims to know the scriptural bases of the edicts or opinions issued by 
religious leaders. As a result, in the view of the Yemeni Salafists, Muslims 
were ignorant of ‘the true Islam’ which is derived from divine sources (the 
Qur’an and Sunnah) and they were involved in internal conflicts and 
sectarianism. Abu Hamzah argued:  
Since they are ignorant of the principles of the correct understanding 
and practice of Islam, many Muslims have fallen into the vicious circle 
of taqlīd and sectarianism. They prioritise the words of their teachers, 
leaders, or schools of law, rather than the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the 
Salaf understandings.3     
 
In addition, the Yemeni Salafi faction identified problems facing 
contemporary Muslim societies to be due to an economic crisis with poverty 
as its main form. As Luqman Ba’abduh said: “People complain about their 
economic life. We see more and more economic difficulties in the life of the 
Muslim ummah. We see these problems everyday”.4  
The Yemeni Salafists offered a further diagnosis on their websites that 
the real crisis was disunity within the Muslim ummah, which resulted in 
conflict and even enmity among Muslims as each faction claims it has the 
truth and condemns other factions. The Yemeni Salafists believed that this 
internal division was consistent with the Prophet Muhammad’s prophecy 
                                                          
2http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/pelipur-lara-di-tengah-keterasingan.html, 
accessed 28 April 2010. 
3http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/04/17/pergolakan-taqlid-dalam-sorotan-bagian-
pertama/, accessed 26 April 2010.  
4http://mimbarsunnah.org/Memahami-Dan-Mengamalkan-Islam-Secara-Kaffah-1, accessed 




that Muslims after his death would split into seventy three groups, from 
which only one faction is saved, namely those who follow his tradition and 
that of his Companions. Abu Rosyid asserted:   
We witness an undeniable phenomenon that the Muslim ummah has 
divided into many groups and sects. The Messenger of God 
[Muhammad] foretold that his ummah would split into seventy three 
groups who would enter Hell except one, namely a faction that follows 
the Messenger of God and his Companions. If these groups were asked, 
each faction will answer that they keep a steadfast grip on the Qur’an 
and Sunnah. However, we see that these groups contradict each other, 
in enmity one to another, split, and are not united within a single 
method.5  
 
Addressing the same problems facing the Muslim ummah, the Jihadi 
Salafi faction maintained that these were closely related to an identity crisis. 
Through its websites, the faction pointed out that Muslims have lost their 
‘Islamic identities’ as they turned to ‘un-Islamic identities’ promoted by the 
enemies of Islam and targeted at young Muslim generations. Western 
ideologies and cultures such as secularism were the most often quoted ‘un-
Islamic identities’ embraced by contemporary Muslim generations. The 
Arrahmah community wrote: 
Current Muslim generations have lost their true identities as they 
become the victims of bad ideologies. They are like a tall tree with 
branches that reach the sky, but without strong roots in the ground. 
They do not have the power to overcome the turbulence facing them. 
The Muslim majority’s way of life is not the way guided by Islam. As a 
result, their fate is similar to those who lie about their religion.6    
 
For the Jihadi Salafists, this identity crisis brought about other crises 
facing the Muslim world. These include the plight of Muslim ummah, the 
decadence of Islamic civilization and the loss of Islamic domination in the 
world.7    
                                                          
5http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=289, accessed 21 April 2010. 
6http://www.arrahmah.com/kajian-islam/propaganda-menjauhkan-islam-dari-kaum-
muslimin.html#sthash.CfVfDHzg.dpuf , accessed 22 July 2014. 
7http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2011/25/17018-ustadz-abu-jibriel-menelusuri-sebab-




In regard to the problems facing contemporary Muslim societies, the 
Haraki Salafi faction shared the same diagnosis of multi-dimensional crises 
facing the Muslim ummah as the Yemeni faction. Yet, the proponents of this 
Salafi faction did not mobilize their websites to elaborate on these issues. 
They just added that these Muslim world crises took the form of natural 
disasters and environmental destruction. The Haraki Salafists believed that 
these were divine punishments because Muslims had breached God’s laws. 
Worldwide natural disasters and life difficulties were regarded as a 
consequence of human negligence of God’s straight path. They said:  
All this is an undisputable rebellion against God’s command and 
prohibitions, which has resulted in His anger. Due to this, punishments 
have come: floods, earthquakes, tornados, landslides, fires, volcanic 
eruptions, airplane crashes, etc. [God said]: “Corruption has appeared 
throughout the land and sea by [reason of] what the hands of people 
have earned so He [Allah] may let them taste part of [the consequence 
of] what they have done that perhaps they will return [to 
righteousness] (Qur’an 30: 41).8   
 
Who to Blame?  
The next step of diagnostic framing of the problems confronting the Muslim 
world involved finding causes of the identified problems. The Salafi factions   
attempted to answers the question what and who is to blame or is 
responsible for the problems. Unlike most Islamist movements, the Salafi 
factions developed an inward-looking approach to finding answers to this 
question. They generally did not point their fingers at external powers such 
as USA or the West as the primary sources of Muslims’ grievances. Rather, the 
Salafi factions adopted a self-critical approach and focused more on internal 
factors. For them, there was no one to blame for the misery of Muslims except 
Muslims themselves.  
                                                          




On this issue, the Yemeni Salafists believed that the eclipse of the 
Muslim world and the multi-dimensional crises explained above were due to 
one single cause:  Muslims have abandoned ‘the true path of Islam’.      
Indeed, the Muslim ummah are at a crossroad. They live in misery in 
ways that the history of Islam has never witnessed before. Many crises 
and disasters come and go, befalling Muslims. All this is because 
Muslims today are weak and do not observe God’s law. Consequently, 
we see that many Muslims now have lost their countries and wealth; 
they live in fear, are confused, and in shock.9  
 
The Yemeni Salafists emphasized that the decline of the Muslim world 
in the last three centuries was attributed to Muslims’ deviation from ‘true 
Islamic teachings and values’. Muslims were considered to have ignored the 
teachings of the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition (Sunnah) as seen in the 
widespread practice of forbidden religious innovations (bid’ah) and the 
practice of deification or worship of anyone or anyone other than the One 
God (shirk). The Yemeni Salafists believed these practices contaminated the 
purity of Islam and prevented Muslims from accessing the true messages of 
Islam, which provide true guidance in dealing with the problems and 
challenges of modernity. In other words, they believed that ignoring the 
messages of Islam as prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunnah has caused the 
Muslim ummah to lose the ability to deal with challenges of modernity and 
unbelievers. For them, too much love of worldly affairs and material wealth is 
the main cause of Muslims’ ignorance of the true Islam. They said: 
All this is caused by the Muslims’ lack of attention to their religion and 
the prophetic traditions. They do not pay serious attention anymore to 
pursuing religious knowledge because they are too busy with the 
worldly businesses that keep them away from their religion. They are 
no longer interested in attending religious learning circles. As a result, 
religion [Islam] and the prophetic tradition appear strange and alien to 
them.10  
 
                                                          
9http://assunnah-qatar.com/manhaj-artikel-198/618-islam-awalnya-asing-dan-akan-
kembali-dalam-keadaan-asing.html, accessed 3 June 2010.  
10http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/aqidah/potret-ummat-di-akhir-zaman.html, 




In regard to this issue, Jihadi Salafi faction believed that ‘the enemies 
of Islam’ ‒often referred as Jews, Christians and the West in general‒ have 
played a role in attempts to destroy Islam and Muslims. Through their media 
and cultural propaganda, these enemies were regarded as having attempted 
to keep Muslims away from ‘the true Islam’, to lead them to embrace 
ideologies other than Islam, and to reject the implementation of Islamic law.     
Look at the way people live; many of them are morally decadent, drug 
users, gamblers and prostitutes. All this happens because people reject 
Islamic law and prefer secular laws in their attempt to overcome their 
problems. Unfortunately, the majority of Muslim people have become 
opportunists and weak targets of un-Islamic ideologies... As a result, 
many people claim to be Muslims, but in fact they have lost their Islamic 
identities and reject Islamic law. It is a fact that the enemies of Islam 
have always made every effort to put out the light of Islam.11  
 
Nevertheless, Jihadi Salafists generally recognized that the real causes 
of the eclipse of the Muslim world had much more to do with internal 
conditions within the contemporary Muslim community. Like the other two 
Salafi factions, they believed that the enemies of Islam would have no effect 
on Muslims if Muslims truly embraced Islam. Muslims should blame 
themselves for their loss of religious, political, economic and scientific 
dominance over the world.  
Jihadi Salafists stressed that the Muslim ummah have lost their 
religious and political domination of the world because they have left the 
guidance of the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition behind and, instead, 
followed their sectarian leaders,12  had weak faith in their own religion, had 
inadequate knowledge of it, and decline to live a life under its laws. The 
Arrahmah community reported: 
Ustadz Abu Jibriel (the community leader) emphasized that the 
unfortunate conditions facing the Muslim community, namely 
humiliation and backwardness, are not because they are a small 
                                                          
11http://www.arrahmah.com/kajian-islam/propaganda-menjauhkan-islam-dari-kaum-
muslimin.html#sthash.CfVfDHzg.dpuf  accessed 22 July 2014.  
12http://www.arrahmah.com/kajian-islam/sebab-utama-kehancuran-umat-beragama-




population, but rather because they are weak in faith, ignorant of Islam 
and unwilling to implement Islamic law… He pointed out that their 
fading faith in Islam, ignorance, limited knowledge of Islam, moral 
degradation within Muslim society, corrupt leaders, and cowardly 
mentality are causes of the eclipse of Islam.13    
 
Haraki Salafists echoed similar self-criticism. They specifically 
explained in their websites that the decline of the Muslim ummah was closely 
linked to the fact that Muslims have neglected tawhīd (the belief in the One 
God), the very core of Islam, by which the Prophet Muhammad began and 
ended his calling to Islam. A Haraki Salafi community claimed: 
It is a fact that Muslims have slumped because they suffer from a 
spiritual degradation: they have strayed from the straight path 
particularly tawhīd, whereas tawhīd is the main guidance and 
foundation of everything. They are right if their tawhīd is right. And if 
their tawhīd is not correct, they will be doomed. Tawhīd is the first and 
the last teaching of Islam that the Prophet Muhammad taught. It is the 
foundation of a great success.14 
 
For Haraki Salafists, Muslims’ abandonment of ‘the true path of Islam’ 
was manifested in their incorrect understanding of their religion. Sectarian 
and political interests, rather than Islam’s interests, have prevented Muslims 
from gaining the correct knowledge of Islam in accordance with the ways of 
the Prophet and the Salaf. Ahmad Fais remarked:  
The real problem is that Muslims are divided into partisan groups so 
that their views are influenced by their faction and sectarian interests. 
What is right or wrong is determined by these partisan interests. This is 
because Muslims do not understand their religion properly; they have 
abandoned Islam.15 
 
Haraki Salafists claimed that this lack of correct knowledge of Islam 
resulted from the fact that most Muslims did not learn Islam from experts in 
Islam, namely the Salafi ‘ulamā`, but rather from popular mass media 
                                                          
13http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2011/25/17018-ustadz-abu-jibriel-menelusuri-sebab-
sebab-kemuliaan-dan-kehinaan-umat-islam.html, accessed 22 July 2014. 
14http://www.hasmi.org/kemurnian-tauhid-ruh-penggerak-kebangkitan-sejati.html, 
accessed 13 July 2010. 




preachers, like Islamic televangelists, who were considered not to have 
adequate knowledge and understanding of Islam. Contemporary Muslims no 
longer paid respect to ‘ulamā`, and even humiliate them. Consequently, since 
Muslims were no longer aware of the true Islam, they were vulnerable to 
division and conflict among themselves.16  
Furthermore, in this diagnostic framing, Haraki Salafists developed a 
narrative that problems facing the contemporary Muslim ummah were 
caused by the Muslims’ sin of leaving and ignoring God’s laws and messages 
as prescribed in the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition. Hence, the plight of 
the Muslim ummah was considered to be a divine punishment for their sins. 
As a Haraki Salafi leader emphasized: 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to identify the disease that has 
destroyed the Muslim ummah and makes them weak to be our own sins.  
Lots of evidence from the Qur’an indicates this, such as this: “Why [is it 
that] when a [single] disaster struck you [on the day of Uhud], although 
you had struck [the enemy in the battle of Badr] with one twice as great, 
you said, “From where is this?” Say, “It is from yourselves [due to your 
sin]” (Qur’an 3: 165).17 
 
Based on this self-critical diagnostic framing, it is worth noting that 
Haraki Salafists criticized other Islamic movements that often blamed the 
unbelievers’ conspiracy for the problems confronting the Muslim ummah.  A 
Yogyakarta-based Haraki Salafi leader argued:  
Some people said that the root of the problems facing the Muslim 
ummah is the conspiracy of Islam’s enemies, namely the unbelievers, 
and their victory over Muslims. They offered a solution that [Muslims] 
must make themselves busy with the unbelievers’ strategies and 
thoughts. Let us analyse this using our two sources of guidance, namely 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  The Qur’an says: “If you are patient and fear 
Allah, their plot will not harm you at all” (Quran 3:120). This verse 
clearly shows that if we truly fear Allah, the conspiracy of enemies is 
not a threat at all.18  
 
                                                          
16http://www.almanhaj.or.id/content/735/slash/0, accessed 22 June 2010.     
17http://ustadzaris.com/solusi-dari-problema-umat-islam, accessed 2 June 2010.  




As a consequence, Haraki Salafists were convinced that contemporary 
Muslims were not entitled to victory because they did not meet the required 
criteria set by God, namely having true faith in God, observing His laws and 
doing righteous deeds. Instead, as a punishment, God let the unbelievers gain 
victory over the Muslim world.   
The current [Muslim] generations do not meet requirements to achieve 
victory so that Allah allows no victory for them. They are humiliated in 
their own countries and their dignity is trampled by the unbelievers 
and deviant people. The unbelievers have led some Muslim countries 
into the ideology of communism and others into Christianity. Bait al-
Maqdis [Jerusalem] has been seized by the Zionists, the killers of the 
prophets, and the damned as mentioned in the Qur’an.19  
 
Based on the above narrative prevalent in the Salafi factions’ use of 
websites examined here, it is clear that there was an ideological homogeneity 
within the Salafi movement in terms of diagnostic framing of the challenges 
facing the contemporary Muslim world. The Salafi factions utilised websites 
to construct the ideology of Salafism by, first, framing problems and 
challenges facing the Muslim ummah. They had a common diagnosis that 
these problems and challenges were multi-dimensional crises --social, 
political, religious, and environmental-- that have caused the decline of the 
Muslim world over the past three centuries. The causes of these crises were 
closely related to the Muslims’ ignorance and abandonment of the ‘true 
Islam’. The Salafi factions used their websites to promote an inward-looking 
approach to their identification of the problems occurring within the Muslim 
ummah and their causes. They did not view the external factors like the 
conspiracy of unbelievers against Muslims as the most responsible for the 
problems facing the Muslim world. Rather, they perceived that crises and 
misfortune of contemporary Muslims should have resulted from their own 
sins of ignoring ‘the true messages’ of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In other words, 
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in fact Muslims were responsible for the eclipse of the Islamic world and they 
should have blamed themselves for all crises facing them.  
Salafism as a Solution: A Prognostic Framing 
For the Salafists, diagnostic framing alone was not enough for a 
comprehensive analysis of problems facing the Muslim ummah as it did not 
translate into a solution and plan of action. Therefore, they then conducted 
the next framing task, namely prognostic framing to answer the question 
“How should the problem be resolved?” or “What is to be done?”  This task 
stipulates specific remedies and solutions for the identified problems in the 
process of diagnostic framing, and proposes tactics for achieving goals 
(Benford and Snow 2000:616).  
In response to the above-diagnosed problems of the Muslim world, 
the Salafi factions used their websites to call for a return to the ‘pure Islam’ as 
the only solution to these problems of contemporary Muslims. Their 
prognostic answer to those problems was unequivocal: return to the ‘pure 
Islam’ whose true messages ironically have been abandoned by 
contemporary Muslims. For them, the rhetoric of “coming back to the pure 
Islam” requires re-Islamizing Muslims, having true faith and observing 
righteous deeds as prescribed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In order to 
regain religious and political victory, as the first Muslim generations 
achieved, the contemporary Muslim ummah must meet these requirements.   
Is it possible for Muslims to achieve victory and glory? The answer is 
found in the Qur’an 24:55 that to regain victory and glory, we must 
meet the required criteria: believing in Allah and doing righteous 
deeds... This includes keeping our creed in the true path and practicing 
rituals in line with the Prophet’s tradition.20  
  
As to how to realize such a project, the Salafi factions emphatically 
turned to manhaj al-salaf (the Salaf method) as the best and only way to 
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come back to ‘the pure Islam’. The Haraki Salafi faction argued through its 
websites that the Salaf method was the only solution that will lead Muslims 
to the ‘pure Islam’ because Haraki Salafists regarded it was the true way of 
the Prophet Muhammad and his righteous Companions in understanding and 
observing Islam which all Muslims must follow in order to revive Muslim 
societies. A Haraki Salafi community website stressed:   
The only solution [to the problems facing the Muslim world] is to follow 
al-Salaf al-Ṣālih (the Pious Predecessors) in our attempts to change, 
reform, and revive the Muslim ummah. Imam Malik (a great scholar in 
the second century of Islam) said: “The Muslim ummah will not have a 
good ending unless they follow al-Salaf al-Ṣālih.21   
 
In particular, Haraki Salafists believed that following the manhaj al-
salaf was a solution to disunity within the Muslim ummah.22 They argued that 
the Salaf way was a uniting entity for it calls all Muslim factions to come to a 
single way of understanding and practicing Islam as best exemplified by the 
Salaf.  They believed that propagating the Salafi ideas (da’wah salafiyyah) 
would unite Muslim factions into a single global Muslim community because 
it called them to come back to the ‘pure Islam’ as practiced by the Pious 
Predecessors. As a Haraki Salafi leader said:   
As the only true Islamic method (manhaj), Salafism is a uniting system, 
not a divisive one. The Salafi da’wah (proselytization) calls for unity, not 
division, among the Muslim ummah...[because] it calls for the 
purification of Islam from the stains of shirk (polytheism), bid’ah 
(heresy) and other deviations, as well as the implementation of pure 
Islamic teachings. [By doing this], Muslims will be united and freed 
from sectarian fanaticism, and more importantly from God’s 
punishment. 23 
 
To put this solution into practice to answer problems confronting the 
Muslim world, Haraki Salafists explained that Muslims should have begun 
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with learning Islam thoroughly by following the ways of Prophet Muhammad, 
his Companions and the Salafi ‘ulamā`. They criticised those who claim to be 
the followers of Salaf, but were actually Salafi imposters. To support this, 
they referred to the Qur’anic texts (e.g. Qur’an 6:153) and the Prophetic 
sayings, which they interpreted as indicating that Muslims must follow the 
Salaf in their attempt to understand and practice Islam. A Haraki Salafi 
community wesbite argued:  
We are obliged to understand Islam in line with true understanding set 
by our prophet, his companions and our al-Salaf al-Ṣālih (Pious 
Predecessors). We must do this in order to follow God’s straight path.24  
 
The next steps involved, according to Haraki Salafists, implementing 
exactly what Muslims have learned; they were not allowed to add to, or 
deduct from what has been ordered and written in the religious texts. This 
should be implemented as one’s personal efforts, family obligation and social 
responsibilities.  In addition, a return to the ‘pure Islam’ requires Muslims to 
practise da’wah, calling people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, to Islam 
using the Salafi methods of understanding and practices. Calling people to 
Islam through Salafism was regarded by Salafis as a personal duty of every 
Muslim.25  
Consequently, Haraki Salafists believed, once Muslims have had 
understood and implemented the ‘pure Islam’, they would achieve the 
promised glory and victory over their enemies.  They claimed:  
This [return to Islam in line with the Salaf method] is the only way we 
can fight back and free our seized lands. We deserve glory from Allah 
once we have returned and saved our religion.26     
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As they returned to the authentic Islam through the manhaj al-salaf, 
Haraki Salafists believed, Muslims in the world would be united in a single 
creed (aqīdah) and untainted religious practices (`ibādah). The Muslim 
ummah would seize social and political power to overcome their problems, 
challenge the dominating power of the non-believers, establish global Islamic 
societies, and finally regain glory (religious and political dominance and 
leading roles in science) all over the world.  Islamic societies and a caliphate 
(khilāfah; Islamic global state) were regarded as the only logical consequence 
of the comprehensive observing of the ‘true Islam’. A Haraki Salafi 
community asserted:   
True Islamic societies and khilāfah (Islamic global state) can only be 
achieved by those who are committed to ‘pure Islam’, have understood 
Islam, and are fully dedicated to realise [its teachings] in 
comprehensive ways.27  
 
The Yemeni Salafi faction through its websites also confirmed this belief 
in the return to ‘true Islam’ according to the manhaj al-salaf as the only 
remedy for the problems facing the Muslim ummah. In more detail, referring 
to the scriptural texts particularly the Qur’an 24:55, Yemeni Salafis claimed 
that once Muslims have followed God’s law, held the true faith in God and 
done righteous deeds according to the Salafi method, they would be 
rewarded in the following ways. First, Muslims would be given power over 
other social-religious communities in the world in the form of an Islamic 
caliphate. Second, Islam would be a victorious religion, for none would dare 
to humiliate Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, and Muslims. Finally, Muslims 
would have a prosperous and harmonious life, free from fear, poverty and 
misery. When Muslims truly observe all divine orders and prohibitions, they 
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would receive blessing, guidance, and the promised heaven, and everything 
on the earth would be provided and blessed for them.28  
Similarly, through its websites, the Jihadi Salafi faction promoted that 
the only remedy for the global crises facing the Muslim ummah was a return 
to the ‘true Islam’ through the manhaj al-salaf. The proponents of this faction 
argued that in order to claim victory over the world, Muslims must follow the 
Qur’an and Sunnah according the practice and understanding of the Salaf, not 
that of faction leaders or recent religious leaders. To maintain the purity of 
Islam as the only answer to the problems of the Muslim world, they argued 
for the application of lā mazhabiyyah (the rejection of the intellectual-
speculative heritage of Islamic schools of thought) and lā hizbiyyah 
(tendency towards any particular sectarian group or faction) in their attempt 
to understand and strictly implement the Qur’an and Sunnah. The Arrahmah 
community website said: 
The Messenger of God (Muhammad) guaranteed that Muslim groups 
that always obey the Qur’an and Sunnah and set themselves free from 
the influences of sectarianism and sectarian schools of thought will 
always exist till the Day of Judgement although they are regarded as 
strangers by their fellow Muslims.29  
 
Furthermore, Jihadi Salafists specifically pointed out on their websites 
that implementing Islamic law according to the Salaf was a perfect solution 
for Muslims to overcome the global problems of the Muslim world and regain 
the glory of Islam. For this purpose, they asserted that every Muslim was 
obliged to implement the Islamic law in his or her personal and social life.   
If Muslims truly obey Islamic law just like God’s chosen servants (the 
prophet’s companions) did, Islam will stand and Muslims will reclaim 
victory. The only solution to achieve glory is implementing Islamic 
law...Why must there be Islamic law? This is a question that is always 
raised by disbelievers, liberals and secular people. The answer is 
because Islamic law is perfect so that it can answer all problems in the 
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world and it is a solution to global issues which other ways of life 
cannot provide...It is a personal obligation for every believer to 
implement Islamic law in any conditions. Islam as a movement requires 
Muslims to actively propagate its teachings.30  
 
After claiming that return to the ‘true Islam’ according to the views and 
practice of the Salaf was the only solution to overcome the decline of the 
Muslim world, the Salafi factions attempted to strengthen their argument by 
mobilizing their websites as resources for providing further information 
about the manhaj al-salaf. This includes the use of their websites to explain 
some common Salafi doctrines such as tauhīd, sunnah, bid’ah, and al-walā` wa 
al-barā`. In this context, the relevant issue was whether the Salafi factions 
equally mobilized their websites as resources for spreading further 
information about the manhaj al-salaf method to a wider audience as a logical 
consequence of their belief in Salafism as the solution to crucial problems 
facing the Muslim world.  It is important to understand why a particular 
Salafi faction was more elaborate and assertive in promoting the ideology of 
Salafism as the prescribed solution to global crises of the Muslim world on its 
websites.  
Tawhīd 
One may expect that the Salafi factions mobilized their websites extensively 
for spreading tawhīd, one of the most important doctrines of Salafism. Yet, in 
fact the factions’ use of websites as resources for spreading this doctrine was 
varied. Haraki Salafists’s use of websites for this purpose was limited in that 
they provided little information about tawhīd on their websites. For example, 
through limited articles posted on its website, a Haraki Salafi community only 
described the basic meaning of the doctrine and claimed that tawhīd was a 
foundation of everything and the only guide to the straight path. This 
community emphasized that true observance of tawhīd was the only 
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condition of the revival of the Muslim world. Only if they strictly maintained 
the purity of tawhīd, would Muslims solve the problems facing them and 
achieve victory over other religious communities.31  
By contrast, other two Salafi factions provided quite detailed 
information about tawhīd on their websites. Quoting certain Qur’anic verses 
to support their interpretation of tawhīd, Yemeni Salafists described that 
tawhīd was an essence of all prophets’ messages including those of the 
Prophet Muhammad. They also referred to the classic Salafi ‘ulamā` like Ibn 
al-Qayyim and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb to support their belief that 
tawhīd was the fundamental creed on which Muslims should base their 
beliefs and practices. They asserted that glory could only be regained by 
contemporary Muslims if they truly observed tawhīd and avoided shirk, any 
acts and beliefs that can contaminate the purity of tawhīd like associating 
Allah with anything or anyone.32        
In the same way, Jihadi Salafists described in more detail the meaning 
and importance of tawhīd on their websites. They argued that tawhīd was 
expressed in the Islamic creed of Lā Ilāh illa Allāh(There is no god but Allah). 
The terms Lā Ilāh (no god) means rejection and liberation from any false 
deity, and illa Allāh (but Allah) refers to a clear declaration that Allah is the 
only true God who must be worshipped. Tawhīd, then, is  a creed that Allah is 
the only God who deserves loyalty, obedience and love of all creatures and, 
consequently, any deviation and distortion from this divine law will result in 
the unforgivable capital sin of shirk.33 Allah is also the only Legislator whose 
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laws regulate all His creatures including human beings. Any attempts to 
follow and apply man-made laws will distort this very foundation of Islam 
and, therefore, must be rejected.34 Thus, tawhīd, Jihadi Salafists believed, is 
the very core of Islam and a necessary condition, without which God cannot 
accept all beliefs and righteous practices.35                           
Sunnah  
The variation of the website use for providing information about Salafi 
doctrines was also identified in the Salafi factions’ description of Sunnah. The 
Yemeni Salafi faction mobilized websites better than the other two Salafi 
factions to spread the Salafi doctrine of Sunnah. Through their websites, 
Yemeni Salafists described the meaning of Sunnah as the legacy and tradition 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in the form of their sayings, 
deeds and decisions compiled in the collections of hadith.  Quoting certain 
Qur’anic verses and the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, Yemeni Salafists 
emphasized the obligation of strictly holding and practicing the Sunnah 
because it is the second source of Islam after the Qur’an.36   
 Yemeni Salafists used their websites to stress the need to revive the 
Sunnah within contemporary Muslim society as many Muslims have 
abandoned the Sunnah resulting in the Sunnah becoming poorly understood 
and applied. They also attempted to defend the Sunnah from the attacks and 
criticism of anti-Sunnah factions and those who belittle or do not pay serious 
attention to it. They even considered those who belittle the Sunnah to be 
apostates.37 To support their claim, Yemeni Salafists referred extensively to 
certain Qur’anic texts, the Prophet Muhammad’s words, and the opinion of 
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the Salafi religious authorities, who (according to their interpretation) 
ordered Muslims to strictly obey and practice the Sunnah.38        
Bid’ah 
The belief in the religious obligation of strict application of Qur’anic and 
Sunnahic texts has led the Salafi factions to emphasize a religious obligation 
of avoidance and condemnation of bid’ah, any beliefs and acts regarded as 
having no textual basis in the Qur’an or the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his Companions. Nevertheless, the Salafi factions did not 
show the same enthusiasm in using their websites for promoting this 
common doctrine.  Haraki Salafists wrote a few articles on the meaning of 
bid’ah and condemnation of the people of bid’ah (ahl al-bid’ah). But, they did 
not elaborate to provide examples and connect to realities in contemporary 
society.39 
 On the other hand, other Salafi factions were adept in using their 
websites, publishing many articles on the prohibition of bid’ah. Through their 
websites, Yemeni Salafists condemned those who practice bid’ah by 
characterizing them as the haters of both the Sunnah and the ‘ulamā` who 
support Sunnah. Such people were regarded by Yemeni Salafists as more 
dangerous than Muslims who commit capital sins.40 Furthermore, Yemeni 
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Salafists described how to treat people who engage in bid’ah. Quoting their 
Salafi authorities, the Yemeni Salafists suggested that ‘true Muslims’ should 
disassociate from the people of bid’ah, condemn their action, expose their 
error to the public, insult and disregard them, and never come to the 
religious learning activities or lectures organized or given by them.41        
 Similarly, Jihadi Salafists utilized their websites to elaborate their 
condemnation of bid’ah and the people of bid’ah by identifying forbidden 
innovations commonly practiced within contemporary Muslim society. They 
claimed that many popular rituals among Muslim society were forbidden 
religious innovations that have tainted the purity of Islam such as tawassul 
(saying a prayer to Allah on behalf of, and for, others) and certain rituals 
during the middle of Sha’ban (the month before the fasting month of 
Ramadhan).42 Moreover, they condemned popular festivals or cultural 
expression of Muslims’ religiosity, which they regarded as having no basis in 
Islamic scripture or the practices of the Prophet Muhammad, the Salaf and 
the Salafi ‘ulamā`. These include the celebration of the birth of the Prophet 
Muhammad (maulid al- nabiy), celebration of the Islamic New Year in 
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Muharram (the first month of Islamic calendar), and ruwatan (a spiritual 
procession among Javanese people aimed at removing bad luck).43  
Al-Walā` wa al-Barā` 
All Salafi factions share the importance of the doctrine of al-walā` wa al-barā` 
(alliance and disavowal). It might have been assumed that each faction would 
have described this doctrine extensively on its websites. Yet, the Haraki Salafi 
faction did not provide adequate information about this Salafi doctrine.
 By contrast, the other Salafi factions used their websites extensively to 
describe the doctrine of al-walā` wa al-barā`. Explaining the meaning of the 
doctrine, Yemeni Salafists argued that ‘true Muslims’ must observe al-walā’, 
namely to love, assist, establish alliances, observe loyalty, and live only with 
their fellow Muslims. At the same time, they believed, Muslims also must 
practice al-barā’, namely to hate, disassociate, and express enmity towards 
non-believers and mushrikun, Muslims who do shirk.44  
 To support their view of the importance of al-walā` wa al-barā`, 
Yemeni Salafists quoted Saudi Salafi authorities such as Ṣālih al-Fauzān on 
their websites. They argued that this doctrine was a fundamental creed in 
Islam so that Muslims were religiously obliged to observe this creed faithfully 
based on Qura’nic and Sunnahic religious texts. A Muslim must love, help and 
be loyal to his or her fellow Muslims, especially those who strictly observe 
tawhīd, and must also express hatred and oppose non-believers as well as 
Muslims who abandon the purity of tawhīd.45     
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 The doctrine of al-walā` wa al-barā`, Yemeni Salafists explained on 
their websites, had some implications that Muslims must avoid. These 
include the prohibition against imitating non-Muslims’ way of life including 
dress code, living in a non-Muslim country while refusing to migrate to an 
Islamic country, travelling to a non-Muslim country on holiday, asking non-
believers for help, appointing them to a position that deals with Muslim 
affairs, making them close friends and partners regarding deliberation in 
Muslim affairs, and using their calendar system, instead of the Islamic one.46     
 Jihadi Salafists explained the implication of the al-walā` wa al-barā` 
doctrine in more detail on their websites. They attempted to develop the 
ethics of interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims with references to 
Qur’anic and Sunnahic texts, according to their method of interpretation. 
They emphasized that Muslims were forbidden to imitate and live a life of 
non-Muslim culture because this act was regarded as an act of imitating non-
Muslims (tashabbuh).47 Muslims were also prohibited from participating in 
rituals and religious celebrations of non-Muslims as it was regarded as 
recognition of the truth of religions other than Islam. This includes the 
prohibition of saying ‘Merry Christmas’ to Christians, celebrating New Year’s 
Eve,  speaking the languages of non-Muslims, and participating in the 
activities aimed at protecting rituals of other religions from disorder and 
possible attacks (such as the Nahdlatul Ulama Youth Movement, Anshor’s, 
protection of churches during Christmas and New Year celebrations).48    
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Yet, Jihadi Salafists argued that such ethics also included doing justice 
and helping non-Muslims who show no enmity and do not attack Muslims 
such as providing charity for those in need. Muslims were also allowed to 
have relationships with non-Muslims in terms of general affairs of human 
interaction like business and social interaction.49      
The above findings show that although they shared the idea of 
Salafism as the solution to the problems and challenges facing the Muslim 
ummah, the Salafi factions did not utilize their websites equally as resources 
to spread Salafi doctrines. Haraki Salafists’ use of websites as resources for 
providing information about, and spreading, the Salafi doctrines was quite 
limited. They dedicated most of their websites to providing information 
about their foundations and learning centres. Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi 
Salafists, by contrast, mobilized their websites more actively than Haraki 
Salafists as resources for elaborating the ideology of Salafism to a wider 
audience online.  
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Punishment:  A Motivational Framing 
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The above diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks were not enough for the 
Salafists to solve the problem of action mobilization. These framing tasks had 
insufficient power to mobilize the Salafi movement’s adherents. Those who 
supported the diagnostic and prognostic framing works should be activated 
to do what has been prescribed. Herein lies the importance of the third 
framing task conceptualized as “motivational framing”. This framing aims to 
provide “a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective 
action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” 
(Benford and Snow 2000, 617). This motivational framing involves the 
construction of “vocabularies of motive” by which movement supporters are 
instigated to move and overcome fear or risk associated with collective 
action (Snow and Byrd 2007, 128).  
My examination of the Salafi factions’ websites revealed the significance 
of motivational framing for the Salafi movement. An identification of the 
problems that contributed to the decline of the Muslim world and their 
causes was not sufficient to activate the Salafi followers or sympathizers to 
dedicate their lives to the realization of the Salafi ideology. How was a strong 
commitment to the Salafi way developed and put into action? The answer, I 
argue, lies in the motivational framing developed by the Salafi leaders and 
‘ulamā`.  
However, it was only the Yemeni Salafi faction that extensively utilized 
websites as resources of such motivational framing. The other Haraki and 
Jihadi Salafi factions either did not use their websites, or used them very 
little, to establish motivational framing of Salafism as the only solution to the 
diagnosed problems of the Muslim world.  What follows, therefore, is 
focussed on how the Yemeni faction mobilized their websites to construct 
vocabularies of motive.   
Religious Obligation 
Through its websites, the Yemeni Salafi faction framed the call to ‘return to 




making extensive references to religious texts, which they interpreted to 
support their point of view, as well as to selected ‘ulamā` of the past. The 
Yemeni Salafi actors claimed that since following the ways of the Salaf in 
understanding and practicing Islam was scripturally ordered, strictly 
adhering to the Salaf method was a religious obligation for every Muslim in 
order to overcome problems facing the Muslim ummah. As one Yemeni Salafi 
preacher said:  
It is compulsory for every Muslim man and woman to follow the way of 
the Salafi ‘ulamā` in terms of all religious issues. The evidence of this 
obligation can be found in the Qur’an, the Sunnah and ijmā’ (consensus) 
of ‘ulamā` over many generations... It is impossible for us to understand 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah without the manhaj al-salaf. It is impossible 
for those of the current generations to throw away the manhaj al-salaf 
while they claim to take [religious knowledge] directly from the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah. This [abandoning the Salaf] is an error, which divides 
the Muslims and ceases the connection between the later generations 
and the first generations (the Salaf).50  
 
Another Yemeni Salafi preacher declared that following the Salaf 
method was a religious duty for Muslims because it was the only way to 
implement and revive the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
Companions (ashāb al-nabiy). He warned:  “We are obliged to follow the Salaf 
and make them our guides in our devotion to Allah. This is not a negotiable 
issue”.51    
Salaf is the Best and Only Model 
However, the vocabulary of religious obligation was not always sufficient to 
stimulate people to engage fully in Salafism as the only solution to the 
problems confronting the Muslim world. Hence, Yemeni Salafists utilized 
their websites to develop other vocabularies of motivational framing. These 
include the exaltation of the Salaf and the followers of the Salaf as they were 
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regarded as possessing a special status and highly respected characteristics 
among the Muslim majority. This was expressed in the depiction of the Salaf 
as the most knowledgeable about the Qur’an and the tradition of Prophet 
Muhammad. Their understanding and practice of Islam were unquestionable 
because they lived during the Prophet’s era, learned, and observed Islam 
under his direct guidance. To love the Salaf constitutes a part of faith in God 
and to ignore the Salaf means a sign of hypocrisy and rebellion against Islam.  
Specifically, Yemeni Salafists attempted to build the positive images of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions on their websites. This was a strategic 
attempt to secure the important position of the Companions as the core 
generation of the Salaf. In doing so, they used their websites to exalt the 
Companions as the best Muslim generation and at the same time refuted any 
discrediting features and criticism of them. For example, the Companions 
were depicted as the best interpreters of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, who 
understood and implemented Islam best, because they had direct guidance 
from the Prophet Muhammad. As a consequence, the degree to which one 
follows the Companions determines the degree of one’s faith in God and love 
of the Salaf. Yemeni Salafists said on one website: 
The evidence from the Qur’an clearly shows us that to love the 
Prophet’s Companions constitutes an unseparated part of faith in 
Allah... To love them expresses your faith; your hatred of them indicates 
that you are hypocrites.... So, it is a religious obligation for all Muslims 
to love the Prophet’s Companions based on clear evidence from the 
Qur’an.52  
  
Therefore, it was a religious duty for contemporary Muslims to turn to 
the Salaf and make them the only model and guide in understanding and 
practicing the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and dealing with the problems of the 
Muslim ummah. Yemeni Salafists argued on one website:  
Our question is: who has the best and truest understanding of the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, so that we are not allowed to go against them? 
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The answer is the Prophet’s Companions. They understood best the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah because they lived in a period when God 
revealed His messages to the Prophet. Therefore, we are obliged to 
follow their guidance.53  
 
Subsequently, Yemeni Salafists believed that those who followed the 
Salaf were also of special status. They depicted the Salaf followers as the 
saved ones and those who rejected or ignored the Salaf as belonging to the 
doomed groups that would be burnt in Hell. As one Yemeni Salafi leader 
claimed:  
Those who follow the Prophet’s way of life will be saved from Hell. The 
Prophet said: “The Jews will split into 71 sects; only one faction will 
enter Paradise, while the rest will go to Hell. The Christians will split 
into 72 sects; only one sect will enter Paradise, while the rest will go to 
Hell. My people [Muslims] will split into 73 groups; one faction will 
enter Paradise and the rest will go to Hell. A  Companion asked: “O the 
Messenger of God, who are those people who will enter Paradise?” He 
answered: “They are those who follow my way and that of my 
Companions.54  
 
Divine Rewards and Punishment 
In addition, Yemeni Salafists developed a motivational framing in the form of 
vocabularies of divine rewards or punishment awaiting those who truly 
embraced or rejected Salafism. In their view, the true Salafis would be 
rewarded with honours from God such as eternal pleasure in the afterlife and 
the Prophet’s intercession (shafa’at al-nabiy).55  They would also be 
rewarded with God’s promised paradise.  One Yemeni Salafi leader said:  
The carriers of the truth have no fear. [They keep committed to follow 
the Salaf] though it is hard as if they hold a burning fire. But, their faith 
and patience will take them to an honoured pleasurable place, promised 
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by God. God said: “Enter paradise; you and your spouses will be 
delighted”.56  
 
Yemeni Salafists also framed what was considered to be a higher 
reward than ascent to Paradise. Those who remained steadfast in the Salafi 
way would be rewarded with God’s favour and eventually achieve the highest 
reward of all, namely “meeting God” and “seeing His face”. As a Yemeni Salafi 
leader remarked:  
Allah said: “For those who have done good deeds, (Paradise) is the best 
reward and extra (seeing Allah’s face) (the Qur’an 10:26). From this 
verse we see clearly how honourable and beneficial following the 
manhaj al-salaf is. The sweetness of faith, the perfect love and longing 
to see Allah are main results of perfectly knowing Him, which is only 
achieved through understanding His name and attributes in line with 
the correct method of understanding, namely the method of the people 
of the Prophet’s tradition or the Salaf way.57  
 
Moreover, Yemeni Salafists framed a narrative of divine punishment on 
their websites to reinforce the obligation of adhering to Salafism for 
contemporary Muslims.  This included a threat that those who ignored the 
Salafi way would be going astray in this world and entering Hell in the 
afterlife as a punishment for their evil deeds. A Yemeni Salafi leader asserted:  
It is a religious obligation to follow them (the Salaf) in understanding 
God’s religion as revealed in the Qur’an or the Sunnah. God warned that 
those who do not follow the Salaf way will enter into Hell, the worst 
place to return to.58  
Salafi Resources and the Mobilization of the Internet for Constructing 
the Ideology of Salafism 
 
Based on the findings above, there was evidence that Yemeni Salafists and 
Jihadi Salafists mobilized their websites for constructing and promoting the 
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ideology of Salafism more than Haraki Salafists as seen in all three framing 
tasks: identifying the key problems that contributed to the eclipse of the 
Muslim world, offering solutions to the diagnosed problems, and providing 
motivational vocabularies to move the followers into action. This does not 
mean that Yemeni Salafists or Jihadi Salafists were more skilful in using 
websites as resources for constructing and promoting the Salafi ideology to a 
wider audience than Haraki Salafists. Rather, the point being stressed here is 
that the Yemeni Salafi faction harnessed the internet for constructing its 
ideology online to a greater degree than the other two factions.  
This finding can be explained by looking at the close connection 
between the Salafi factions’ use of the internet and the differential state of 
resources among them. As explained in Chapter Three, Salafism in Indonesia 
was characterized by internal resource inequality among its different 
factions.  The Yemeni Salafi faction had limited access to important types of 
resources including moral, socio-organizational, human, and material 
resources. They particularly suffered from the lack of constituency, physical 
facilities, organizational infrastructure, money, and legitimacy, which in turn 
contributed to their extensive mobilization of websites for constructing their 
ideology online. This resulted from the ‘ultra-conservative’ nature of Salafism 
that the Yemeni Salafists promoted in Indonesia that, in turn, hindered 
individuals or organizations from providing support to their movement. To 
deal with their limited access to these resources, the resource-poor Yemeni 
Salafists adopted the internet to achieve their ends, regarding it as one of a 
limited range of resources available to them (for they had limited numbers of 
‒albeit skilled‒ activists, and organizational infrastructure like computers 
and internet connections).   
Since they were highly motivated to overcome the disadvantage of their 
lack of other resources and were aware of the internet’s potential and 
advantages, the under-resourced Yemeni Salafists maximised their websites 




to a wider audience (as described above). I argue that the realizing of self-
insufficiency of resources including constituency, organizational facilities, 
money, and legitimacy contributed to the Yemeni Salafists’ extensive use of 
websites for constructing and promoting the Salafi ideology online. By doing 
this, they used the internet as a coping strategy to deal with their lack of 
resources in an attempt to enhance their movement’s capacity.  A Yemeni 
Salafi web administrator said: 
Since the internet is allowed for religious use for the purpose of good, , 
we attempt to use our website as effectively as possible for the purpose 
of da’wah salafiyyah (spreading Salafi ideas). In this era, the internet is a 
new important tool of our da’wah. Amidst our limited facilities and 
infrastructure, as you see, the use of the internet in the forms of website 
or radio online has provided us with a positive alternative resource so 
that we are able to reach a wider audience.59   
   
A similar lack of resources motivated the Jihadi Salafists, as the smallest 
of the three Salafi factions under study in this study, to embrace the internet 
and maximize its use. The Jihadi Salafi faction suffered from a limited access 
to legitimacy, solidarity and celebrity support which were acquired from 
outside the faction (moral resources), organizational infrastructure and 
network (social-organizational resources), money and physical facilities 
(material resources), and constituency and labour (human resources). The 
nature of the Jihadi Salafists’ movement that promoted violent jihadi ideology 
contributed to this lack of resource. This caused individuals or organizations 
unwilling, at least openly, to provide the support needed to realize the Jihadi 
Salafi ideals.    
Using limited resources at hand in the form of skilled and committed 
active participants, and organizational infrastructure like computers and 
internet connections, the less well-resourced Jihadi Salafists adopted the 
internet and mobilized it as a new resource to cope with their lack of other 
resources. This internet mobilization was manifested in their extensive use of 
                                                          




websites as a means for constructing and promoting their ideology of 
Salafism as described above.   
By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction had good access to most of the 
types of resources salient to its movement, making it the best-resourced 
faction among the three Salafi factions under study. Like the Yemeni and 
Jihadi Salafi factions, the Haraki Salafi faction had good access to conceptual 
tools, skills and knowledge that were publicly available, but limited access to 
legitimacy, solidarity and celebrity support which were normally acquired 
from external sources. However, it had much better access than the other two 
factions to the resources that enhanced its movement’s capacity including 
money and buildings, a large constituency, labour and leadership, and 
appropriate organizational infrastructures and network. This good access to 
the various types of resources was largely due to the ‘moderate’ version of 
Salafism that Haraki Salafis promoted, which has been relatively successful in 
attracting support from individuals or organizations that shared the same 
Salafi ideals.  
While having this good access to such resources, the Haraki Salafi 
faction still recognised the strategic benefit of embracing the new media 
technology as a new resource for promotional purposes. Nevertheless, the 
Haraki Salafists did not actually mobilize the adopted internet as effectively 
as the Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists did. As seen above, their use of 
their websites for promoting and constructing their diagnoses of the 
problems and challenges facing the contemporary Muslim societies was 
limited. This, I contend, was closely related to the feeling of resource 
sufficiency which in turn discouraged the resource-rich Haraki Salafists from 
maximising their website use for constructing and promoting their Salafi 
ideology online. Instead, the Haraki Salafists seemed to be content with the 
use of their websites for informational purposes about their learning 
institutions and foundations.  A Haraki Salafi web administrator said:  
We use the internet mainly as a medium to share information about our 




of our students or anyone who is interested in studying here. Praise to 
God, we have facilities such as networks of parents of nearly one 
thousand students, regular da’wah activities, As-Sunnah magazine, and a 
radio network (Radio Rodja) that we use to develop our da’wah 
salafiyyah and reach a wider audience.  So far, we only use our website 
for informational purposes such as the announcement of new student 
admission and financial reports.60   
                         
As to what extent this mobilization of the internet impacted on the 
Salafi factions, the internet has not so far fully compensated for the Yemeni 
Salafists and Jihadi Salafists’ lack of constituency, physical facilities, money 
and legitimacy. Their mobilization of the internet has had insufficient impact 
to solve these big challenges. Nevertheless, their attempts were not 
completely without success. Yemeni Salafists reported that new students 
came to their learning centres after visiting the Yemeni Salafi websites. A 
committee member of Adhwaus Salaf Salafi learning centre in Bandung, for 
example, reported that some new students from Sumatra initially found out 
about the learning centre on reading articles on the Salafi views on its 
website. He added that a new mosque, separated from the single, main 
building of the learning centre, was being built with money and materials 
from its supporters who often visited the centre’s website.61 The same was 
true for As-Sunnah Yemeni Salafi learning centre in Makassar. In addition to 
personal networks, new students found the centre and decided to study 
Salafism there after they accessed its website promoting the Salafi ideology.62 
So, the Yemeni Salafists acquired new recruits and new physical facilities, 
albeit relatively modest in scope, due to their use of websites for constructing 
and promoting the ideology of Salafism online.    
It was difficult to assess precisely the impact of internet mobilization 
for constructing the Salafi ideology on Jihadi Salafists due to the closed and 
rather secretive nature of their organization. However, to some extent its 
impact could be seen in the fact that their websites were active and able to be 
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maintained and updated daily. For example, Arramah.com was, and remained 
active, publishing news and current issues and promoting its Jihadi Salafi 
views, even when its chief editor and founder, Muhammad Jibriel, was 
arrested and put in jail for five years due to his involvement in the bomb 
attacks on JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009. I contend 
that the website kept running as it continued to receive labour support from 
committed activists, old and new, and financial support from its readers and 
sympathizers, with this support being mobilised, among other ways, by their 
visits to the website that consistently promoted Jihadi Salafi ideology.         
By contrast, as a well-resourced Salafi faction, the Haraki Salafists did 
not seem to benefit particularly from their minimal use of the internet for 
constructing their Salafi ideology online. Their disinterest did not enhance 
their capacity to attract legitimacy for their ideology from external 
established Islamic organizations or support from well-known public figures. 
However, it did not decrease their existing resources including followers, 
active participants, and financial resources.  
Such evidence demonstrates that the internet has had varied 
significance for the different Salafi factions. It played a significant role in 
constructing and promoting the Salafi ideology for the two under-resourced 
Salafi factions, Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists. But, the new media 
technology has been relatively insignificant for constructing the ideology of 
Salafim for the well-resourced Haraki Salafists. The different levels of access 
to resources among the Salafi factions contributed to this varied significance 
of the internet for the proponents of the Salafi movement in Indonesia.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the Salafi factions employed the internet as a 
resource of ideological mobilization, namely for constructing and asserting 
the ideology of Salafism. The centrality of this religious ideology was clearly 




element of their web content. This suggests that religious ideology played a 
key role in the ways the proponents of the Salafi movement used the internet 
technology and that ideological propagation constitutes the main mission of 
their web use. 
Most importantly, this chapter has demonstrated that, although all 
Salafi factions claimed they used the internet for spreading and promoting 
Salafism to a wider audience, they did not actually utilize this new resource 
for this purpose to the same degree. It has shown that Yemeni Salafists and 
Jihadi Salafists mobilized the internet as a resource for constructing the 
ideology of Salafism more actively than Haraki Salafists.  
This tendency has been shown to be closely related to the different 
states of resource availability among the Salafi factions. Yemeni Salafists 
were a faction with limited access to resources salient to their movement’s 
capacity such as legitimacy and celebrity, labour and constituency, buildings, 
and money. The Jihadi Salafists were in a similar position. The ‘ultra 
conservative’ nature of its Salafi ideology has resulted in the Yemeni Salafi 
faction having limited access to these resources. The radical-violent version 
of Salafism has had a limiting effect on the Jihadi Salafi faction’s access to 
resources. Haraki Salafists, by contrast, had good access to most types of 
resources, making it the best-resourced faction of the three Salafi factions 
under study. Its ‘moderate’ version of Salafi ideology has contributed to the 
Haraki Salafi faction’s success in attracting various types of resources 
necessary for its development.  
Realizing that they had limited access to resources and being aware of 
the potential of the internet, the less well-resourced Yemeni and Jihadi Salafi 
factions were motivated to use websites as instrumental resources for 
promoting and constructing their ideology of Salafism in an attempt to 
sustain and continue their movement. Therefore, both factions mobilized 
their websites to describe in more detail the ideology of Salafism than did the 




sufficiency meant this resource-rich faction regarded the internet as less 
central in its mobilization, particularly with regard to constructing the 
ideology of Salafi as a collective identity. In fact, the proponents of the Haraki 
Salafi faction dedicated most of their websites to providing information about 
their foundations and learning centres.  
Thus, this chapter has demonstrated that the significance of the 
internet, and the particular tasks to which it is put, was not uniform across 
the Salafi movement. Rather, it varied across the different Salafi factions for 
each faction’s use of the internet was influenced by factors such as their 
access to other resources.  
Having now analysed the Salafi use of the internet for framing and 
constructing the ideology of Salafism, the following chapter examines the 
Salafi factions’ internet mobilization focussing on the factions’ setting of 





Setting Boundaries Online 
 
 
After constructing the ideology of Salafism as a collective identity in 
cyberspace (as discussed in the previous chapter), the Salafi factions sought 
to secure their claim of religious authority. To achieve this, they set 
boundaries to distinguish between ‘good us’ and ‘evil other’ or, more 
specifically, between ‘true Salafists’ and ‘Salafi imposters’.  
In doing so, the Salafi factions developed an act of “othering”. First 
coined as a systematic theoretical concept by G. C. Spivak (1985), “othering” 
refers to a “process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is 
drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’ -between the less and the more powerful- and 
through which social distance is established and maintained” (Lister 2000 in 
Jensen 2011:65).  It does not evolve around the fascination of the other, but 
rather around the belief that the other is always the other because it is 
inferior (Jensen 2011:65). The act of othering defines the faction that is 
othered as “morally and/or intellectually inferior” (Schwalbe et al., 2000:423 
in Jensen 2011:65) and is “reduced to stereotypical characters and are 
ultimately dehumanized” (Riggins 1997:9; Lister 2004:102 in Jensen 
2011:65).        
This chapter examines how the Salafi factions in Indonesia mobilized 
their websites as resources for setting boundaries in their attempt to assert 
the right to sacred authority and guardianship of ‘pure Islam’. Echoing 
findings in the previous chapter, it argues that the internet had a varied 
significance for different factions within the Salafi movement. It shows that 
less well-resourced Salafi factions mobilized the web as an instrumental 
resource for setting boundaries more actively than the well-resourced faction 




This chapter describes how different Salafi factions used websites to 
set boundaries in an attempt to assert sacred authority. Then, it explains 
what might have influenced a particular pattern of internet use for setting 
boundaries among the Salafi factions. Lastly, the chapter briefly portrays the 
implication of this internet practice for different Salafi factions. 
 
The Salafi Factions’ Web Use for Othering Practice 
The Salafi websites were laden with the polarization between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
which has resulted in online othering contests among the supporters of the 
Salafi movement in Indonesia. My examination of these websites revealed 
that in this act of othering the Salafi factions used vilification and exaltation 
as key strategies. However, findings show that these factions did not mobilize 
their websites as resources for employing these othering strategies in equal 
ways due to resource variation among them.    
 
Vilification of ‘the Other’  
First of all, the act of othering within the Salafi movement in Indonesia was 
characterised by the strategy of jarh. Derived from the term al jarh wa al-
ta’dil (vilification and exaltation) within the conventions of criticism of the 
prophetic tradition (naqd al-hadis), jarh was used by a Salafi faction to vilify, 
discredit and excommunicate other Salafi factions or individuals accused of 
breaching or abandoning the principles and teachings of Salafi way (manhaj). 
In this online act of vilification, the Salafi factions employed the following 
tactics: name-calling and character assassination. 
Name-Calling 
Name-calling refers to “the use of labels to connect an individual or faction to 
a negative symbol, event, or phenomenon, often in an attempt to produce 
visceral responses that erode the target’s ability to assert credibility” 




engaged in the practice of name-calling online in their vilification of those 
considered the opponents of Salafism and Salafi imposters.    
 
The Haraki Salafists’ Online Name-Calling 
The Heirs of Kharijism 
The well-resourced Haraki Salafists used the epithet of “the heirs of 
Kharijism” to label those who considered to have violated the true Salaf 
teachings. Kharijites (Khawarij) refer to the first rebellious Muslim group 
which emerged in the early Islam against the fourth Caliph Ali ibn Abi Thalib 
and then became a branch of Islamic theology that promoted a radical literal 
interpretation and violent implementation of Islamic teachings (see Timani 
2008). Through this name-calling, the Haraki Salafists commonly targeted the 
violent Jihadi Salafists. Quoting Muhammad al-Utsaimin, a prominent Salafi 
leader of Saudi Arabia, they claimed that Jihadists who often condemn the 
ruler of a Muslim country as disbeliever (takfir) and attempt to topple him 
from his power are the heirs of Khariji ideology of the early Islam. They 
called these Jihadists “contemporary Kharijites” who misinterpret and 
misuse the Islamic teaching of takfir for their own interests, and maintain 
that their takfir practice does not meet the criteria required by the Salaf 
way.1  
 Nevertheless, as far as this name-calling practice was concerned, the 
Haraki Salafists did not mobilize their websites to employ other labels or 
epithets targeted at other Salafi factions. As will be explained in the next 
section, perhaps good access to various kinds of resources has contributed to 
Haraki Salafists’ reluctance to use the web as a medium for name-calling.    
 
The Yemeni Salafists’ Online Name-Calling 
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In contrast to the Haraki Salafi faction,  the less well-resourced  Salafi 
factions, as represented by the Yemeni Salafists, employed their websites 
extensively to denigrate other Salafi factions or other Muslim factions 
considered to have breached the ‘true Islam’. Their name-calling practice was 
mostly manifested in the labelling of the Haraki Salafists and Jihadi Salafists 
with epithets derived and connected to certain disreputable Muslim groups 
and organizations. By using this tactic, the Yemeni Salafists challenged these 
two factions’ values and activities and questioned their motivation for joining 
Salafism. This name-calling had very negative connotations for the other two 
Salafi factions.  
Surūrists and Turāsists  
A range of common derogatory names that the Yemeni Salafists levelled at 
‘the other’ include the epithet “Surūriyyah” (Surūrism). The Yemeni Salafists 
created this term to refer to ideas associated with Muhammad al-Surūr, the 
prominent leader of Al-Muntada al-Islami, a reformed Salafi faction based in 
London, which had close contact with the Haraki Salafi faction in Indonesia. 
They dubbed the followers and sympathizers of Muhammad al-Surūr as 
“Surūrists” (Surūriy; plural: Surūriyyun). The term “Surūriyyah” connotes a 
polar reflection of Salafism. As Abu Hamzah said, the differences between 
Surūriyyah and Salafism do not lie in the different ways they both interpret 
religious texts, but rather in the issue of ideology and fundamental 
principles.2   
This labelling was intended to discredit the Haraki Yemeni faction by 
connecting it to negative characteristics associated with al-Surūr and his 
faction. For the Yemeni Salafists, al-Surūr and his followers (Surūrists) 
including those who joined the Haraki Salafi faction were not fully committed 
to the Salafi way. For example, al-Surūr and the Surūrists were believed to 
have embraced the Salafi understanding of the divine attributes and human 
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predestination, but adopted the views of al Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim 
Brotherhood; a transnational Islamic movement which is based in Egypt and 
has spread worldwide) regarding takfir, condemning someone or ruler as 
kafir (disbeliever) if he did not implement Islamic laws.3   
The Surūrists label was also associated with Khawarij (Kharijites). 
Within online Salafi othering, the Yemeni Salafists dubbed the Surūrists “the 
Khawarij of this era” or “neo-Khawarij”. They believed that both Surūrists 
and Khawarij share the view that it was permissible to rebel against a ruler 
considered to have breached Islamic laws and to declare a Muslim guilty of a 
capital sin to be a kafir. A Yemeni Salafi leader stressed: 
It is clear to me that I must call them (the Surūrists) “the Khawarij of 
this era”. This is because they support al-khurūj (rebellion against 
rulers) as we understand from their words. In fact, they also share the 
same thoughts as the Khawarij with respect to declaring the major 
sinners as disbelievers.4  
    
The online label of “Surūrists” was also targeted at other Haraki Salafi 
protagonists who established Al-Sofwah foundation in Jakarta and those who 
had contacts with it. The Yemeni Salafi faction believed that this foundation 
had a close relationship with two foreign charitable foundations, namely 
London-based Al-Muntada foundation led by Muhammad al-Surūr and 
Kuwait-based Jum’iyyah Ihya al-Turās with Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq as 
its prominent leader. Al-Sofwah allegedly received financial support from 
these two foreign charitable foundations and has been intellectually and 
ideologically influenced by these foundations’ leading personalities such as 
Salman al-‘Audah and Aidl al-Qarny, in addition to al-Surūr and Abd al-
Khaliq. Umar Sewed, a leading Yemeni Salafi figure, explained:  
What Syaikh Rabi said has now materialised. What Al-Muntada/Al- 
Sofwah has done in Indonesia is similar with what Al-Muntada of 
London did. This can be seen in the evidence I saw myself or heard in 
confidence that (1) they disseminate Al-Bayan magazine which is 
published by Al-Muntada London founded by Muhammad al-Surūr; 
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and (2) they disseminate Al-Muntada books written by Surūri figures 
such as Salman al-‘Audah, ‘Aidl al-Qarny, etc.5  
 
Due to this financial and intellectual connection, the founder of Al-
Sofwah was dubbed a “Surūrist” in this online intra-Salafi othering. Again 
Sewed remarked: 
In regard to the founder of Al-Sofwa Foundation, Muhammad Khalaf, 
please listen to the testimony of Sheikh Abu Abdirrahman ibn Umar 
ibn Mar’i who knew him personally in Saudi Arabia… (In fact) our 
Salafi brothers in the city of al Qasim told us that he is one of those 
who have a close connection with Salman al-‘Audah. He is a Surūri in 
his manhaj because he has a close relationship with al-‘Audah and his 
followers.6    
 
The connection between the Haraki Salafists and the Ihya al-Turās 
foundation was indicated in the financial aid received by the former to build 
the Salafi learning centres and mosques and to publish magazines and works 
by the Ihya al-Turās-conneted Salafi scholars in Indonesia. This has created 
the Ihya al-Turās network in Indonesia that includes Yogyakarta-based 
Majelis At-Turas Al-Islamy foundation, with Abu Nida as its prominent 
leader, which runs Jamilurrahman ma’had (religious learning centre) and Bin 
Baaz Islamic Centre; Imam Bukhari ma’had in Solo, Central Java, led by 
Ahmad Fais and Kholid Samhudi; and Al Furqon ma’had which operates in 
Gresik, East Java, with Aunur Rafiq as its leading figure. This financial and 
intellectual connection has led the Yemeni Salafists to label these foundations 
and individuals who get involved in this network as “Turāsists”, that is, the 
followers or sympathizers of the Ihya al Turās charitable foundation. 
Hizbists 
Another common epithet used by the Yemeni Salafi faction in the name-
calling tactic through its websites was “Hizbist” (hizbiy; plural: hizbiyyun), 
which means one who is inclined to hizbiyyah, associating oneself with a 
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group, political party or school of thought in understanding and practicing 
Islam. From the perspective of Salafi ideology, hizbiyyah is a reprehensible 
religious innovation (bid’ah; heresy) which every Muslim has to avoid. Once 
one fails to do so, he or she commits sin and should be called a mubtadi’ (a 
reprehensible religious innovator; a heretic).  
Applying the Hizbist label to other Salafi factions was intended to 
impugn the reputation of these factions in that Yemeni Salafists associate 
these factions with an impure understanding and misguided practice of 
Islam. For example, the Yemeni Salafists quoted a fatwa by a Middle Eastern 
Salafi scholar, Sheikh Yahya, who commented on Sholeh Suaidi, an 
Indonesian Haraki Salafi preacher: 
He (Sholeh Suaidi) is a Hizbist, an evil fanatic. By God, it is enough [to 
identify him as a Hizbist] by his words. He is a Hizbist, who is burnt 
out and confused. It is compulsory to warn people of his propagation 
activities so they are aware of his dangerous ideas... By God, it is a 
disaster. So, it is compulsory to purify [Islam from hizbiyyah] and 
warn [Muslims of it].7   
 
  This name-calling was also applied to the Haraki Salafists who were 
associated with the Ihya al-Turas foundation, such as Abu Nida, Aunur Rafiq 
and Ahmas Faiz, to whom the Yemeni Salafists labelled “the defenders of 
hizbiyyah”. Abdul Mu’thi al-Maidani, a Yemeni Salafi preacher, pointed out: 
“In regard to Abu Nida, Aunur Rafiq, Ahmad Faiz and their followers, they 
have not changed from the beginning in defending their hizbiyyah”.8  
Ikhwanists and Qutbists 
The Yemeni Salafi othering on the web also included the label “Ikhwanists”. 
This was used to associate the Haraki Salafi faction with the supporters and 
followers of Egypt-based al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun movement. From the 
Yemeni Salafi perspective, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun represents movements 
and ideologies that transgress the Salaf way of Islamic understanding and 
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practice and, consequently, deviate from the ‘pure Islam’.  Hence, declaring 
them “Ikhwanists” was another attempt to impose negative characteristics on 
the Haraki Salafi faction.9    
Another label, “Qutbists”, was also used by the Yemeni Salafists to 
associate the Haraki Salafists with the ideologue of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). For the Yemeni Salafists, the influence of Qutb’s 
ideas (Qutbiyyah), rather than that of Salafi ‘‘ulamā` , was clearly seen in the 
ways the Ihya al-Turas adopted the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun’s ideas and 
practice of organization and politics. As Abu Karimah Jamal pointed out: “In 
addition, they (those of Ihya al Turas) are influenced by al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun in terms of organizational issues, hizbiyyah, and democracy.”10  
In some cases, these three labels, Qutbiyyah, Hizbiyyah, and 
Sururiyyah, were levelled at the same time at certain followers of Haraki 
Salafism such as those who joined or were associated with the Wahdah 
Islamiyyah foundation, which was based in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The 
Yemeni Salafists excluded the proponents of the Wahdah Islamiyyah from the 
circle of the true followers of the Salaf way due to their deviation from the 
ways of people of the prophetic tradition (Ahl al-Sunnah). A fatwa was issued 
to declare that the organization has gone astray from the ‘true path’: 
In regard to the organization or foundation named Wahdah 
Islamiyyah, I view that they belong to the people of Hizbiyyah, 
Qutbiyyah and Sururiyyah who are in contradiction with the ways of 
Ahl al Sunnah wal Jamaah (people of the prophetic tradition and 
community). They follow the ways of these misguided groups in 
regard to their ideas of the permissibility of staging demonstrations 
and general elections... and Sayyid Qutb’s tauhid hakimiyyah (the 
oneness of God sovereignty).11 
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The Yemeni Salafi faction’s online name-calling practice also targeted the 
Jihadi Salafi faction. The most common label was “Kharijists”.  Like the Haraki 
Salafists, the Yemeni Salafists particularly levelled this label at the Bali 
bombing perpetrators and other bombers in Indonesia. According to them, 
the Bali bombers were heavily influenced by the ideology of takfir, a belief 
that governments of Muslim countries that do not fully implement Islamic 
law and teachings are declared as disbelievers (kafir) against whom rebellion 
is a religious obligation according to the Kharijites. In his book Aku Melawan 
Teroris (I Fight Against Terrorists, 2004), Imam Samudra, one of the Bali 
bombing actors, even claimed that after the fall of Ottoman Islamic caliphate 
in 1924 the world has returned to the age of ignorance (jahiliyyah), the time 
before the prophethood of Muhammad, when people were not guided by 
God’s law. 
 Rejecting Samudra’s claim, Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain, a 
prominent Yemeni Salafi figure in South Sulawesi, stressed that Samudra was 
misguided by Khariji doctrines. He said:  
We found that Imam Samudra held the Khariji doctrines. He said in his 
book: “...When the Ottoman Islamic caliphate collapsed, the world 
returned to the age of ignorance...” Look, this sentence indicated that 
the whole world, in general, returned to the age of ignorance... If so, it 
implies that there has not been Islam and Muslims in this world. 
Undoubtedly, this is a doctrine of takfir that has been promoted by a 
number of ideologues of underground movements through the 
slogans “the ignorance of the 20th century”, “the age of ignorance”, 
etc.12   
 
  In the perspective of the Yemeni Salafists, since the Bali bombing 
actors subscribed to the Khariji doctrines, they adopted the practice of the 
Kharijites in the early growth of Islam: that is, terrorism. Luqman Baabduh, 
another leading Yemeni Salafi leader, argued: 
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Indeed, they (the Kharijites and their followers like the Bali bombing 
actors) always create chaos, disorder and destruction over the world. 
This is terrorism. Therefore, Kharijites are terrorists and terrorists are 
Kharijites; both are identical.13   
 
Character Assassination 
Another tactic of vilification of ‘the other’ used by the Salafi factions in their 
online othering was character assassination. This refers to a deliberate 
attempt to destroy the reputation, character, and credibility of a person, 
group, or institution (see Shiraev and Icks, 2014). This character 
assassination involved maligning, misrepresentation, and accusation of ‘the 
other’.  
 
The Haraki Salafists’ Online Character Assassination 
Men who Exceed the Limits 
In response to the Yemeni Salafists’ name-calling, the Haraki Salafists used 
the web to malign the Yemeni Salafists as “men who are fond of exceeding the 
limits” (ghuluw) in regard to their responses to other Salafi factions who have 
different views of an issue, a person or an institution. They viewed the 
Yemeni Salafists aggressively vilifying any Salafi leader, foundation or 
organization that the Yemeni Salafi faction believed to be Sururists. This 
excessive stance, the Haraki Salafists argued, resulted in fragmentation and 
enmity among the Salafi activists in Indonesia.14 They considered this Yemeni 
Salafists’ attitude to be un-Salafi because Sheikh al-Albani, one of global Salafi 
authorities, allowed Salafists to socialise, study with, and take benefit from 
Sururists.  
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Sheikh al-Albani allowed (the Salafists) in certain conditions to make 
friends with and benefit from the Sururists, such as studying religious 
lessons with them. If a religious teacher is only accused of being a 
Sururi, while he is in fact not, is it appropriate to totally ban people 
from studying with him? Please think about it carefully, my brothers! 
Look at how a fatwa of a knowledgeable person is different from that 
by who pretends to be a knowledgeable one. Indeed, we will find the 
primacy of the knowledgeable over the pretenders.15     
The Haraki Salafists also regarded the Yemeni Salafists as engaging in 
‘extremism’ for their easy condemnation of other Salafists who allegedly 
transgress the Salaf way as heretics (ahl al-bid’ah) or fanatics in a particular 
group or school of thought (hizbiyyun). The Haraki Salafists regarded this 
behaviour as contrary to the statement of Abd al-Aziz al-Rais, a main Salafi 
religious scholar in Saudi Arabia, that the act of excluding a Muslim from the 
people of the prophetic tradition (ahl al-sunnah) and declaring him or her as 
a heretic is not a simple issue as it requires complicated requirements. The 
Haraki Salafists even suggested that Yemeni Salafists declared people to be 
heretics and fanatics simply over a conflict among Salafists who run different 
foundations, studied with different teachers or read different Salafi 
magazines.16 Furthermore, they asserted that the Yemeni Salafists’ 
exaggerated accusations, contradicted the view of Ibn al- Qayyim, a religious 
authority of the 14th century to whom contemporary Salafists often refer to, 
who permitted cooperation with polytheists, heretics, sinners, rebels, even 
disbelievers for the purpose of commanding good, forbidding wrong and 
observing God’s order.17  
Men who Misinterpret Religious Texts 
Through their websites, the Haraki Salafists also vilified the Jihadi Salafi 
faction by characterising them as “men who had limited knowledge of the 
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method of understanding Islamic texts so that they misinterpreted them”. 
Like the Kharijites in the early Islam, the Jihadi Salafists interpreted Islamic 
texts based on their own personal desire, not on the Salaf method of 
understanding the Quran and Sunnah. Their understanding of jihad as 
warfare and violence targeted at non-Muslims, for instance, resulted from 
their method of interpretation that treats Quranic and Sunnahic texts on 
jihad as isolated verses, rather than as comprehensive and inter-connected 
ones. Consequently, their understanding of jihad was in conflict with 
fundamental teachings of Islam on respecting the lives of non-Muslims and 
humanity.18  
Destroyers of the Face of Islam 
As a result, the Haraki Salafists characterised the Jihadi Salafists as “the 
destroyers of the image of Islam and Muslims”. Their action, which was 
inspired by their misguided method of Qur’anic and Sunnahic interpretation 
in the form of violence and terror, brought damage to Islam, Muslims, and the 
world.   
Indeed, they have brought more harm than good to Islam and 
Muslims. Their actions have created bad images of Islam before the 
Western people and others! What have they achieved? Have the 
disbelievers got closer to Islam or kept away from Islam? Muslims 
themselves kept away from this faction that has created terror. And 
Islam has nothing to do with it.19    
The Haraki Salafists regarded the Jihadi Salafists as having caused 
Islam to become a scapegoat for any terror or radical action in Indonesia and 
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worldwide due to their use of Islamic symbolism and attributes in their 
terrorist acts. Islam has been seen as identical with terrorism and has been 
accused of being a religion of violence. As a consequence, Islamic 
proselytization has been monitored and its activists have experienced 
difficulties in spreading ‘the true messages of Islam’.20       
Outlawed Underground Activists 
Lastly, the Haraki Salafists utilized their website to portray the Jihadi 
Salafists as misguided underground activists. The Salafi ‘ulamā`  such as 
Muqbil al-Wadi’i permitted the activists of Islamic propagation to undertake 
underground activities only if they are under the following conditions: they 
live among the enemies of Islam; the ruling government suppresses their 
activities; they run their underground activities and organization according 
to the Quranic and Sunnahic teachings. However, the Jihadi Salafists run 
underground activities that do not meet the above requirements for they live 
in a peaceful country Indonesia whose government provides them with full 
freedom to promote Islam and proselytise.21   
 
The Yemeni Salafists’ Online Character Assassination         
Men of No Principles and Ideology 
In response to the Haraki Salafists, the Yemeni Salafists employed a range of 
common forms of online character assassination including maligning. They 
regarded the Haraki Salafists as “men who did not pay attention to the 
importance of method (manhaj) in understanding and practicing Islam”. The 
Haraki Salafists were depicted as uncommitted men who adopted the 
ideology of Salafism in some issues, but followed other ideologies such that of 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in other cases. As Abu Hamzah Yusuf comments on 
those labelled as “Surūrists”: 
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Sururiyyah does not pay attention to the importance of Salaf manhaj 
as an ideology. For the supporters of Sururiyyah, it (Salafi manhaj as 
an ideology) is not important. It is clear that this view is close to that 
of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Hence, preachers or anyone who do not 
pay, or lack attention to this issue are affiliated with Sururi thoughts.22  
 
Hence, the Yemeni Salafists maligned the Haraki Salafists as men of 
inconsistent ideology or “men of mixed methods” (manhaj sana-sini), and 
“men with no principles” regarded as a misguided faction. The Yemeni 
Salafists quoted a fatwa by a Middle Eastern Salafi religious authority on the 
Ihya al-Turās foundation: 
Similarly, the Ihya al-Turās adopted mixed principles; some of them 
follow the manhaj of Jamaah Tabligh, while others join Abd al-Rahman 
Abd al-Khaliq, Surūrists, Salman Audah, and spread their recorded 
lectures...Ihya al-Turās is an organization with inconsistencies, 
sometimes it is against al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Sayyid Qutb, and 
Muhammad ibn Surur, [but] it praises Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, 
Safar Hawali and those who are against the Salaf and the Salafi 
dakwah.23 
 
The Yemeni Salafists characterized some leading figures of the Haraki 
faction as being ignorant of ‘true religious ideology’. Abdul Hakim Abdat, for 
example, was blatantly maligned as a person who was ignorant of manhaj 
when he was said to be unable to distinguish the way of Salaf from that of al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun and other ‘misguiding’ ideologies.24  
Therefore, for the Yemeni Salafists, the difference between themselves 
and the Haraki faction was ideological in nature. They regarded the Haraki 
Salafists as ‘the other’ who were ideologically different from themselves. 
They believed that their online othering practice was not driven by personal 
or material interests, but rather by ideological ones. The Yemeni Salafists 
characterized their vilification and criticism of the Haraki Salafi faction and 
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‘misguided’ others as an ideological conflict. Abu Hamzah Yusuf, for example, 
asserted that his contention with Abu Qotadah of the Ihya al-Turās network 
was an ideological dispute, not a personal or wealth-related issue.25  
Men with No Respect for ‘Ulamā` 
The online character assassination conducted by the Yemeni Salafists also 
included characterising the Haraki Salafi faction as having no respect toward 
the Salafi ‘ulamā` and teachers. For example, the leader of the Ihya al-Turās 
foundation, `Abd al-Rahmān ‘Abd al-Khāliq, was portrayed on the Yemeni 
Salafists’ websites as having insulted his former Salafi teachers. This was 
related to ‘Abd al-Khīliq’s criticism of a fatwa issued by the Saudi Salafi 
‘ulamā`  in which they supported the kingdom’s policy of inviting the US 
troops to combat Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991.26 
The same applies when the Yemeni Salafists depicted on their 
websites the Salafi preachers of the Haraki-inclined Ihya al-Turās network in 
Indonesia.  They claimed that Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abu Qotadah of 
Jakarta-based Al- Sofwah foundation and Abu Nida of Majelis al-Turas al-
Islami foundation have degraded the respected Salafi ‘ulamā`  when they 
ignored a fatwa on the Ihya al- Turas.  Abu Hamzah Yusuf, a Bandung-based 
Salafi leader, said: 
When we told them that our ‘ulamā` have warned them of the Ihya al- 
Turas and asked them not to cooperate with them. They replied:  
“Sheikh Muqbil or Sheikh Rabi is not the only ‘ulamā` we have”. This 
implies that they defame and discredit these ‘ulamā` …Is this the Salafi 
way? Certainly, it is not. We cannot accept their statements.27  
 
Men whose Hearts and Ears Have Died   
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Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists claimed that individuals who 
are affiliated with the Ihya al-Turās foundation have been blinded by their 
adherence to hizbiyyah so that they refused to accept truth. Abu Nida, a Salafi 
leader of the Ihya al-Turās foundation in Yogyakarta, for example, was 
characterised as a man whose ears and heart had died so there was no use 
giving him advice and warning of the danger of reprehensible religious 
innovation.  He was also accused of expelling from his circle some ‘true 
Salafists’ who attempted to give him advice and warnings. Abdurrahman 
Wonosari announced: “Indeed, his heart and ears have been locked so that he 
rejected to return to truth and take benefit from the warnings [we gave]”.28  
Such online character assassination was not only levelled at 
individuals, but also at organizations or individuals who allegedly had 
association with Hizbi-Sururi faction. The Wahdah Islamiyah, for instance, 
was maligned as an organization that refused to accept truth so that the 
Yemeni Salafists felt it was useless to maintain dialogue with its supporters. 
Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain argues: 
Who does not want to do dialogue? Who does not want to debate? 
Clear? Debate is fine and permissible. But, we view there is no use to 
have a debate with them (Wahdah Islamiyyah)...The problem is that 
they do not want to accept truth, so there is no benefit from sitting 
together with them. God willing, we are open to dialogue if we can 
take benefit from it.29  
According to the Yemeni Salafists, the Wahdah Islamiyyah supporters’ 
refusal of truth and their hatred of the Yemeni Salafi fellows who had given 
them advice were driven by their unconditional love for this organization, 
which was, in the Yemeni Salafists’ eyes, the religiously forbidden innovation 
of hizbiyyah. Abu Abdillah Sofyan said: “Maybe their love for organization 
named Wahdah Islamiyyah is so deep that it is hard for them to accept 
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criticism. This has led them to overlook and hate those who attempt to give 
them advice”.30  
Trouble Makers 
Aware of the division within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, the Yemeni 
Salafists claimed that this internal rift resulted from financial support 
provided by the Sururiyah-connected Middle East charitable foundations to 
Indonesian Salafists. Therefore, on their websites, the Yemeni Salafists 
depicted the Haraki Salafists as troublemakers, who caused this rift among 
Indonesian Salafists. They believed that the financial support provided by the 
Ihya al-Turās network had fragmented the Salafi movement. In this sense, 
they viewed the Ihya al-Turās network’s charitable works as much more 
dangerous than its ideas in that the network’s financial support jeopardised 
the sustainability of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Abdurrahman 
Wonosari said: 
The Ihya al-Turās and Abd al Rahman Abd al-Khaliq have succeeded to 
make rifts and divisions among Salafists in Indonesia. Abd al-Khaliq 
was scolded by the ‘ulamā` and was called as a mubtadi’ (a heretic). 
Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi asserted that, in fact, Abd al-Khaliq and his 
Ihya al-Turās do not divide the Salafists with their ideas, but rather 
with their wealth.31  
Leaving True Salafism for Material Gains 
The Yemeni Salafists accused the other ‘misguided’ Salafi factions of having 
left the true Salafi way for material gains, particularly financial support from 
the Middle East charitable foundations like the Ihya al-Turas foundation. Abu 
Nida and his allies were regarded as having refused to join the ‘true Salafists’ 
because they were influenced by the financial support received from the Ihya 
al-Turās.32  
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This accusation was also levelled at the Wahdah Islamiyah foundation. 
Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists accused the Wahdah activists of 
pretending to be Salafists in order to get financial aid from the Middle 
Eastern charitable foundations. They wrote: 
They claimed they are Salafists, but I need to explain that they did so 
in order to get money [from the Middle East donors]. I really know 
their actual deeds. They invited people from overseas, such as Saudi 
Arabia, and said: “We are Salafists. Teach us tauhid”. However, their 
religious teachers vilified and discredited the Saudi government as I 
heard from their recorded tapes. If there was money, they spoke 
nicely, but if there was no money, they discredited and defamed [the 
Saudi government].33  
 
Such online maligning that the Haraki Salafi faction was deviating 
because of financial inducements was also levelled at some of its leading 
preachers like Yazid Jawwaz of the Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation 
(Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia [DDII]),34  Abu Nida of Majelis Ihya al-Turas 
Yogyakarta,35 and Abdurrahman Tamimi of Surabaya-based Al-Irsyad 
organization.36  
Hypocrites and Liars 
The Yemeni Salafi faction also accused other Salafi factions of being 
hypocrites and liars. The Yemeni Salafists regarded the Wahdah Islamiyyah 
organization, for example, as pretenders, those who claimed to be Salafists 
“only on their lips”, not in their hearts and their practice. Though it shared 
the Salafi ‘aqīdah (creed) with the Yemeni Salafists, the Wahdah Islamiyyah 
has been accused of breaking the principles of the Salafi ideology by getting 
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involved in ‘un-Salaf politics,’ such as vilifying the ruling government, staging 
demonstrations and openly criticising the government.37  
Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists stressed that the 
proponents of Haraki Salafism like the Al-Sofwah foundation have fooled the 
Muslim ummah by claiming to be Salafists and preachers of Salafism. The 
Yemeni Salafists claimed they had evidence of Al-Sofwah’s lies and hypocrisy 
including their relationship with non-Salafi radical factions such as Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir’s Al-Mukmin network. Abu Hamzah Yusuf testified that the Al 
Sofwah foundation supported Ba’asyir’s pesantren (Islamic boarding school) 
with financial aid and book donations. He stated:    
I still remember, when I was in Ngruki, Al Sofwah gave [Al Mukmin 
pesantren] financial aid for building a library and its book collection. 
We know what the Ngruki manhaj is. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir received 
support from Al Sofwah. This is undisputable evidence. It is ironic in 
that they call people to Salafism, [as they established a relationship 
with non-Salafists like Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and his religious school]. 
They actually have fooled the ummah.38  
 
Moreover, in response to the criticism of their strict and rigid 
understanding and practice of Salafism, the Yemeni Salafists accused their 
critics of manipulating the Salaf ‘ulamā’s works for their own interests. On 
their websites, they claimed that Abduh Zulfidar of Pustaka Al-Kautsar 
publishing house, for instance, had lied about Rifqan Ahl al-Sunnah bi Ahl al-
Sunnah, a book by Sheikh ‘Abd al-Muhsin, a prominent Salafi authority in the 
Middle East, to which Salafists often make reference. Zulfidar has been said to 
have misread the book when he said that Sheikh ‘Abd al-Muhsin had 
admonished the Yemeni Salafists in regard to their strict and rigid ways of 
Islamic propagation. Refuting this, the Yemeni Salafists asserted that Zulfidar 
attempted to attack and divide the Salafi movement.39  
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Salafi Imposters  
For the Yemeni Salafists, the Haraki Salafi faction has tarnished the purity of 
the Salaf way and this was enough to exclude them from the circle of ‘true 
followers of Salafi ideology’. Therefore, the Yemeni Salafi websites were 
highly judgemental of the Haraki Salafists. For example, the Yemeni Salafists 
declared that the proponents of the Ihya al-Turas foundation were “the Salafi 
imposters”. They quoted Abu ‘Abd Allah Khālid al-Dhahawi, one of the Salafi 
authorities from Kuwait, who used to give religious lectures in Indonesia:  
The Ihya al-Turās transgressed the straight path of Ahl al-Sunnah 
because (1) in regard to the loyalty to the rulers, they did the 
forbidden baiat [oath of allegiance); (2) they invited Sururists-Hizbists 
to give lectures; (3) they did not help Salafists, but rather divided 
them through financial aids and material gains, and did not respect 
the ‘ulamā` of Ahl al Sunnah.40  
 
The same verdict was also given to Wahdah Islamiyyah, another 
Haraki-inspired organization. By citing a fatwa by Shaikh Rābi’ of Yemen, the 
Yemeni Salafists declared that Zaitun Rusmin, the leader of Wahdah 
Islamiyyah organization, was misguided and, therefore, was excluded from 
the People of the Prophetic Tradition (Ahl al-Sunnah) and declared him to be 
“non-Salafist” because they believed he had committed serious violations of 
the Salafi way when he publicly criticized the ruling government and 
persuaded people to stage open protests.41  
As it was no longer considered to belong to the People of the 
Prophetic Tradition, the Wahdah Islamiyyah organization was condemned as 
heretical, whose followers belong to the doomed groups that will be 
punished by God in Hell. The Yemeni Salafists asserted that Muslims should 
be warned of the danger this organization posed for the Islamic creed. To 
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support this, Abu Abdillah Sofyan referred to a Middle Eastern Salafi 
authority, Salih al-Fauzan:   
Shaikh Salih al-Fauzan was asked: “Can the existing Muslim groups be 
included in the doomed 72 groups [which were mentioned in a 
Prophet Muhammad’s saying]?” He answered: “Yes. Every Muslim 
who is in breach with Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah either with respect 
to Islamic mission, or creed or faith, then he will belong to one of the 
doomed 72 groups, be punished by God, and deserve to be discredited 
in accordance with his deviations... There have been groups that 
deviate from the Quran and the Sunnah. Those who join these groups 
are considered heretics (mubtadi)’.42  
 
Enemies of the Salafi da’wah  
Furthermore, the Yemeni Salafists declared that those who had breached the 
Salafi way or had been sympathetic towards groups or factions who were 
against true Salafism like al-Surūr and his allies were declared enemies of the 
Salafi da’wah. For this reason, Al-Sofwah foundation was considered as one of 
the main enemies of the Salaf da’wah in Indonesia. As Umar as Sewed said:  
I still remember what Shaikh Rābi’ told me, when I asked him about 
the Al-Muntada foundation (which later changed to Al-Sofwah): “If the 
foundation (Al-Sofwah) is similar to the Al-Muntada that is located in 
London, then it will be the main enemy of the Salafi mission in 
Indonesia” he said.43  
 
Unsurprisingly, the strict and literal adherence to the Salafi way has 
led the Yemeni Salafists to vilify anyone who, they believed, deviates from the 
Salaf way, including the early flag bearers of Salafism who had contributed to 
the early development and spread of Salafism in Indonesia. They included 
Jafar Umar Thalib with whom most current Salafi leaders studied in the late 
of 1980s and early 1990s. The Yemeni Salafists believed that he had breached 
‘the true path of Salafism’ when they found that he formed relationships with 
politicians, military officers and those considered as “Ikhwanists”, “Surūrists” 
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or heretics. In their view, Jafar Thalib had left Salafism and refused to take 
advice from the Salafi authorities from whom they sought a fatwa on Jafar’s 
case.44 Qomar ZA, a Salafi preacher, depicted Jafar’s deviation from the Salaf 
way: 
He (Jafar Thalib) has changed a lot. Now, he visits not only the places 
and events he condemned before, but also new places and events such 
as Arifin Ilham’s Majlis Zikir, Refleksi Satu Hati of priests and monks, 
the inauguration of Tawwabin pesantren initiated by Habib Riziq 
Shihab, Abu Bakar Baasyir’s Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, and Isra 
Mi’raj (the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent to Heaven) 
commemoration.45  
 
Narrow-Minded and Ignorant People 
In addition, the Yemeni Salafists utilized their websites to denigrate violent 
Jihadi Salafists. The Jihadi Salafists were characterised as lacking 
comprehensive religious knowledge so that their actions were not based on 
knowledge, but on emotion and misinformed understandings. They were 
misguided by the ideology and doctrines of Kharijites, which have flourished 
through translation among Islamic activists in Indonesia. Luqman Baabduh 
wrote:  
All this resulted from the misguiding ideology of Kharijites, which has 
been revived by ideologues such Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, al- 
Maududi, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, and others, promoted by Dr. Safar al- 
Hawali, Salman al-Audah, Usamah bin Laden, Aiman al-Zawahiri, and 
others, and then translated into Indonesian and spread in this country. 
Indeed, this misguiding ideology has been developing among Islamic 
activists whose activities and religious observance are only based on 
enthusiasms and emotion, without true knowledge gained from the 
Quran and Sunnah as understood and implemented by the prophet 
Muhammad.46     
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The Yemeni Salafists regarded those involved in Bali bombings as 
narrow-minded young Muslims who were fooled by deceiving organizations, 
irresponsible writings and misguiding fatwa, on the basis of which they 
spread terror and destruction in the world in the name of jihad.47 The Yemeni 
Salafists vilified Imam Samudra, one of the infamous trio Bali bombing 
perpetrators, as being ignorant of Islamic teachings on jihad and martyrdom. 
They believed Samudra’s statements and actions in regard to Bali bombings 
as written in his book Aku Melawan Teroris (2004) indicated his ignorance, 
misunderstanding, and falsehoods about Islam.48      
Men who Dishonour ‘Ulamā` 
Furthermore, the Yemeni Salafist websites characterized the Jihadi Salafi 
faction as dishonouring ‘ulamā`. This was a Khariji character, which led to 
their error in understanding and practicing Islam in that they believed that 
they were able to interpret and implement Islamic religious texts without 
reference and consultation to religious scholars. Abu Muhammad 
Dzulqarnain stressed that Imam Samudra held this Khariji character: 
One of the characteristics of Kharijites, which has become a source of 
misguidance experienced by a number of Muslim groups...is the 
dishonouring of religious scholars and claiming that they are better 
than religious scholars. Other misguided groups also share this 
character. They believe that they have sufficient ability to draw 
conclusions about religious issues from religious texts without paying 
attention to religious scholars before them. Indeed, it is a disaster 
falling on Imam Samudra when he adopted this method and character 
as seen in his book.49   
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Destroyers of the Images of Islam, Muslims and Salafists 
Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists also characterized the Jihadi 
Salafists as the destroyers of the image of Islam before global non-Muslim 
communities. They maintained that Muslim terrorists’ attacks upon USA on 9 
September 2001 in the name of jihad had devastating implications for Islam. 
These acts resulted in Islam being accused of being a religion of terror and 
violence. Muslims living in Western countries were also affected in that they 
had to face the enmity and hatred these terrorist acts triggered.50 They said: 
The attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon was a really 
shocking tragedy that caused disbelievers in the West and other 
similar groups to give Islam an epithet of “religion of terror” and 
“blood-thirsty religion”! This is an evil accusation. Indeed, it is 
inappropriate to relate Islam with terrorism because both are 
contradictory to each other.51 
Due to the destructive implication of their terror, the bombers and 
ideologues were regarded as criminals disguised as Muslims. The Yemeni 
Salafists quoted Muqbil al-Wadii who commented on Osama bin Laden: “I 
free myself before God from bin Laden’s error and misguidance. He is a 
criminal and disaster to the Muslim global community. What he did was a 
crime”.52     
 The Yemeni Salafists particularly depicted the Violent Jihadists as the 
destroyers of Salafism. Because the terrorists wear Salafi-style garb, grow 
beards, have their wives wear cadar (face-veil; Arabic: niqāb), and claim to be 
Salafists, their behaviour has led non-Muslims and non-Salafi Muslims to 
equate terrorism with Salafism. For the Yemeni Salafists, the Bali bombers 
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have tarnished the purity of Salafi ideology and way of life through their 
Salafi-like outer appearance and claim to be the followers of Salafi ideology.              
Muslims have to keep an outer appearance like that (Salafi dress style 
and appearance). However, the terrorists have tainted this great 
characteristic of Muslims as they also wear this Salafi outer 
appearance. This has caused Muslims themselves to be unwilling to 
have this Islamic outer appearance because they believe that it is the 
terrorists’ outer appearance. Indeed, the Khariji terrorists have 
tarnished every aspect of Islam.53  
Heretics  
The Yemeni Salafists used their websites to articulate their verdict upon the 
Jihadi Salafists. Having found that the Jihadi Salafists’ beliefs and actions 
deviated from the Salafi way in spite of their claim to be Salafists, the Yemeni 
Salafists declared that the Jihadists were not Salafists, but heretics disguised 
as Salafists. Imam Samudra, for instance, was not a Salafist though he claimed 
to be a follower of the Salaf way and the Salafi ‘ulamā` as he wrote in his 
book.  
In his book Aku Melawan Teroris, Imam Samudra claimed to be a 
follower of the Righteous Predecessors’ way and all his actions were 
supported by the Salafi ‘ulamā`. He mentioned a number of religious 
authorities believed as the Salafi ‘ulamā` such as Salman al-Audah, Dr. 
Safar al-Hawali, Dr. Aiman al-Zawahiri, Sulaiman Abu Ghaits, Dr. 
Abdullah Azzam, Usamah bin Laden, and Maulani Mullah Umar. He 
called them “fighter-‘ulamā`”(‘ulamā`-mujahid). Actually, those figures 
Samudra mentioned above do not follow the Salafi way. Their life 
histories show that they do not live the Salafi way... They have nothing 
to do with the ‘ulamā` of ahl al-sunnah. People know that they are 
adherents of the ideologies of Qutbism (Qutbiyyah), Sururism 
(Sururiyyah), and Kharijism (Kharijiyyah). Shaikh Rabi’, Shaikh al- 
Albani and Shaikh Muqbil have witnessed that the figures mentioned 
are not Salafi ‘ulamā`. Shaikh Muqbil commented on Usama bin Laden: 
“I disassociate from bin Laden. He is evil and a disaster for Muslim 
communities”.54      
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Terrorists, Not Mujahid 
Yemeni Salafist websites announced that, despite their claim, those involved 
in Bali bombings were not mujahid (holy warriors), but rather terrorists as 
their actions did not meet Islamic requirements of holy war while, after the 
execution of the Bali bomber trio (Imam Samudra, Mukhlas and Amrozi) in 
2008, their followers declared they were shuhadā` (martyrs). The Yemeni 
Salafists quoted a fatwa by Shaikh ‘Ubaid al-Jabiriy, a Salafi authority in 
Medinah, Saudi Arabia: 
 
Nobody declares that they were shuhadā` (martyrs) except two kinds 
of people: First, the ignorant people who do not have an 
understanding of Sunnah to distinguish between guidance and 
misguidance, between truth and evil, between prophetic tradition and 
heresy; and second, the followers of evil desire and the misguided 
people who deviate from the prophetic tradition. They conducted 
demonstration and condemn the ruling government, but praised the 
misguided Kharijites.55  
 
      In regard to the perpetrators of Jakarta JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton 
hotel bombings in 2003, the Yemeni Salafists also rendered the same verdict. 
Qomar ZA said:  
Is it true that they were welcomed by bidadari (fairies in Paradise) 
after their bodies exploded in pieces in those suicide bombings? Not at 
all! How can you say they were martyrs when they conducted a capital 
sin of suicide? We cannot judge them before Allah judges them. We are 
only able to judge them based on their physical appearance. We are 
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forbidden to ensure that someone is a martyr with all consequences 
he or she deserves.56    
Death Sentence 
Then, the Yemeni Salafists announced a final verdict. Since the bombers were 
terrorists guilty of major crimes, killings and massive destruction, they 
deserve the death sentence. To support this, they quoted a fatwa by the Saudi 
Arabia Assembly of Senior ‘Ulamā` that consists of recognized Salafi 
authorities: 
...Whosoever is proven according to Islamic laws to have conducted 
terror and destruction on the earth which resulted in security 
problems and the loss of lives and personal and public property such 
as mosques, schools, hospitals, factories... he or she is sentenced to 
death based on Quranic verses...57      
 
Jihadi Salafists’ Online Character Assassination 
Anti-Jihad 
In response to the other Salafi factions’ strong criticism, the Jihadi Salafists 
did not directly vilify them, but rather discredited certain Salafists factions in 
the Middle East who have ideological connection with such factions in 
Indonesia. For example, they characterized the Salafists who follow Shaikh 
Rābi’ al-Madkhali of Saudi Arabia, or “Madkhali Salafists” as they called them, 
as an anti-jihadists due to their strong criticism of jihadists such as Al-Qaeda, 
Jabha Nusra in Syria and Daulah Islamiyyah in Syria and Iraq and their 
support for the Saudi government’s policy of cooperation with the US in 
combating these violent Jihadist factions. Rābi’ al-Madkhali is one of the 
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Middle Eastern Salafi authorities to whom the Yemeni Salafi faction in 
Indonesia refers and asks for guidance. By discrediting the “Madkhali 
Salafists” in Saudi Arabia as anti-jihadists, the Jihadi Salafi faction in 
Indonesia aimed to similarly discredit those Yemeni Salafists in Indonesia 
whom they also labelled “Madkhali Salafists”.58    
Misinterpreting the Doctrine of Takfīr 
The Jihadi Salafists also used their websites to characterize their opponents 
as ignorant of the doctrine of takfīr. They did not deny this doctrine, but 
argued that their opponents have misunderstood it. In doing so, they retold 
an interrogation story of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a prominent ideologue 
among the Jihadists, by an officer of Jordan General Intelligence Directorate 
who asked him about takfīr. Quoting al-Maqdisi, they claimed that takfīr was 
not an act of declaring a Muslim as a disbeliever, but rather declaring those 
who cause Muslims to be disbelievers as disbelievers and making every effort 
to prevent Muslims from being disbelievers. They asserted that by enacting a 
man-made constitution and law the government of a Muslim country forces 
its people to be disbelievers. It is at this point the Jihadi Salafists believed that 
they had to observe a religious obligation of takfīr, namely making every 
effort to prevent Muslims from falling into disbelief the ruler created.59     
Fake Salafists 
Moreover, having characterized the “Madkhali Salafists” or Yemeni Salafists 
in Indonesia as an anti-jihadi faction due to their full support for the ruling 
government of Saudi Arabia, the Jihadi Salafists decreed that such people 
were an anti-Salafi faction. They claimed that Yemeni Salafists appeared to be 
Salafists when they attacked heretics and Shiites, but they were actually more 
dangerous to the “true Salafists” than Shiites, Jews and Christians.   
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They are similar to Salafists in terms of their anti-heresy and anti-
Shiites stance. As you see, Madkhali Salafists fought against the Soviets 
in Afghanistan and were pro Khattab in Chechnya, but they turned to 
be anti-jihadists facing US troops in Iraq and Saudi Arabia because 
their master ordered them to do so. Then, they turned to be anti-
Salafists and anti-Al Qaedah…Beware of these people and refrain from 
being impressed by them because they are more dangerous to the true 
Salafists than Shiites, Jews and Christians.60  
 
Exaltation of ‘Us’ 
In addition to the above explained vilification (jarh), the Salafi factions 
employed the strategy of exaltation (ta’dīl) in their online othering practice. 
Through this strategy, a Salafi faction attempted to create the positive 
attributes and characteristics of itself.  
Nevertheless, it appeared that the well-resourced Haraki Salafists 
were not engaged in the online practice of self-exaltation following their 
vilification and discreditation of ‘the other’. They were much more interested 
in utilizing their websites as instrumental resources for spreading 
information about their foundations and their activities. This reluctance was 
probably related to their confidence in having good access to resources so 
that they did not consider the internet to be particularly important as a tool 
to gain new resources (as will be explained later). The same was true for the 
Jihadi Salafists. However, their lack of enthusiasm in using the web for 
exalting themselves was in all likelihood overwhelmed by their strong 
emphasis on campaigning for jihadism as seen in their mobilization of 
websites for posting jihadi-related articles and news.  
By contrast, the less well-resourced Yemeni Salafi faction used their 
websites to portray themselves as the vanguard of the purity of Islam, the 
true adherents of the Salaf way, and men of pure heart. It claimed to be the 
true followers of the Salafi ‘ulamā`, who are mostly from Yemen and Saudi 
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Arabia such as Shaikh Rābi’ al-Madkhali and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, and 
regarded them as the most credible and authoritative ‘ulamā` within 
contemporary Salafism to whom the Muslim ummah must refer for guidance. 
The Yemeni Salafists’ Online Self-Exaltation 
Most Knowledgeable Faction about Islam 
The Yemeni Salafists used their websites in an attempt to demonstrate that 
they were more knowledgeable about Islamic teachings and doctrines than 
other Salafi factions. They believed that they were guided by ‘true religious 
knowledge’ (‘ilm) in understanding and practising Islam, and that this 
knowledge keeps them on the path of ‘true Islam’. It was this ‘true 
knowledge’, they believed, that distinguished them from misguided Salafists 
like the Ihya al-Turas community of Haraki Salafi faction. The Yemeni 
Salafists claimed that their understanding and observance of Islam was based 
on ‘true knowledge’, while the people of Ihya al-Turas were ignorant of such 
true teachings.61  
Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists also claimed that they 
had a profound knowledge of Islamic law and Arabic. They believed this 
enabled them to distinguish good from evil and helped them identify which 
behaviour was acceptable and which breached the Salafi way, a judgement 
that the misguided other was incapable of making. A Yemeni Salafi leader 
asserted: “Those who have thorough knowledge of Islamic law and Arabic are 
able to distinguish acceptable things from unacceptable ones and the 
beneficial ones from those of no value”.62  
Men of Pure Heart  
In addition, the Yemeni Salafists depicted themselves as men of pure heart on 
their websites. They argued that they were not motivated by worldly 
interests and financial gains in their attempts to discredit the Haraki Salafi 
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faction and others who they considered had breached the ‘true Salafi way’. 
The Yemeni Salafists stressed: “We do not want your mosque. We do not 
want your money. Allah sustains us so we do not need such things. And we do 
not want your aid”.63  
Rather, the Yemeni Salafists claimed that their act of rebuking those 
who violate the Salaf way was driven by their love for fellow Salafists, their 
pure intentions, their desire for a united Salafi movement, and to serve God. 
In their perspective, vilification was permitted for the purpose of correcting 
those vilified and reminding them of their errors and deviation from what 
they believed to be the true path of understanding and implementing Islam. 
The Yemeni Salafists argued:    
Look at the people of the prophetic tradition! They do not arbitrarily 
say that this institution is hizbi or someone is hizbi because the issue 
of vilification and exaltation (al-jarh wa al-ta’dil) should not be 
motivated by personal desires, but by the intention of providing 
advice. Religion is advice. With our love for our brothers, we expect 
them to be united. Unfortunately, this attempt is regarded as 
spreading the seeds of enmity. The issue of al-jarh wa al-ta’dil is 
misunderstood as the forbidden act of revealing one’s disgrace 
(ghibah).64 
 
To give legitimacy to their online othering practice, the Yemeni 
Salafists referred to Salafi religious authorities in the Middle East. These 
Salafi ‘ulamā` included Abd al-Azīz ibn Bāz (d. 1999), Muhammad al-Utsaimīn 
(d. 2001), Nāshir al-Din al-Albani (d.1999), Muqbil al-Wadi’i (d. 2001), Rabi’ 
al-Madkhali (b. 1931), and Salih al-Fauzan (b. 1933). The Yemeni Salafists not 
only used the tactic of quoting their fatwa, but also asking them for fatwa on 
issues confronting the Indonesian Salafists.  
For example, to support his criticism of Indonesia’s Haraki-inspired 
Ihya al-Turas network for allegedly breaching the Salafi way, Abu Karimah 
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Askari, a Yemeni Salafi leader, referred to a fatwa by Sheikh Muhammad al 
Madkhali on Kuwaiti-based Ihya al-Turās foundation who declared that: 
I swear by God that the Ihya al Turās was not established on the basis 
of the manhaj al-salaf. By God, it was based on the Ikhwan al-
Muslimun’s manhaj. Its members are hypocrites. It is a [religiously 
forbidden] hizbi organization. They conduct [a religiously forbidden] 
bai’at (oath of allegiance) named in disguise as an agreement or 
“loyalty to those in charge”. Wherever they go, to the Muslim countries 
or non-Muslim ones, you will find them dividing (the supporters) of 
the Salafi mission.65  
A similar pattern could be seen in the Yemeni Salafi othering of the 
Haraki-inclined Wahdah Islamiyyah foundation. To support his labelling of 
the Wahdah Islamiyyah as a disreputed organization, Abu Abdillah Sofyan 
quoted a fatwa by Shaikh Salih al-Fauzan on the groups or factions that have 
allegedly violated the true way of Ahl al-Sunnah. Shaikh al-Fauzan regarded 
Wahdah Islamiyyah as to belong to the doomed groups and factions who 
deserved to be vilified and punished because it breached the Prophetic 
Tradition.66  
In some instances, the Indonesian Yemeni Salafists approached Middle 
Eastern Salafi authorities directly with a request for fatwa. This was 
undertaken either in-person or in mediated ways such as making phone calls 
and sending letters to a Salafi scholar in the Middle East. In the case of asking 
for a fatwa in-person, a fatwa seeker (mustafti) went to the Middle East to see 
a Salafi scholar and asked him about a particular issue.  
For example, Abdul Muthi al-Maidani, a Yemeni Salafi preacher and 
director of Yogyakarta-based Yemeni Salafi religious learning who went to 
Yemen for study, asked Shaikh Yahya al-Hājūri and Shaikh Muqbil for fatwa 
on the case of some Indonesian Salafi figures considered to be in breach of 
the Salaf way such as Abu Nida, Ainur Rafiq, Sholeh Suaidi and Yazid 
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Jawwaz.67  In his attempt to seek fatwa on ‘the misguided’ Abu Nida, Abdul 
Muthi went to see Shaikh Muqbil. He said: 
We told [Shaikh Muqbil] what we know about Abu Nida. He answered: 
“This man is a Hizbi because he is seeking material gains or a Hizbi 
fanatic because of his ignorance. Looking at reality, the first one is 
more appropriate to be used to label people like Abu Nida”. I am 
telling this statement to assert that the Salafi brothers, particularly 
those who are in Yogyakarta, to be careful with the Ihya al-Turas 
foundation.68  
  
Some Yemeni Salafists went in person to ask for a fatwa on allegedly 
misguided Salafi factions. For example, a Yemeni Salafi went to see Shaikh 
Rabī’ in Yemen and asked for his fatwa on the Wahdah Islamiyyah 
organization. A Salafi website reported Sheikh Rabi’s response to this fatwa 
seeker, saying that: “The Wahdah Islamiyyah is a Qutbiyyah and Sururiyyah 
organization, whose manhaj is in contradiction with that of Ahl al-Sunnah 
(Salafi way)”.69  
  In other stances, such fatwa seekers used communication 
technologies. For example, Usamah Mahri telephoned Sheikh Rabi’ and asked 
for his fatwa on the case of Jafar Umar Thalib, a prominent early Salafi 
preacher. As Qomar ZA said:  
One day Ustadz Usamah Mahri telephoned Shaikh Rabī’ al-Madkhali 
asking about the case Jafar Thalib who went to the Dzikir 
(remembrance of God) sessions of Arifin Ilham. Shaikh Rabī’ replied: 
“If what you said is correct, that he attended the Maulid [the Prophet’s 
birthday commemoration] and joined the politicians, you did not leave 
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Internet Use for Boundary Setting and Resource Differentials among the 
Salafi Factions 
 
The findings above show that the Yemeni Salafi faction was very engaged in 
the act of vilification of ‘the other’ and exaltation of itself by mobilizing its 
websites to set boundaries between ‘us’,  ‘the true Salafists’, and ‘them’, ‘ the 
Salafi imposters’. By contrast, other Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafists and 
Haraki Salafists, employed these othering tactics only rarely on their 
websites. The Haraki Salafists used their websites the least in such othering 
practice. This particular pattern of the internet use for boundary setting is a 
consequence of each Salafi faction’s availability (or unavailability) of offline 
resources.   
As explained in Chapter Three, the Haraki Salafi faction had the best 
access to offline resources among the Salafi factions. It had good access to 
most types of resources including cultural, social-organizational, material 
and human resources, while lacking only moral resources. Perhaps this 
resource advantage made the Haraki Salafists less enthusiastic to optimise 
the internet as a tool to gain new resources though they were aware of the 
advantages of the internet. Therefore, while they used their websites to set 
boundaries in their attempt to assert Salafi religious authority, they did not 
engage in such behaviour excessively. They were confident that they had 
acquired religious authority as seen in their achievement of most types of 
resources so that they felt it was not necessary to fully mobilize the internet 
as a tool for setting boundaries among the Salafi factions in order to claim 
and assert Salafi religious authority among Salafi followers in Indonesia.          
By contrast, the Yemeni Salafi faction had little access to offline 
resources; they had the best access only to cultural resources in the form of 
knowledge, skills and other cultural artefacts publicly available, while they 
lacked or had only limited access to other types of resources such as moral 
(legitimacy and celebrity), socio-organizational (network and infrastructure), 




followers and leadership). This situation in turn encouraged the Yemeni 
Salafists to overcome this resource shortage by using any means available to 
them. In this context, they found the internet a useful tool to assert religious 
authority by mobilizing their websites for setting boundaries between 
‘us’/’true Salafists’ and ‘the other’/’Salafi imposters’. By doing this, they 
particularly expected to gain moral resources in the form of recognition and 
legitimacy from ummah as the authoritative Salafi faction in Indonesia. For 
this purpose, using their websites extensively for othering practice as 
described above was a necessary attempt by the Yemeni Salafists to 
overcome their lack of moral resources (legitimacy and recognition from 
ummah in Indonesia).              
The Jihadi Salafists faced the same challenge, lacking most types of 
resources except for cultural resources. However, this did not encourage 
them to use the web extensively to set boundaries and pursue othering 
practice online. Perhaps, their strong self-confidence in the truth of their 
ideology and full faith in their jihadism as the only true ideology might have 
made the Jihadi Salafists ignore the potential of the internet as a resource for 
asserting religious authority. Therefore, they considered the internet less 
useful in setting boundaries in their attempt to assert and claim the Salafi 
religious authority among Salafis in Indonesia.   
 
Implications for the Salafi Factions 
The internet has been a significant tool for the Yemeni Salafists to set 
boundaries between ‘good/us’ and ‘evil/other’ in their attempt to overcome 
their lack of resources. However, despite this, this internet use had limited 
benefit for them. The Yemeni Salafists’ extensive use of the web to vilify the 
other and exalt their own selves has increased the number of followers who 
studied in its learning centre and raised donations to fund its da’wah 




kind of web use. Rather, personal networks and family relationships 
contributed significantly to this increase in human and material resources. A 
Yemeni Salafi leader said:  
Indeed, there have been more new students, coming from some 
provinces in Indonesia, who are learning in our ma’had. I heard that 
some students were motivated to study here after reading our articles 
on our website that show the errors of those who claimed to be 
Salafists. They believed that we follow the true Salaf way [which 
encouraged them to come here]. All praises are upon God, we also 
received donations from ikhwan (brothers) who support our dakwah 
activities. However, in general, I believe that the students came here to 
study because they were informed by their colleagues or sent by their 
parents who have joined our Salaf way before. And they gave us their 
support and donations because they truly believe in the truth of our 
Salaf way.71  
In addition, their web use for setting boundaries has not made the 
Yemeni Salafists gain significant moral resources in the forms of legitimacy 
from prominent Islamic organizations or support from well-known public 
figures. A Yemeni Salafi leader said:  
So far, we have not received support from local or national public 
figures or Islamic organizations. We actually do not need their 
support. God willing, our dakwah Salafiyyah will grow with God’s 
support and help, rather than theirs.72  
Consequently, the Yemeni Salafists’ aggressive use of the web to set 
boundaries through online othering practice was not sufficient to achieve 
their goal of being acknowledged as the most authoritative Salafi faction in 
Indonesia. The Yemeni Salafi faction has remained less well-resourced than 
the Haraki Salafi faction in terms of religious authority, the number of 
followers and leaders, financial support, infrastructure and networks. As a 
result, this web use has not significantly generated new resources for the 
Yemeni Salafi faction to resolve the resource gap between it and the well-
resourced Haraki Salafists.  
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Perhaps, the only significant implication was that their extensive use 
of the web to set boundaries, in which the rhetoric of the saved sect was 
strongly emphasized, has bolstered the self-confidence of the Yemeni Salafi 
followers that they were the true Salafists in Indonesia. A Yemeni Salafi 
leader said: 
We do not care whether what we publish on our website has 
benefitted us or not. We are only concerned with delivering the true 
knowledge and the truth according to the Salaf way. People have a 
right to discuss what we say on our websites. By revealing their 
mistakes through our website, we become more certain and 
committed to our Salaf way.73   
Similarly, the Haraki Salafists’ limited use of the web for setting 
boundaries, due to their good access to various other resources, appears to 
have had no actual implication for the Haraki Salafists. This web use neither 
generated new resources nor reduced the resources at hand. A Haraki Salafi 
teacher said:  
Our limited use or disinterest in using our website for publishing 
articles on the error and ignorance of those who claim to be Salafists 
has not affected our da’wah activities. The number of students has not 
decreased from year to year; instead, it is increasing. Our religious 
lectures are attended by a large audience, comprised of students and 
their parents, as well as local community members who live near our 
ma’had.74      
 The Haraki Salafists’ disinterest in employing their web to set 
boundaries has also not significantly hindered its supporters or sympathizers 
giving financial or material support for their dakwah activities. A Haraki 
Salafi web administrator said:   
We have not been affected by our minimal use of our website and its 
articles to criticise or attack other Salafi factions. Parents still send 
their children to study here in our ma’had and sympathizers give 
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donation for our da’wah purposes. We are still able to fund our 
activities here.75  
The little use of the web to set boundaries between ‘real Salafists’ and 
‘Salafi imposters’ has not made the Haraki Salafi faction lose its prominence 
as the biggest Salafi faction and leading Salafi religious authority, at least 
among their committed followers, in Indonesia. As one Haraki leader argued, 
the availability or unavailability of legitimacy from public figures or credible 
Islamic organizations had nothing to do with the extent to which the faction 
employed their websites to set boundaries and it has not affected the Haraki 
Salafists’ daily Salafi dakwah activities.76  
Likewise, their limited use of the web to set boundaries appears to 
have had no actual implication for the Jihadi Salafists. This web usage neither 
generated new resources for the Jihadi Salafists nor caused them to lose any 
resources at hand. They were still able to conduct their religious study circles 
and their website continued to operate. Their limited use of the web to set 
boundaries may have failed to strengthen their Salafi authority among other 
Salafists in Indonesia, but it did not fail to re-affirm their religious authority 
among their committed Jihadists followers.      
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that different Salafi factions in Indonesia used   
the internet as a resource for setting boundaries between ‘us’/’true Salafists’ 
and ‘them’/‘Salafi imposters’ by conducting hostile intra-othering practice in 
their attempt to sustain their movement and assert sacred authority. Their 
claims to be the vanguards of ‘authentic Islam’ and their method of strict 
literalism and anti-intellectualism contributed to the Salafists’ hostility to ‘the 
misguided’ other, including ‘misguided’ insiders.  
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However, the Salafi factions differed in the degree to which they were 
engaged in this internet use. The Yemeni Salafi faction was engaged in 
mobilizing their websites as instrumental resources for vilifying Salafi 
factions and individuals considered ‘the other’. They optimised the tactics of 
vilification in this online practice of othering including name-calling, 
character assassination and verdict giving, which were targeted at the Haraki 
Salafists and Jihadi Salafists. By contrast, the Haraki Salafi and Jihadi Salafi 
factions only partially used their websites as resources for boundary setting. 
The Haraki Salafists partly employed the tactic of character assassination, 
while practicing very limited use of name-calling and verdict giving tactics 
levelled at the Yemeni and Jihadi Salafi factions. The same is true for the 
Jihadi Salafists who targeted their vilification at the Yemeni Salafists.   
The Yemeni Salafi faction was also fully engaged in mobilizing their 
websites as resources for self-exaltation, another strategy of othering. The 
proponents of this faction attempted to portray themselves as ‘the true 
Salafists’ with ideal attributes and characteristics of ‘the true followers’ of the 
Prophet Muhammad, his companions and Salaf ‘ulamā. By contrast, the 
Haraki Salafi faction and Jihadi Salafi faction did not utilize their websites for 
this self-exaltation strategy of othering.  
This variation in web use was closely related to the resource 
difference among the Salafi factions. The Salafi factions with limited access to 
fundamental resources, as exemplified by the Yemeni Salafists, was 
motivated to mobilize the internet as a new instrumental resource for 
boundary setting between ‘us’/’true Salafists’ and ‘them’/’Salafi imposters’ in 
their attempt to overcome their lack of resources. By contrast, being 
confident as they had good access to various types of resources, the Haraki 
Salafists were less enthusiastic about online othering to assert their 
guardianship of Salafism.  
The Salafi factions with limited access to crucial resources have 




extensively than the well-resourced factions. The limited access to 
fundamental resources has encouraged and motivated the poorly resourced 
Salafi factions like the Yemeni Salafists to optimise online boundary setting to 
sustain their movement. This varied use of the internet to set boundaries has 
demonstrated varied significance of this internet use for different Salafi 









In addition to the use of the internet to construct the movement’s ideology 
and set boundaries (as explained in the last two chapters), the Salafi 
movement mobilized the new media to create links with like-minded 
individuals or organizations with shared ideological background.  In creating 
these linkages, the Salafi factions reflected their local and global connections 
as well as their ideological affiliation. This chapter examines the pattern of 
links created on the Salafi factions’ websites and their usage, to understand 
the links’ significance for different Salafi factions.  
 First, the chapter briefly describes links and factors influencing link 
formation. Second, it presents the typology of links created by the Salafi 
factions in Indonesia. Third, it analyses how the Salafi factions actually used 
the links in order to show what purposes Salafi links could serve, and 
examines what factors influenced their linking practices. Lastly, the chapter 
discusses the significance of links by explaining why these linking practices 
occurred from the perspective of resource mobilization theory. In support of 
the overall argument that the internet has varied significance for Islamic 
movements, the chapter argues that the significance of link creation varied 
across the Salafi factions due to variation in social-organizational resources 
among different Salafi factions as well as because of  the particular nature of  
Salafi ideology adopted by each Salafi faction. Particularly, it shows that 
instead of establishing strategic linkages aimed at organizing collaborative 
alliances for collective action, the Salafi factions used links as resources 




website based on factors related to content of the target web and attributes 
of the target web producers. 
        
Links, Linking Practice and Networks 
The web is a ‘small world’ in that it is composed of social networks created 
and maintained by its actors in cyberspace (Bjorneborn 2004; Park and 
Thelwall 2008). Social actors can associate in cyberspace through 
interconnections among their websites (Bealieu 2005 in Park and Thelwall 
2008). All this can be recognized through link formation on their websites. In 
this context, ‘link’ or ‘hyperlink’ refers to a word (or a number of words) or 
picture in a document or web page, normally highlighted, that can be clicked, 
or simply hovered over, in order to go to another place in the same web page, 
a different document, another web page or another website.   
Links created on a website indicate that website’s connection with 
other websites (the linked ones) and thus a relationship with the linked 
websites’ creators. Foot et al. (2003) argue that “links represent relationships 
between producers of web materials” (that is, web pages). Links also 
demonstrate recognition among website actors involved in linking practice 
(Rogers and Marres 2000 in Foot et al. 2003). Thus, links reveal connections 
and recognition among websites and social networks among their actors in 
cyberspace. By social networks I mean “a set of people (or organizations or 
other social entities) connected by a set of social relationships such as 
friendship, co-working or information exchange” (Garton et al. 1997). 
Network building, then, refers to any attempts by an individual, group or 
other social entities to connect or recognize another individual, group or 
other social entities based on the same set of social relationships including 
ideology.  
The networking potential of the internet is especially true in the 




Activists not only use the internet as a tool for disseminating information and 
constructing collective identities, but also mobilize it as a resource for 
creating social networks through links. The Zapatista movement in Mexico, 
for example, used the internet to establish online networks with like-minded 
movements and supporters that were global and free from government 
control (Garrido and Halavais 2003).  Political actors create links to related 
websites of parties, peer politicians, and media in order to increase the 
information value of their websites and show their shared missions, activities 
and ideology (Park et al. 2004 and 2005). For marginalized political actors 
like those in Singapore, links help them not only to establish communal 
structures and set boundaries in cyberspace, but also to connect with one 
another in order to enhance their organizational strength and capacity (Soon 
and Kluver 2005).   
Link studies have been concerned with what influences individuals or 
groups to create links to another person’s or group’s website. As Park and 
Thelwall (2003) have elaborated, individuals or groups making the links are 
motivated by a desire to recommend or endorse the linked website and this 
desire to maintain cooperative alliances influences link formations. Yet, 
hostile relations rather than cooperative alliances can also motivate link 
creation as seen in satirical political websites, where linking to other 
websites is intended as sarcastic and negative criticism (Sunstein 2001 in 
Park and Thelwall 2003).  
According to Park and Thelwall (2008:688-689), factors contributing 
to link creation can be divided into two categories: target website contents 
and target website producer attributes. First, linking activities within a 
website are motivated by variables related to characteristics of the linked 
website content. They include credibility, content diversity, subject or topic 
similarity, search engine inclusion and ranking of a target website. Link 




well as its content relevance. The number of links incoming to a website may 
indicate the credibility and reputation of the site. 
In addition, link creation is influenced by factors related to the 
attributes of a target website producer, namely an individual, a group or an 
institution that runs or controls the linked website’s establishment, content, 
day-to-day operation and maintenance. Linking activities are influenced by 
aspects related to the linked website producer, which are shared by the 
linking website producer. These include such aspects as party affiliation, 
language, collaboration, and ideological affinity. The social, economic, 
political and ideological aspects of the relationship between the linking 
website producer and the linked website producer play a crucial role in 
linking activities among websites. 
Typology of the Salafi Movement’s Links 
Of 60 Salafi movement websites selected for this study, 20 websites had links. 
The Yemeni Salafi faction had 16 linking websites and the Haraki Salafi 
faction had 4 sites with links. The Jihadi Salafi faction, however, had no 
websites with links (Figures 1 and 4). Therefore, the following analysis is 
focused on the linking practices of the Yemeni Salafists and Haraki Salafists 
who represented the resource-poor and resource-rich Salafi factions 
respectively. The issue of why the Jihadi Salafi faction created no links will be 
discussed in the final part of this chapter together with the discussion on the 
linking practices of the other two Salafi factions. 
In what follows, in order to analyse the types of the Salafi faction’s 
online linkages, I present a statistical overview of the typology of Salafi links 
based on geographical location of linked website producers and the content 
of linked websites. This is relevant to demonstrate that different Salafi 
factions created different types and number of links; that the less well-




Salafi faction. As will be explained in the next section, this indicates that 
creating linkages online had a varied significance for different Salafi factions. 
Local and Global Links 
All links created by the Salafi factions were “out-links”, which can be defined 
as links from a given website to another website (Bjorneborn and Ingwersen 
2004 in Park and Thelwal 2008:691). Based on the (apparent) geographical 
location of the target or linked-to website producers, the Salafi movement’s 
links may be categorized into two types: local and global links. By local links I 
mean linkages to the websites of Indonesian Salafi followers, religious 
authorities (‘ulamā`), communities and institutions. It is important to clarify 
that this categorisation of ‘local’ refers to Indonesia-related content, 
regardless of the actual physical location of the website server, which in most 
cases appeared to be located and hosted inside Indonesia, but in some cases 
may have been outside of Indonesia.   These local links navigated visitors to 
websites that appeared to be created by Indonesian Salafi communities or 
individuals and were written in Indonesian language. Besides such local sites, 
the Salafi factions established linkages to non-Indonesian, overseas Salafi 
religious authorities, communities and organizations through global links. 
These global links were target websites that appeared to be hosted outside 
Indonesia, established by non-Indonesian Salafi individuals and 
organizations, and which were written in languages other than Indonesian, 
especially Arabic and English. 
Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafi faction created 207 local 
links to show its connection with like-minded Salafi individuals, groups and 
institutions in Indonesia. The website with the largest number of links was 
Al-Ilmu (http://al-ilmu.web.id) with 134 local out-links, followed by 
Darussalaf (www.darussalaf.or.id) with 30 out-links and Al-Atsariyyah 
(www.al-atsariyyah.com) with 15 out-links in the second and third place 




nashihah.com) and Asy-Syariah (www.asysyariah.com), each created the least 
number of local links with only three out-links.  
The Yemeni Salafi faction created 35 links to global target sites 
established by individuals and organizations with the same ideological 
affinity in the Middle East and Europe. Only half of linking Yemeni Salafi 
websites (eight websites) established such a linkage to global target sites. 
The Darussalaf Salafi learning centre (www.darussalaf.or.id) contained the 
most global links connecting to 23 primary Salafi information sites and Salafi 
authorities in the Middle East and Europe.1 In total, the Yemeni Salafi faction 
created 242 links to establish a network with sites of local and global Salafi 
individuals, organizations and religious authorities. 
By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction established linkages to 102 local 
target sites, which equates to only half of the local links created by the 
Yemeni Salafi faction. Of four Haraki Salafi sites with links, Atturots 
Foundation (www.atturots.or.id) created the most links, connecting to 65 
local target sites, followed by Wahdah Islamiyyah (www.wahdah.or.id) and 
Hasmi (www.hasmi.org) with 31 and 9 local links respectively. Meanwhile, 
Imam Bukhari Salafi Boarding School established the least networks with 
only three local target sites. This shows that around 60% of the Haraki Salafi 
local links were created by a single website (www.atturots.or.id).  
However, the Haraki Salafi faction had more links to global sites than 
the Yemeni Salafi faction with the total of 87 and 35 links respectively. Of this 
number of links, the Yemeni Salafi faction prioritised Arabic websites of Salafi 
organizations and religious authorities (68 links) above those in English (19 
links). Interestingly, of the selected Haraki Salafi websites, only one 
(www.atturots.or.id) established this global linkage so that all Haraki Salafi 
global links (87 global links) were on this single Haraki Salafi site.  
                                                          
1The remaining linking Yemeni Salafi websites had no global links: http://an-
nashihah.com,http://al-ilmu.biz,http://akhwat.or.id,http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id,http://al-




Overall, the findings show that the Haraki Salafi faction established 
less linkages than the Yemeni Salafi faction. The Haraki Salafis created 189 
links to local and global websites, while the Yemeni Salafis formed 242 links 
to local and global sites (Table 1). 
Content-Based Salafi Link Categories  
Based on the content of the linked websites, links created by the Salafi 
movement have been divided into eight categories; Salafi information and 
teachings; religious authorities (‘ulamā`); learning institutions; online 
business; online publications; online radio; audio and television; online 
communities; and Salafi women (Tables 2, 3 and 4).  
The Yemeni Salafi faction created more links to websites of Salafi 
information and teachings than the Haraki Salafi faction with 179 links and 
58 links respectively. It also established more links to other types of target 
sites: online business, online publications, online communities and Salafi 
women. The Yemeni Salafi faction had more links to online business sites (6 
links) than the Haraki group (1 link). The Yemeni Salafists created more links 
(12) to online publication sites than the Haraki group (8 links). They also had 
more link types than the Haraki Salafi followers relating to online 
communities (3 links and 1 link respectively) and Salafi women (7 and 4 links 
respectively) (Tables 2 and 3).   
However, the Haraki Salafists created more links than the Yemeni 
Salafists in three particular categories: religious authorities, learning 
institutions, and online radio and television. The Haraki Salafists built more 
links to the sites of Salafi religious authorities than the Yemeni Salafis with 74 
and 22 links respectively. They also established more links (36) to sites of 
Salafi learning institutions or foundations than the Yemeni group (9 links). In 
addition, the Haraki Salafi faction created slightly more connections with 





In summary, the Yemeni Salafi faction had more links than the Haraki 
Salafi faction in five of the eight categories (namely information and 
teachings, online business, online publications, online communities, and 
Salafi women). It created more links than the Haraki Salafi faction with a total 
of 242 links and 189 links respectively (see Table 5). 
Salafi Linking Practice  
Drawing on the link studies referred to in the opening sections of this chapter 
which focus on the motives and factors (target website contents and 
attributes of target website producers) influencing the Salafi linking practices 
outlined above, this section examines how these Salafi factions actually used 
the links they created on their websites. Significantly, I found that there was 
no strategic link creation aimed at organizing collaborative alliances for 
collective action. Rather, the Salafi factions mobilized the links as resources 
simply for identifying, recognizing and endorsing a group or individual’s 
website based on factors related to content of the target web and attributes 
of the target web producers such as credibility, subject or topic similarity, 
organizational affiliation and ideological affinity of a linked website.   
 
Recognizing Sites Considered Credible 
The Salafi factions created links as a means of demonstrating what they 
considered credible Salafi websites. The credibility of content of a target 
website was an important factor in determining whether the group endorsed 
the website or not through a linkage. The contents of a linked website were 
credible, meaning ideologically correct, if they were in accordance with the 
teachings of the Salaf, with references to the Salafi ‘ulamā` recognized by 
Salafists and in line with their interests and purposes.  
This credibility was a required criterion for the Yemeni Salafi faction 
to create a link in its website as recognition and endorsement of a target 




Yemeni Salafists created links on its website, www.salafy.or.id (which was 
one of the Yemeni Salafi websites that included the most links), to recognize 
and endorse ten websites because their contents, ranging from general Salafi 
ideas to the issue of terrorism, were considered correct in the light of the 
Yemeni Salafi faction’s ‘ulamā`, its ideology and interests.2 As its web 
administrator stated: 
We only included links to websites which (we consider) are in 
accordance with the true manhaj al-salaf (Salaf method). We, for 
example, provide them as references for our articles related to actual 
issues here. Our ustadh (teacher) warned us not to publish articles 
without their permission and references to ‘true’ Salaf sources.3 
 
The same is true for the Haraki Salafi faction. The Imam Bukhari Salafi 
Boarding School (http://bukhari.or.id), for instance, established links to 
recognize and endorse three websites whose contents were considered 
correct based on the ideology and interests of the Haraki Salafi faction.4 This 
was illustrated by the fact that the first two websites were online versions of 
the Imam Bukhari’s monthly print magazine As-Sunnah, while the last one 
was an online radio station operated by the proponents of Haraki Salafism in 
Indonesia (Radio Rodja).  
Endorsing Websites with Shared Subjects and Topics  
The Salafi factions created web links to endorse sites that shared the same 
subjects and topics.  This included not only shared general ideas of Salafism, 
but more importantly also topics which were specific to each Salafi faction. 
For example, strong criticism of violent jihadism (as seen in the bombings in 
Bali and Jakarta the 2000s) was one common topic shared by the Yemeni 
Salafists. This shared interest would have motivated Ahlussunnah Jakarta 
                                                          
2The Yemeni site www.salafy.or.id had links to the following ten websites: Ahlussunnah 
Jakarta, Anti Teroris, As Salafy, An-Nashihah, Darus Salaf, Asy-Syariah, Darussunnah, PP 
Ibnul Qoyyim, Mereka Adalah Teroris, and Thullabul Ilmiy. 
3 Interview with Mahdi, Bandung, 4 September 2010. 
4http://bukhari.or.id created links to the following websites: Majalah As-Sunnah 
(http://majalah-assunnah.com), Majalah Digital As-Sunnah (http://ebook.majalah-




(www.ahlussunah-jakarta.com) to endorse other websites as ‘true Salafi 
websites’ through links including Majalah Asy-Syariah (www.asy-
syariah.com), Darussalaf (www.darussalaf.or.id) and As-Salafy 
(www.salafy.or.id) whose contents were concerned with the same issue. 
Another common topic was the issue of Sururiyyah, an allegedly deviant 
stream of Salafism which was attributed by the Yemeni Salafists to 
Muhammad al-Surūr and his followers (see Chapter Two). The Yemeni Salafi 
website www.salafy.or.id was so concerned with this issue that it created 
links to websites that published similar content, such as 
www.darussalaf.or.id, www.asy-syariah.com, and http://thullabul-ilmiy.com. 
The Haraki Salafi faction also created links recognising and endorsing 
sites with shared content. One of the common topics among the proponents 
of this group was rejection of Shi’ism as part of Islam. Their websites were 
laden with anti-Shi’i ideas. This was manifested in their links to sites that 
promoted the same anti-Sh’i sentiment. For example, Majelis at-Turots al-
Islamy (www.atturots.or.id), the Haraki Salafi website which had the most 
links, established links to at least two websites (Hakekat Syi’ah Imamiyah, 
http://hakekat.com, and Gen Syi’ah, www.gensyiah.com) that shared the 
same rejection of Shi’ism.   
Identifying with Affiliated Groups and Individuals’ Websites  
Furthermore, links were used to identify with Salafi individuals or 
organizations’ websites based on attributes of the target web producers. In 
this respect, three dominant attributes of a target web producer could be 
identified as influencing the Salafi factions to use links: group affiliation, 
ideological affinity and authority.  
The Salafi factions used links to identify with one another based on 
group affiliation, namely organizational or group relationship which 
motivated the Salafi factions to create links to particular websites. It was 
common among the proponents of Salafism to set up organizations to achieve 




publishing house. Within the Yemeni Salafi faction, websites established by a 
Yemeni Salafi foundation created links as tools to identify with one another. 
This intra-organizational identification linking practice was exemplified by 
An-Nashihah magazine (http://an-nashihah.com); it was established by As-
Sunnah foundation in Makassar and created links to identify two other 
websites established by the same foundation: www.dzulqarnain.com, a 
website of its leader, and Radio Online An-Nashihah (attached to http://an-
nashihah.com). 
This group affiliation-based identification link use was also manifest 
within the Haraki Salafi faction. Wahdah Islamiyah (www.wahdah.or.id) used 
links created on its website to identify with 31 websites of its affiliated 
regional branches.5  Harakah Sunniyyah Untuk Masyarakat Islami 
(www.hasmi.org) linked to nine websites affiliated to this organization.6  
Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (www.atturots.or.id) created links to identify with 
six affiliated websites.7 Lastly, Imam Bukhari Salafi Boarding School 
                                                          
5www.wahdah.or.id created links to the following  31 affiliated websites: 
http://www.belajarislam.com/, http://darulabrar.org/, , http://wahdahbandung.or.id/, 
stibamks.net (expired when accesses 30 Sep 2014), http://wahdah-banggai.blogspot.com/, 
http://wahdahmakassar.org/,  http://www.lmdppwi.com/(not active when accessed 29 Oct 
2014), http://ww34.suarawahdah.com/(not active when accessed 29 Oct 2014), 
http://wahdah.or.id/#,  http://smawahdah.sch.id/,  http://alumnistiba-mks.blogspot.com/, 
http://markazassunnah.blogspot.com/, http://www.wahdahbaus.co.nr/ , 
http://wahdah.or.id/#, http://www.alinshof.com/, http://wahdah.or.id/#, 
http://wahdah.or.id/#, http://www.wahdahmuna.blogspot.com/, http://wahdah.or.id/#, 
http://wahdah-sinjai.blogspot.com/, http://wahdah.or.id/#, 
http://www.wahdahsidrap.com/, http://wahdah.or.id/#,  
http://wahdahmaros.blogspot.com/, http://wahdahpulauburu.blogspot.com/,  
http://wahdah.or.id/#, http://www.wahdah-belopa.blogspot.com/, http://wahdah.or.id/#, 
http://wahdah.or.id/#, http://wahdah.or.id/#, and 
http://forummuslimahda’wahkampus.blogspot.com/.  
6www.hasmi.org had links to 9 affiliated websites: www.beasiswapendidikanislam.com, 
www.hasmi-islamicschool.com, http://elsunnah.wordpress.com, http://bukusaku.net, 
http://ipmipeduli.org, http://minyakzaitunruqyah.com, http://hasmidepok.org, 
http://ww2.maktabahaliman.com, and http://pembangunanmasjid.wordpress.com.  
7www.atturots.or.id had links to the following six websites of intra-organizational affiliation: 
www.atturots.or.id/Islamic-centre-bin-baaz.html, www.atturots.or.id/jamilurrahman-as-
salafy.html, www.atturots.or.id/lajnah-da’wah.html, www.atturots.or.id/rs-at-turots.html, 




(http://bukhari.or.id) established links to identify with two affiliated 
websites.8 
Endorsing Websites with Shared Ideology 
The Yemeni Salafi faction created links on its websites recognizing and 
endorsing websites of individuals or organizations that had shared Yemeni 
Salafi views and beliefs. For example, Adhwaus Salaf (http://adhwaus-
salaf.or.id), which was established and run by a Yemeni Salafi learning centre 
in Bandung, created links to recognize and endorse five websites which were 
produced and administered by individuals or organizations that had common 
Yemeni Salafi beliefs and ideas.9 Thullabul Ilmy (http://thullabul-ilmiy) had 
similar links.10 
This ideological affinity-based endorsement link creation was also 
manifest among Haraki Salafi websites. The site www.atturots.or.id, which 
was established by a Haraki Salafi foundation in Yogyakarta, endorsed 
through websites which were administered by individuals or foundations of 
Haraki Salafism such as Ma’had Imam Bukhari in Solo (http://bukhari.or.id), 
Ma’had ‘Ali Al-Irsyad in Surabaya (http://mahad.info), Madrasah Imam 
Ahmad bin Hanbal in Semarang (http://binhambal.wordpress.com), Ma’had 
Al-Furqon in Gresik (http://alfurqon.co.id), Ustadz Kholid Syamhudi 
(www.ustadzkholid.com), Ustadz Aris Munandar (http://ustadzaris.com) and 
Ustadz Abu Haidar (www.abuhaidar.web.id). 
 
Recognizing Websites with Authoritative Sources  
                                                          
8http://bukhari.or.id had links to two affiliated websites: http://majalah-assunnah.com and 
http://ebook.majalah-assunnah.com.  
9http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id created links to these Yemeni Salafi websites: 
www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com, http://al-atsariyyah.com, www.assalafy.org, 
www.asysyariah.com, and www.salafy.or.id.  
10http://thullabul-ilmiy.or.id built networks through links to the following Yemeni Salafi 
websites: http://almakassari.com, http://an-nashihah.com, www.assalafy.org, 
www.asysyariah.com, http://darussunnah.or.id, http://thullabul-ilmiy.or.id/blog/audio, 




Lastly, the Salafi factions used links as recognition of the authority of target 
websites. This was related to the religious authority of the linked web 
supervisors or administrators. A Yemeni Salafi community created links to 
websites which were published or endorsed by Yemeni Salafi ‘ulamā`, ‘the 
learned men’ who were believed to have authority to speak about and for 
Yemeni Salafism. This linking practice indicated that the community 
regarded the linked website and its producers as the authoritative sources of 
Yemeni Salafism. The linked websites included those of global and local 
Yemeni Salafi authorities. Ahlussunnah Makassar (www.almakassari.com), 
for example, established links to recognize and endorse the websites of some 
Yemeni Salafi ‘ulamā` in the Middle East (Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādi’i and Rabī 
ibn Hādi al- Madkhali) as well as those of Yemeni Salafi leaders in Indonesia 
(Abdul Mu’thi al Maidany, Dzulqarnain, and Sofyan Chalid Ruray).11 However, 
due to the strong influence of the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities within the 
Salafi movement, some websites like Ma’had Ibnul Qoyyim 
(http://salafybpp.com) only linked to the websites of Yemeni and Saudi Salafi 
authorities.12 
This religious authority-based recognition linking practice was also 
seen in the Haraki Salafi faction.  Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy 
(www.atturots.or.id), the Haraki Salafi foundation with the most links (87 
global and 65 local), best illustrated this linking practice among the Haraki 
Salafists. Of its 87 global links, 65 were to websites of overseas Salafi 
personalities recognized and endorsed as the authoritative Salafi ‘ulamā` in 
                                                          
11Ahlussunnah Makassar (www.almakassari.com) created links to the websites of the 
Yemeni global and local authorities: Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i, http://muqbel.net; Rabi bin 
Hadi al-Madkhali, http://rabee.net; http;//almiadani.net (Ustadz Abdul Mu’thi al-Maidany), 
http://dzulqarnain.net (Ustadz Dzulqarnain), and http://sufyanruray.info (Ustadz Sofyan 
Chalid Ruray).    
12Mahad Ibnul Qoyyim (www.salafybpp.com) created links to the websites of the Middle 
Eastern Salafi authorities: Abd al-Aziz bin Baaz, Abd al-Muhsin al- Abbad, Ahmad bin Yahya 
al-Najmi, Lajnah Daimah, Muhammad bin Salih al-Usaimin, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i, Rabi 




the Middle East and Europe.13 As with the Yemeni Salafi faction, the centrality 
of the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities has made the Haraki Salafi faction 
create fewer links to local Salafi authorities with only 8 links to the websites 
administered or supervised by Indonesian Salafi leaders. These were Ustadh 
Kholid Syamhudi (www.ustadzkholid.com), Ustadh Muhammad Abduh 
Tuasikal (http://rumaysho.wordpress.com), Ustadh Basweidan 
(http://basweidan.wordpress.com), Ustadh Abdullah Roy 
(http://tanyajawabagamaislam.wordpress.com), Ustadh Aris Munandar 
(http://ustadzaris.com), Ustadh Abu Haidar (www.abuhaidar.web.id), and 
Ustadh Abu Zubair (http://abuzubair.net).  
                                                          
13Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (www.atturots.or.id) had links to 65 sites of global Salafi 
authorities: Abd al-Azhim Badawy (www.ibnbadawy.net), Abd al-Aziz Alu Syaikh 
(www.sahab.ws/5600/news/3399.html), Abd al Aziz al Rajihi (www.sh-rajhi.com), Abd al 
Aziz al Rayyis ((www.islamancient.com), Abd al Aziz bin Baz (www.ibnbaz.org), Abd al Aziz 
al Bura’i (www.alburaie.com), Abd al Muhsin Abbad (www.alabad.jeeran.com), Abd al 
Muhsin Ubaikan (www.obaykan.com), Abd al Qadir al Arnauth (www.alarnaut.com), Abd 
Allah al Fauzan (www.alfuzan.islamlight.net), Abd Allah al Zhafiri (www.sahab.ws/6111), 
Abd Allah Jibrin (www.ibn-jebreen.com), Abd al Razzaq Afifi (www.afify.com), Abd al Salam 
Barjas (www.burjes.com), Abu Abd al Muiz Firkuz (www.ferkous.com), Abu Ashim al 
Ghamidi (www.abouassim.net), Abu Bakr al-Mishri (www.abu-bakr.com), Abu Islam Salih 
Taha (www.abuislam.net), Abu Malik al Juhanni (http://abumalik.net), Abu Umar al Utaibi 
(www.otiby.net), Ahmad Yahya Najmi (http://njza.net), Ali Hasan al Halabi 
(www.alhalaby.com), Ali Rida (www.albaidha.net), Ali Yahya al Haddadi 
(www.haddady.com), Alwi al Saqqaf (www.dorar.net), Hisyam al Arifi (www.aqsasalafi.com), 
Imam al Ajurri (www.ajurry.com), Khalid al Muslih (www.almosleh.com), Lajnah Daimah 
(www.alifta.com), M. Ismail Muqaddam (www.m-ismail.com), M. Abd Allah al Imam 
(www.sh-emam.com), M. al Hamud al Najdi (www.al-athary.net), M. Aman al Jami 
(www.aljami.net), M. Ibrahim al Hamd (http://toislam.net), M. Khalifah Tamimi 
(www.mediu.org), Majdi Arafat (www.magdiarafat.com), Masyaikh Sudan 
(www.marsed.org), Masyhur Hasan Salman (www.mashhoor.net), Muhammad al Magrawi 
(http://maghrawi.net), Muhammad al Uthaimin (www.ibnothaimeen.com), Muhammad 
Musa Nashr (www.m-alnaser.com), Muhammad Said Ruslan (www.rslan.com), Mustafa al 
Adawi (http://aladawy.info), Nashir al Barrak (http://albarak.islamlight.net), Nashir al Din 
al Albani (www.alalbany.net), Rabi al Madkhali (www.rabee.net), Sa’ad al-Hushayin 
(www.saad-alhusayen.com), Said Abd al Azhim (www.al-fath.net), Salim al Ajmi 
(http://sahab.ws/3250), Salim Ied al Hilali (http://islamfuture.net), Salih al Fauzan 
(www.alfawzan.ws), Salih al Suhaimi (www.assuhaimi.com), Salih Saad al Suhaimi 
(http://sahab.ws/4435), Sultan al Ied (www.sahab.ws/3147), Taqiy al Din al Hilali 
(www.alhilali.net), Ulama Yaman (www.olamayemen.com), Wahid Abd Salam Baly 
(www.waheedbaly.com), Yahya al Hajuri (www.sh-yahia.net), Abd al Rauf  Shakir 
(www.islamlecture.com), Dr. Bilal Philips (http://bilalphilips.com), Dr. Salih al Salih 
(www.understand-islam.net), Jalal Abu Alrub (www.islamlife.com/news.php), Nadir Ahmad 




Thus, it can be said that the Salafi factions used links simply as tools 
for recognizing, endorsing, and identifying websites considered credible, 
authoritative Salafi sources according to shared ideological views. In other 
words, Salafi linking practice was focused on the creation of recognition, 
endorsement and identification links, rather than strategic ones for building 
the network or communication for collective action.  An administrator of a 
Haraki Salafi website reported:              
We don’t use the internet to build networks or strengthen 
communication with other Salafi brothers in Indonesia and overseas. 
We simply use it for da’wah (Islamic propagation) purposes. Links or 
contact addresses provided on our website were simply used by users 
to ask questions [about Salafism] or to subscribe to our magazine As-
Sunnah.14    
This linking practice was also confirmed by the Yemeni Salafi faction, with an 
activist in the Yemeni Salafi community saying: 
We included credible links on our website so visitors can access the  
further true Salafi sources. We created the links as facilities for 
introducing real Salafi websites to visitors who are interested in 
enhancing their knowledge [of Salafism].15    
In spite of limited use of links above, the links do reveal nodes of Salafi 
networks or connections with like-minded individuals and groups.  They 
expose the connections between the Indonesian Salafi websites, particularly 
those of the Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists, with other Salafi websites, 
which were identified, recognized, and endorsed as allies.  
Significance of Links: Resources and Salafi Linking Practice 
The types of links and patterns of link use described above indicate that the 
Salafi factions created links differently although they actually used them for 
the same purposes. Significantly, the Yemeni Salafi faction mobilized its 
websites to create more links to the websites of like-minded individuals and 
                                                          
14Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010. 




groups than the Haraki Salafi faction. The Jihadi Salafi faction, however, 
created no links on its websites. This demonstrates that the Salafi factions 
had different linking practices as the significance of such links varied 
between the three groups.  
To uncover why this linking practice and varied significance occurred, 
it is necessary to examine the context within which the Salafi factions 
operated and how this relates to their online practices. This context refers to 
two aspects of the Salafi factions: organizational resources and the nature of 
ideology adopted by a Salafi faction. 
Organizational Resources 
First, the context refers to offline organizational resources, which were 
particularly evident in the cases of Yemeni and Haraki factions. The Salafi 
factions considered organizational networks important resources for their 
movement’s capacity and continuity. This was manifested not only in their 
building of offline organizational networks, but also in asserting those 
networks online. They created links on their websites as way of asserting 
networks with individuals, communities or organizations with the same 
ideology and purposes. 
However, each Salafi faction actually formed different types and 
number of links as described above because each Salafi faction had different 
needs. This difference in linkages can be traced back to the groups’ disparity 
in access to offline organizational resources. The linking practice of these 
Salafi factions reflected the state of their offline network resources. As 
explained in Chapter Two, although they shared the same aim in promoting 
Salafism in Indonesia, the Salafi factions had different access to 
organizational resources as instrumental facilities for achieving their goals. 
Among the Salafi factions, the Haraki Salafi faction had the best access 
to organizational resources in the form of networks. It maintained a good 
connection with a large number of organizations and individuals of the same 




adapt and respond to current socio-political change. This has made the 
followers of Haraki Salafism relatively open to building relationships with 
wider members of local and global Muslim communities, though they still 
hold fast the Salafi teachings.   
The Haraki Salafi faction established educational networks among 
local learning centres and foundations of the same Haraki Salafi ideology. 
This was manifested, among other ways, in the form of local teachers’ 
exchange and students’ input. It was common among the Haraki Salafi 
foundations or learning institutions to exchange teachers among themselves. 
An ustadh (teacher) of one Haraki Salafi learning institution could be 
assigned, at the same time, to teach at one or more other learning 
institutions. For example, apart from their learning centre, some teachers of 
Al-Irsyad Salafi Boarding School in Semarang conducted teaching duties at 
Imam Bukhari Boarding School in Solo. It was also not uncommon that a 
Haraki Salafi community sent its children to study Salafism at a Haraki Salafi 
learning institution which was endorsed by its Salafi teacher. In turn, that 
Haraki Salafi learning centre might recommend another learning centre to 
potential students of a Haraki Salafi community or family.  
Besides, the Haraki Salafi faction had access to the global educational 
network through cooperation with some Islamic universities in the Middle 
East. In some cases, some Haraki Salafi learning institutions had agreements 
for teachers’/lecturers’ and students’ exchange with some Saudi universities. 
The Makassar-based Wahdah Islamiyyah organization, for instance, selected 
and sent its students to study at Medinah Islamic University in Saudi Arabia, 
and received teachers or lecturers from the same university to teach at its 
learning centres. The same human resource exchange was also true for Al-
Irsyad Salafi Boarding School in Semarang. 
Moreover, the Haraki Salafists had a good relationship with global 
Salafi-oriented charity organizations in the Middle East with which they 




Indonesia. These included the well-known Kuwaiti-based Jam’iyyat Ihyā` al-
Turas and Saudi-based Al-Haramayn Foundation. Both provided the Haraki 
Salafists with financial or material aid to set up foundations, schools, 
mosques and learning institutions. At the local level, certain established 
Haraki Salafi foundations were assigned to channel the aid to the Haraki 
Salafi followers in other parts of Indonesia to support their programs and 
activities. This has created local networks of Haraki Salafists based on 
financial sources, such as Yogyakarta-based Al-Turas network and Jakarta-
based Al-Sofwah network as the local representatives of the Islamic charity 
organizations in Saudi and Kuwait.  
The Haraki Salafi faction especially had a strong social network among 
its communities, learning centres and foundations. This provided its 
adherents with group solidarity to support each other. The Islamic doctrine 
of ukhuwwah (brotherhood), teacher-student relationship, and economic 
advantages, among others, have contributed to this strong bond within the 
Salafi faction. 
Consequently, with such good access to offline social-organizational 
networks, the Haraki Salafi faction did not consider it necessary to mobilize 
their websites to demonstrate and assert such networks online. The Haraki 
Salafists seemed to be confident and content with what they had access to, so 
that it had little incentive to create numerous links on their websites to 
establish online networks with individuals or organizations of the same 
ideological affiliation. Though some of them formed online links on their 
websites, most of the Haraki Salafi communities did not need to maximise 
their website linkages as new resources for expressing and asserting their 
network resources online. 
The Yemeni Salafi faction, on the other hand, had less access to social-
organizational resources in the form of networks. It had comparatively 
limited networks with local and global groups, institutions and individuals in 




understanding of the Salafi doctrines that made its followers refrain from 
connecting with individuals, groups and organizations that they regarded to 
have violated the manhaj al-salaf, ‘the true way’ of understanding and 
practicing Islam.    
The Yemeni Salafists established educational networks in the form of 
teachers’ exchange among their learning centres. Like the Haraki Salafi 
faction, it was common among the Yemeni Salafi communities to support 
each other by sending and receiving teachers or mentors assigned to teach at 
one or more learning centres. Adhwaus Salaf in Bandung, for example, 
organized lectures given by an ustadh of Ihya al Sunnah Salafi learning centre 
in Tasikmalaya, Jawa Barat, or Ibnul Qoyyim learning centre in Balikpapan, 
Kalimantan Timur. At another opportunity, it sent its ustadh to teach at one 
or more Yemeni learning centres in Bandung or other cities in Indonesia. The 
Yemeni Salafists also conducted a kind of students’ exchange. A Salafi 
learning centre might admit students who were sent by another learning 
centre. A Yemeni Salafi family might send its children to study at a Salafi 
learning centre which was recommended by its Salafi ustadh or Salafi 
congregation.   
However, unlike the Haraki Salafi faction, the Yemeni Salafi faction 
had limited access to global educational networks. Generally, it had no formal 
agreement with universities in the Middle East to receive lecturers to teach at 
its learning centres or send its selected students to study at such universities. 
Perhaps, the only global educational network to which the Yemeni Salafi 
faction had access was its strong educational relationship with informal Salafi 
learning centres in Dammaj, Yemen. Most Yemeni Salafi leaders in Indonesia 
studied with the Salafi ‘ulamā` at these learning centres such as Dar al-Hadis. 
It was regarded by them as a privilege for these graduates and the Yemeni 
Salafi pesantren to send its students to study at these centres. On some 
occasions, certain Yemeni Salafi learning centres organized lectures given by 




Furthermore, compared to the Haraki Salafi faction, the Yemeni Salafi 
faction had limited access to Islamic aid organizations and charity groups in 
the Middle East, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the strong supporters of 
the global Salafism. This was because the Yemeni Salafists believed that the 
Islamic aid organizations in these countries (such as Jam’iyyat Ihya` al-Turas 
of Kuwait) were not true Salafi supporters. The Yemeni Salafists, then, 
refrained from, or were at least very cautious in, receiving or asking for aid 
from these organizations. This has resulted in the lack of strong financial 
networks and resources among Yemeni Salafi followers to support their 
activities and programs. They mostly financed their da’wah activities by 
themselves or through donations from local sympathizers. With such limited 
financial sources, Yemeni Salafists were only able to build humble and 
facility-poor learning centres and foundations.  
Nevertheless, the Yemeni Salafi faction had a strong bond among its 
followers and learning centres. Perhaps, this intra-Yemeni connection was 
the best social network to which the group had access. Apart from the belief 
in Islamic brotherhood among the Yemeni Salafists, the self-awareness of 
being a new and still small Islamic movement in Indonesia motivated the 
Yemeni Salafi followers to maintain strong group solidarity by living in a 
separated community, helping each other, and running business among the 
community members. This social network and strong belief in Salafi ideology 
has played a crucial role in the Salafi movement’s survival, even growth, in 
contemporary Indonesia. 
Therefore, given the above limited access to organizational networks, 
the Yemeni Salafi faction attempted to increase its movement’s capacity and 
maintain solidarity among its followers. The Yemeni Salafi followers believed 
that it was necessary to mobilize the internet to demonstrate and assert their 
existing, though limited networks, regarding the new media as a new 
important resource for the movement’s continuity and development. To 




asserted their existing linkage to local and global individuals and groups with 
the same ideological affiliation through creation of a lot of links on their 
websites described above. Limited access to offline organizational networks 
encouraged the Yemeni Salafists to mobilize websites as new important 
resources for exposing and asserting their offline networks through links.  
The Nature of the Salafi Factions’ Ideology 
To understand better the varied significance of linking practice among the 
Salafi factions, it is necessary to look at another aspect of the context in which 
the linking practice operated: the nature of the Salafi factions’ ideology 
involved in this link formation. This was particularly seen in the case of Jihadi 
Salafi faction. The fact that the Jihadi Salafi faction created no links on its sites 
was more closely related to its nature as a hard-line group than its lack of 
social-organizational resources.  
As a hard-line-violent group, Jihadi Salafists mostly operated 
underground, lived in a tightly closed community, were always on high alert, 
and were highly suspicious of foreigners in an attempt to protect themselves 
and their networks. The group made every effort to protect itself and its allies 
to ensure the movement’s continuity and development. 
In fact, Jihadi Salafists did not completely lack organizational 
resources. They had access to educational networks, though limited to the 
form of informal student-teacher relationships. They were also able to 
establish financial support networks, though limited to underground ones 
from individual and group donors, local or global, who secretly supported 
their cause. In addition, like other Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafists had 
access to social networks among its followers, the best organizational 
network which was available to them. However, they generally concealed 
these offline networks from the public to protect their movement, those 





The Jihadi group adopted the same strategy in its online network 
practice. They created no links on their websites because they wanted to 
avoid revealing their networks to protect their movement’s continuity from 
any external threats that could jeopardise or destroy it. Creating links was 
risky for the Jihadi Salafis because it might reveal their networks and allies. 
To be a strict Salafi in a country with a moderate Muslim majority means to 
live a life in a small and tightly-knit community for survival and growth. This 
becomes much harder when a person opts to be a violent jihadi Salafi. To be a 
violent jihadi Salafi means to join a group highly protective of itself and its 
movement. This was manifest, among other ways, in the group refraining 
from establishing networks through link formation on its websites.       
Looking at these two offline aspects of the Salafi movement, it is clear 
that there was a strong relationship between the Salafi factions’ offline 
resources, especially networks, and their online responses in the form of link 
formation. Different access to offline network resources has caused different 
responses to online network expression through links. As a result, the Salafi 
factions created different patterns of links on their websites and perceived 
the significance of links differently.              
The prevalence of some link types reveals something about the state 
of resources among the Salafi factions in Indonesia and its relationship with 
their linking practice. The above findings indicate that the Yemeni Salafi 
faction created more local links than the Haraki Salafi faction (207 and 102 
links respectively). However, the Haraki Salafi faction established more 
global links than the Yemeni Salafi faction (87 and 35 links respectively). This 
pattern of links clearly reflects the state of the Salafi faction’s network 
resources. The prevalence of local links over global ones in the Yemeni Salafi 
faction’s linking practice reveals that the Yemeni Salafi faction lacked access 
to offline global networks, especially with educational institutions and 
Islamic charitable organizations in the Middle East, as explained above. To 




Yemeni Salafists opted to focus on maintaining and asserting local networks 
to which they had good access in order to strengthen their movement’s 
capacity. The same holds true for the Haraki Salafi faction. The dominance of 
global links in its linking behaviour reflects its good access to offline global 
networks with Salafi organizations, institutions and individuals in the Middle 
East. The Haraki Salafi followers needed to show and maintain these global 
networks through link creation on their websites. 
Furthermore, the relationship between resources and linking practice 
was manifested in the links to the websites of learning institutions and online 
businesses. The Haraki Salafists had significantly more links to learning 
institutions than the Yemeni Salafists (36 links and 1 link respectively). This 
indicates that the Haraki Salafi faction had good access to local and global 
financial resources with which it was able to establish many Salafi learning 
institutions and foundations. By contrast, the figures reveal the Yemeni 
Salafists had limited access to financial resources which hindered them from 
building sufficient learning institutions. By creating links on their websites, 
both groups intended to assert their relationships, and maintain their 
networks, with these institutions and foundations, irrespective of the number 
of offline learning institutions each was able to establish. 
This financial resource difference was also reflected in the type of 
online business links the different Salafi factions created. The Yemeni 
Salafists established more links to online businesses than the Haraki Salafists. 
To overcome their limited access to financial resources, the Yemeni Salafists 
run businesses, including online shops, to support their needs and da’wah 
activities. The larger number of out links to online shops they created 
indicates their greater need for access to financial resources and their 
attempts to establish business contact and maintain relationships among the 
Yemeni Salafi business community. By contrast, perhaps being content with 
their good access to financial resources as explained above, the Haraki 




and needs. The very low number of links to online businesses on their sites 
reflects the financial sufficiency of the Haraki Salafists’ existing networks.   
In sum, link formation had a varied significance for different Salafi 
factions due to the variation of their offline contexts. Resource disparity and 
self-protection have given rise to link variation among the Salafi factions. 
Good offline access to resources influenced Haraki Salafists to create few 
links on their websites, making links less significant for them. Being a less 
well-resourced Salafi faction might have encouraged Yemeni Salafists to 
create many links on their websites, indicating the significance of link 
creation for them. The need to protect itself and its offline networks led the 
Jihadi Salafists to refrain from establishing links on its websites; for them 
such links were insignificant.      
Implications of Salafi Linking Practice 
The Yemeni Salafi faction’s extensive link creation may create the impression 
that they were a large and solid Salafi faction with a lot of followers and that 
they were well-connected with a lot of social networks. Their extensive local 
links might be particularly beneficial to Yemeni Salafists, contributing to their 
self-image of being ‘true Salafists’ resisting so-called ‘Salafi imposters’ (as 
explained in the previous chapter).                
However, it seems that extensive link creation has not substantially 
benefitted the Yemeni Salafi faction, or enabled it to close the gap in resource 
mobilization between it and other Salafi factions. There was no report during 
my interviews that link creation contributed to the increase of network 
resources offline or other types of resources within the Yemeni Salafi faction. 
My observation of Yemeni Salafi learning centres also showed that there was 
no increase in the mobilization of financial, infrastructure and other types of 
resources that might have resulted from their linking practice online. The 




The fact that the Haraki Salafi faction created fewer links than the 
Yemeni Salafi faction might have had an online impact, in that Haraki Salafists 
appeared less cohesive and less networked than other Salafi factions. Haraki 
Salafists’ fewer local links, compared to those of Yemeni Salafists, might have 
created the impression that Haraki Salafists received limited support from, 
and had limited networks among, Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, their 
extensive global links might have given viewers the impression that Haraki 
Salafists promoted ideas of Islam which were imported from abroad, and are 
therefore alien to the form of Islam long held by the majority of Muslims in 
Indonesia.         
However, there was no indication given in my interviews that the 
Haraki Salafi faction felt it had been disadvantaged because of its relatively 
sparce links on its websites. My interviews with representatives of this Salafi 
faction gave the strong impression that the absence of web links had no 
negative impact upon the group’s offline linkages and other resources 
enjoyed by the Haraki Salafists, who remain the Salafi faction with the best 
access to resources.     
In the case of the Jihadi Salafi faction, the absence of links on its 
websites might have indicated that the group had no networks and received 
no support from like-minded Muslims in Indonesia and overseas. But, this 
can be misleading because factors like the nature of Jihadi Salafi ideology and 
self-protection would have played an important role in discouraging Jihadi 
Salafists from creating links on their websites (as explained the previous 
section). The actual impact of this absence of links on the Jihadi Salafi faction 
could not be determined as I had great difficulty in getting access to its 
followers for interviews or observation. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the 
absence of links would have any negative impact for the Jihadi Salafi faction 
in that it has not influenced the group’s offline resources, keeping it the Salafi 




Overall, linking practice has not actually altered the existing level of 
resources among different Salafi factions. It simply reproduced, rather than 
closed, the gap in resource mobilization, particularly network resources, 
among the Salafi factions.  Haraki Salafists remained the group with the most 
access to resources, while Yemeni Salafists were less well-resourced, and 
Jihadi Salafists the least resourced. Nevertheless, this linking practice was not 
without significance for different Salafi factions.   As explained in the above 
section, the significance of the links lies in their role as a tool for identifying 
with one another, endorsing and recognizing like-minded individuals and 
groups’ websites, and demonstrating and asserting the existing offline 
linkages no matter how small or large they are.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that links had varied significance for different Salafi 
factions due to different offline contexts in which Salafi linking practices 
operated. Differences in resources and the nature of particular Salafi ideology 
adopted by a Salafi faction caused the Salafi factions to approach the creation 
of links on their websites differently although Haraki Salafists and Yemeni 
Salafists used the created links for similar purposes (namely identification, 
recognition and endorsement of like-minded individuals and groups’ 
websites considered credible and authoritative as Salafi sources). Links 
played a more significant role for Yemeni Salafists than Haraki Salafists, but 
they played no role for Jihadi Salafists.       
The resource-poor Salafi Yemeni group mobilized their websites more 
to create many links compared to the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction. 
Having good access to various social-organizational resources most likely 
made the Haraki Salafi faction content with the offline linkages and networks 
it had, so that it was less motivated to create many links on its websites to 
maximise the internet as a new resource for networking purposes. By 




the resource-poor Yemeni Salafi faction saw an advantage in creating many 
links in order to optimise the internet as a new important resource for 
exposing and asserting the existing connection they had online, and perhaps, 
establishing more networks. This strategy may contribute to the impression 
that it was a solid, ‘true Salafi faction’ with a lot of support. The Jihadi Salafi 
faction created no links on the web due to the nature of its ideology and 
strategy as a hard line group which wanted to protect its networks and allies 
from any threats that might endanger it.   
Importantly, the Salafi use of links merely reproduced rather than 
altered differences in the capacity of resource mobilization among different 
Salafi factions. The many links created by Yemeni Salafists on their websites 
did not translate into a closing of the resource gap with the Haraki Salafi 
faction. The absence of links on Jihadi Salafi websites also contributed to this 
online reproduction of differences in resource mobilization among the Salafi 
factions.    
Links did not necessarily mean there were collaborations or 
cooperative alliances for collective action between Salafi factions and 
individuals or groups associated with different websites. Rather, for these 
factions, links merely served the linking Salafi factions as facilities to identify 
with, recognize and endorse one another based on credibility, authority and 
ideological affinity of the linked websites. In other words, Salafi linking 
practice merely created recognition and identification links instead of 
strategic ones which were aimed at organizing collective action among like-




Table 1 Salafi Movement’s Local and Global Links (Summary) 
Types of Links Yemeni Salafi Faction Haraki  Salafi Faction Jihadi Salafi  Faction 
Local Links 207 102 0 
Global Links 35 87 0 
Total 242 189 0 
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Responding to Current Issues Online 
 
 
The internet has become an important new resource for social movements 
because it provides communication opportunities that are not offered by 
mainstream media. The internet can serve as an alternative form of media,  
bypassing mainstream media gatekeepers or repressive governments to 
enable social movement actors to communicate directly with their 
constituents and a wider audience (Bennet and Iyengar 2008; Thorson 2008; 
Bennet 2003a; Bennet 2003b; Boyd 2003). Drawing on alternative media 
scholarship (Downing 2001 and 2003; Rodriguez 2001), Stein (2009:753) 
argues that through its combination of greater speed, lesser expense, wider 
geographical reach and relative freedom from centralized gatekeepers, the 
internet allows social movements to provide alternative information about 
their perspectives on issues to their particular target groups. Thus, the 
internet can play a role in countering misinformation and disinformation in 
the mainstream media, disrupting prevalent perspectives and offering 
alternative ones.1      
While the above notion of the internet’s role is useful, a key question 
is: what is the ultimate goal of using the internet to provide alternative 
information about issues? Social actors are not satisfied by simply using the 
internet to provide alternative information, for their ultimate purpose is the 
continuation of their movement.   
                                                          
1
There are of course qualifications to this portrayal of the technical power of   internet to 
bypass official gatekeepers. Garry Rodan (1998), for example, in his analysis of the internet 
policy in Singapore argues that “a central feature of the Singapore strategy on internet 
control is the attempt to bring this medium under the same tight regimen as other electronic 
and nonelectronic media” (p. 88). The same government control is found in the cases of the 





While previous chapters have examined particular aspects of the 
Salafi factions’ use of the internet as a response to their level of resources, 
this chapter deals with their use of the internet to respond to current issues. 
It examines how the Salafi factions, as social movement actors, mobilized the 
internet to respond to current issues by providing alternative information 
and/or their perspectives on those issues. It will show that their use of the 
internet is generally a coping strategy to deal with the lack of resources they 
face in attempting to sustain their movement. However, the Salafi factions’ 
actual use of the internet to respond and provide alternative information 
about current issues varied due to each group’s differential access to offline 
resources. In doing so, the chapter first identifies the types of current issues 
to which the Salafists respond and describes the way they used websites to 
respond to these current issues; second, it explains why Salafi factions 
mobilized the web in different ways; and lastly, the chapter evaluates the 
extent to which this use of the internet has impacted upon resource 
mobilization among different Salafi factions.  
Types of Issues and Salafi Responses Online 
The Salafi factions used their websites to publish articles on a wide range of 
current issues. Each Salafi faction paid attention to what was happening in its 
society, its country, and the world. An analysis of the issues covered on their 
websites reveals that the Salafi factions responded to two types of current 
issues: local and global ones. The local issues were actual events that had 
occurred or were occurring in Indonesia, and problems facing Islam and 
Muslims in Indonesia. The global current issues consisted of events related to 
the interests of Islam and Muslims in countries other than Indonesia, in other 
regions and around the world.   
Local Issues 
Salafi factions responded to local issues by publishing articles on their 




interests of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia. Most of the articles and postings 
on these local issues were self-published by the Salafi factions. The writers or 
posters were Salafi leaders and teachers (ustadh) or Salafi web 
administrators who published the articles with the approval of their 
supervisors, who were normally their Salafi leaders or teachers.    
Through their websites, Haraki Salafists, the group with the best 
access to resources within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, addressed key 
local issues they regarded to be in the interests of Indonesian Muslims. 
However, of the 12 selected Haraki Salafi websites, only three published 
articles on local issues (www.wahdah.or.id, www.hasmi.org, and http://al-
irsyad.org). In total, Haraki Salafists published only ten articles on local 
issues (Table 1). The Haraki Salafists did not maximise the potential of the 
web as a resource for providing information about these local issues. They 
not only responded to fewer issues, but also published fewer articles on 
them. Of the ten articles on the selected websites,  three were about jilbab 
(Muslim women’s head coverings), two were on the role of Muslim Arabs in 
Indonesia, and the rest of the articles were the Haraki Salafists’ responses to 
local issues related to Western ideas of secularism, democracy and pluralism, 
state surveillance of Muslim preachers, current condition of Muslims in 
Indonesia, and Sunni-Shi’ite dialogue. Almost all articles and postings on 
these local issues were authored by members of the websites’ sponsoring 
group.           
 On the other hand, Yemeni Salafists, who were less well-resourced 
than the Haraki Salafists, utilized the web extensively as a resource for 
providing information about local issues. There were more Yemeni Salafi 
websites ‒14 in the sample selected‒ that responded to local current issues, 
with all such articles authored by members of the group. They were 
concerned with eleven issues including the Bali bombings and other 
bombings in Indonesia, the impact of the Aceh tsunami, ‘misguided’ Islamic 




software. In total, around 40 articles were published by the Yemeni Salafi 
faction responding to these local issues, with the majority about the Bali 
bombings and other terrorists’ attacks in Indonesia (Table 2).  
Furthermore, the least well-resourced Salafi faction, Jihadi Salafists, 
employed its websites much more extensively to respond to local current 
issues than the previous two Salafi factions. Arrahmah community 
(www.arrahmah.com), for example, published more articles and postings, 
which were mostly self-published ones, in its responses to 67 issues in 
Indonesia.2 The most frequently discussed issues included jihadism, jihadi 
groups and jihadi media, sectarian and religious conflicts in Poso, Central 
Sulawesi, the infamous group Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front), 
minority Muslim groups, George Bush’s visit to Indonesia, and natural 
disasters. As a jihadi-oriented Salafi website, Arrahmah was mobilized mostly 
for publishing articles and providing this group’s perspective on jihad-related 
issues. In total, it published around 180 articles responding to local issues 
(Table 3).               
 This shows that although all Salafi factions used the web to respond to 
local current issues, in practice they varied in the extent to which they 
mobilized the internet technology for this. Haraki Salafists employed the web 
to only a small degree to provide information about, and respond to, local 
current affairs, while Yemeni Salafists mobilized the web much more to 
respond to local issues. But, Jihadi Salafists optimised the web significantly 
more than either of the other two Salafi factions for this purpose.  
Global Issues 
In addition, the Salafi movement used the internet as a medium for 
responding to global current issues. They were not only aware of current 
                                                          
2There were four Salafi Jihadi communities with four jihadi websites selected for this study 
(http://almuhajirun.net, http://al-mustaqbal.net, www.arrahmah.com  and www.voa-
islam.com). Due to the large number of the articles they published on their websites as each 
maintained their websites daily in the form of online magazines and online news portals, I 
confined the analysis on one community with one active website, namely 




events happening in their home country, but also of events taking place, or 
problems facing Muslims, in countries and societies in Southeast Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Europe and other parts of the world. Articles related to 
these global issues were posted on their websites.       
 In the same way they responded to local issues, Haraki Salafists 
employed the web to a lesser extent for providing information about global 
issues. They published only around 20 articles in total in their responses to 
nine global issues. These included the issues of terrorism, the decline of the 
Muslim world, Israel-Palestine conflicts, Valentine’s Day, US-led invasion of 
Iraq, Islamophobia, football World Cup, two movies (2012 and Fitna) and 
global warming (Table 1).  
 By contrast, the Yemeni Salafi faction provided more articles on a 
larger range of global current issues on its websites. Yemeni Salafists 
responded to around thirty global current socio-political affairs including the 
issues of Israel-Palestinian conflicts, terrorism, Christmas and Valentine’s 
Day, and suicide bombings. In total, in their responses to current global 
issues, the Yemeni Salafi faction provided their web readers with 140 self-
published articles (Table 2).  
 Compared to the two previous Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafi faction 
went further by publishing many more articles responding to global issues. 
Jihadi Salafists also responded to a wider range of global issues with around 
90 issues related to Muslim interests in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
The Arrahmah community published around 800 articles responding to these 
global issues. The Israel-Palestinian conflict was on the top of the Jihadi 
Salafists’ list of most prominent global issues with 129 articles published on 
this. It is then followed by other issues involving jihadi groups like Al-Qaedah 
and Taliban, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Islam in the West, US-Iraq 
relations, and US-led invasion of Iraq (Table 3).     
These findings were consistent with those regarding the Salafi 




few articles on global current issues, the Haraki Salafists also used their 
websites rarely to provide alternative information about these issues, with 
the Yemeni Salafists much more active in responding to global current issues. 
But, Jihadi Salafists mobilized the web more than Yemeni Salafists, making 
them the group that responded most extensively on their websites to global 
current issues.          
However, there was one common trend among the Salafi factions in 
that each group responded to global issues more than to local ones (Table 4). 
For the well-resourced Haraki Salafists, 65% of articles on current issues on 
their websites were in response to global issues and only 34% in response to 
local issues. The same balance was true for the less well-resourced Salafi 
factions. Through its website, the Yemeni Salafi faction provided its website 
readers with 140 articles on current global issues and only 37 articles on 
local issues. That is around 80% of the total number of articles on current 
affairs published by the Yemeni Salafists’ are responses to current global 
issues with only 20% to local issues.     
 Jihadi Salafists also reflected the same trend. Of their total of almost 
one thousand articles, around 800 (or about 82%) were on global issues and 
only 180 (or 18%) were on local issues. These figures show that, of the three 
Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafists were most responsive to current global 
issues. 
These findings demonstrated that the different Salafi factions adopted 
similar strategies to use the web to respond to current issues, but they varied 
in its actual mobilization. The Salafi factions with limited access to resources 
(Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists) mobilized the internet more than the 
faction which had good access to other resources (Haraki Salafists) to 
respond to current issues (see Table 5). 
 The well-resourced Haraki Salafi faction responded to both local and 
global current issues less than the poorly resourced groups, the Yemeni 




Haraki Salafi faction published only around 4% of all articles on local current 
issues and around 2% of all articles on current global issues. In total, the 
Haraki Salafists provided their readers with the lowest percentage (2.4%) of 
all articles published by all Salafi factions (around 1200 articles) in their 
responses to current local and global issues (Table 5). 
By contrast, the resource-poor Yemeni Salafi faction published more 
with 16% of all articles on local issues and 14% of all articles on global issues 
published by different Salafi factions. Generally, it responded to current 
issues more than the Haraki Salafi faction, providing 15% of all articles on 
local and global current issues published by all Salafi factions (Table 5). 
The similar pattern of web use was seen in the case of the other 
resource-poor Salafi faction, Jihadi Salafists. They responded to current 
issues the most among the Salafi factions, publishing 79% of all articles on 
local current issues and 84% of all articles on global issues published by all 
Salafi factions. In total, the Jihadi Salafi faction provided the highest 
percentage (82%) of all articles on local and global issues published by 
different Salafi factions (Table 5).  
 
Internet Responses to Issues and Resource Variation among the Salafi 
factions 
 
The above pattern of Salafi factions’ web use certainly raises a question: why 
did different Salafi factions mobilise the web to respond to current issues in 
different degrees? As has been demonstrated, the answer can be found in the 
fact the Salafi factions varied in their access to resources. The use of the web 
to respond to current issues was closely linked to resource variation among 
the Salafi factions resulting in a pattern of internet use whereby the less a 
Salafi faction had access to resources, the more extensively it mobilized the 
web to respond to current issues. Thus, a Salafi faction’s use of the internet to 





This is particularly identified in the Salafi factions’ use of websites to 
provide alternative information about particular issues to that published by 
mainstream media in Indonesia (as will be described below). In fact, the 
Salafi factions varied in terms of the frequency of articles published on their 
websites to respond to these issues. In some cases, a Salafi faction published 
many articles on certain issues, but gave little attention to other issues. Other 
Salafi factions, in other cases, published few articles or did not publish at all 
to respond to particular issues. From the perspective of resource 
mobilization theory, this choice or selection is not without purpose. This 
indicates that certain issues were chosen because they reflected the interests 
of the Salafi factions. The group felt it needed to respond appropriately to 
particular issues, while regarding other issues as of little or no concern. This 
internet practice not only indicated the importance of the selected issues, but 
more importantly also provided opportunities for a Salafi faction to express 
its perspectives about the issues in its attempt to deal with its lack of certain 
resources.   
We now examine the specific issues deemed important to particular 
groups, to analyse what this indicates about each Salafi faction. 
Key Issues for the Haraki Salafi Faction  
Highlighted Local Issues 
Within the Haraki Salafi faction, the local issues to which it responded the 
most included the controversial statement by the president of Islamic party 
PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) regarding jilbab (Muslim women’s head 
covering), Sunni-Shi’ite relation, and the roles of Arab countries for 
Indonesia.  
Tifatul Sembiring, the president of PKS, stated that the issue of the 
jilbab should not be taken seriously because it was just a piece of cloth, and 




solve economic, educational and health problems.3 Through its websites, 
Wahdah Islamiyyah (WI), the Haraki Salafi subgroup most responsive to 
current issues, published a press release to respond to Tifatul’s statement. 
According to its deputy chairman, Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, WI condemned the 
president of PKS for his statement because the jilbab was more than just a 
piece of cloth; it constituted a religious issue and wearing it was an 
observance of God’s teaching and order. He further asked Tifatul to clarify his 
statement; otherwise Tifatul and his party would lose votes from WI and 
other Muslim groups in Indonesia in the 2009 general election.4   
Furthermore, the Haraki Salafists’ attempts to counter what this group 
saw as misunderstanding and misinformation about Islam and Muslims was 
evident in their response to the role of Arab people in Indonesia. Ruhut 
Sitompul, a politician of the ruling party, Partai Demokrat, and a member of 
campaign team for Susilo Yudhoyono-Boediono in the 2009 presidential 
election, claimed that, compared to US and other western countries, Arab 
nations did not provide aid to assist the development of Indonesia.  
In response, Wahdah Islamiyyah published articles declaring that 
Ruhut was unaware of the history of Arab countries’ support for the 
Indonesian struggle for independence from Western (Dutch) imperialism, for 
they were the first countries that recognized Indonesian independence in 
1945. Ruhut was also considered ignorant of Arab countries’ substantial 
contribution to Indonesia’s economic development through dana hibah 
(grants and endowments) when US and other Western countries were 
unwilling to provide these. Therefore, WI proposed that Ruhut be suspended 
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose wife does not wear jilbab, to run for presidency for the 




4“Wahdah Islamiyah Sesalkan Pernyataan Presiden PKS”; “Soal Jilbab, Wahdah Kecam 
Presiden PKS’; and “Wahdah Minta Klarifikasi Presiden PKS tentang “Selembar Kain Saja kok 




from membership of SBY-Boediono presidential campaign team because he 
had offended an ethnic group (Arabs in Indonesia) and its religion (Islam).5 
For the Haraki Salafists, their raising of the above issues demonstrated 
their will to counter misinformation about Islam.  They believed the wearing 
of a jilbab was an obligation for Muslim women based on Islamic texts. 
Counterattacking those who criticize and oppose the jilbab was regarded by 
the Haraki Salafists as a religious obligation. By doing this, the Haraki 
Salafists wanted to show their web visitors that they were the guardians of 
the ‘true’ teachings of Islam. 
The Haraki Salafists felt obliged to refute Ruhut’s statement partly 
because they had strong intellectual and financial relations with some Arab 
countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, regarded 
as the centre of Islam. By rejecting Ruhut’s statement, the Haraki Salafi 
faction presented themselves as defenders of the centre of Islam and in 
solidarity with the global Muslim community.  
This attempt was also seen in their responses to the issues of Sunni-
Shi’ite relations and democracy.6 By claiming that Shi’ites violate Islam, and 
by even considering them to be non-Muslims, and by regarding democracy as 
contrary to Islamic teachings, the Haraki Salafists presented themselves as 
the protectors of ‘true’ Islam from any un-Islamic ideas and behaviours.  
 What is more important here is the significance of responding to 
these issues as a coping strategy to deal with the Haraki Salafists’ lack of 
resources. By raising these issues on its websites and claiming to be the 
protectors of ‘true’ Islam and the defenders of the centre of Islam, the Haraki 
Salafi faction sought to attract more resources to overcome their relative lack 
of resources. As has been explained in the Chapter Four, in fact, compared to 
other Salafi factions, the Haraki Salafists had much better access to various 
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6“Kaum Muslimin di Antara Inkubasi Sekularisme dan Doktrin Demokrasi”; “Tanggapan 





kinds of resources, and they only suffered from the lack of moral resources. 
By presenting themselves as the guardians of Islamic teachings and the 
defenders of the centre of Islam through their strong responses to these local 
issues noted above, the Haraki Salafists sought to compensate for this lack of 
moral resources. In this way, they sought indirectly to attract visitors to their 
websites, to provide their group with more legitimacy, solidarity and 
sympathetic support, on the basis of their efforts to protect the purity of 
Islam from any un-Islamic elements and to defend the centre of Islam and 
ummah solidarity.  
Nevertheless, looking at the low number of articles on local current 
issues on its websites (only 7 local issues with 10 articles on them in total), 
the Haraki Salafi faction did not optimise the internet to respond to current 
issues as a strategy to overcome their lack of resources. As explained in the 
Chapter Four, the Haraki Salafi faction had greater access to various salient 
resources than other two Salafi factions. Because they were confident of 
being self-sufficient in offline resources, Haraki Salafists felt less pressure to 
optimise their online presence to respond to local issues.   
Global Issues that Attracted Most Responses 
The above pattern was also identified in the Haraki Salafists’ responses to 
global issues. The global issues to which they most often responded included 
terrorism conducted by those claimed to be Muslims in the name of jihad, the 
films 2012 and Fitna, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
The issue of terrorism in the name of Islam tops the list of global 
issues on the Haraki Salafi websites. From the perspective of Haraki Salafists, 
the attacks and bombings like those conducted by Al Qaeda were not a holy 
war for a Divine cause, but rather terrorism. Quoting the fatwa of Ha’iat Kibar 
al-‘Ulamā` (Commission of Senior Religious Authorities) of Saudi Arabia, they 
took the view that this terrorism is rooted in un-Islamic doctrines, 
particularly takfir, a doctrine that says that a Muslim or a Muslim ruler is 




teachings, which was developed by Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of al Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun.7  
Therefore, with references to various Quranic verses and the Prophet 
Muhammad’s sayings (hadis), the Haraki Salafists concluded with a hukm 
(judgement) that terrorism is not in line with Islam as it is a gross sinful act 
conducted by misled Muslims and its consequences bring about enmity 
among people and damage to Muslims and mankind.8 To solve terrorism, 
they proposed, Muslims who are involved in terrorism should be brought 
back to the true understanding of Islam according to the way of Salaf. This 
can be achieved through dialogue and counselling between those misled 
Muslims and Muslim religious authorities who are well-known for their 
thorough knowledge of Islam and their respected attitudes.9      
This Haraki Salafists’ self-presentation as the guardians of the purity 
of Islam was also seen in their response to two films, 2012 and Fitna. 
Released in 2009, 2012 is a Hollywood science fiction disaster movie that 
portrays the catastrophic events of the Day of Judgement happening in the 
year 2012 with references to Mayan Long Count calendar. According to 
Haraki Salafists, the movie is misleading because it contradicts the Islamic 
belief that the Day of Judgment is only known to Allah, and that even His 
messenger, Muhammad, had no knowledge when it will come. So, the film 
                                                          
7“Bermula dari Pengkafiran, Berujung Pengeboman”, http://majalah-
assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=98, accessed 




islam&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, accessed 28 June 2010. 
8“16 Kesalahan Aksi Pengeboman”, http://majalah-
assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81:16-kesalahan-aksi-
pengeboman&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, 28jun10; “Buang Bom kok Sembarangan”, 
www.ustadzaris.com/buang-bom-kok-sembarangan/ , accessed 2 June 2010.  
9“Kiat Mengatasi Terorismed di Tengah Kaum Muslimin”, http://majalah-
assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80:kiat-mengatasi-




was regarded dangerous as it can taint or even destroy the purity of Muslim 
viewers’ faith.10  
Fitna is a short film uploaded on the internet in 2008 and produced by 
Geert Wilders of the Dutch ultra-right Party for Freedom (PVV). It depicts the 
Quran as comparable to Hitler’s Mein Kampf as it is considered a source of 
terrorism and violence, which should be banned. Wahdah Islamiyyah 
regarded Fitna as an Islamophobic movie produced by an anti-Islam 
provocateur who promotes blasphemy and humiliation of Islam, the Prophet 
Muhammad and Muslims. They regarded the film as showing Wilders’ 
ignorance of Islam and, more importantly, his fear of the fast spread of Islam 
in the West.11   
The last global current issue that evokes most frequent responses 
from the Haraki Salafis was the Israel-Palestinian conflict. For Haraki 
Salafists, Israeli military aggression in Palestine is a form of Jewish enmity 
and hatred of Islam and Muslims. Quoting some Quranic verses, they argued 
that it is a religious conflict in which Jews have attempted, and will continue, 
to destroy Islam and Muslims. Any UN resolutions supported by the US and 
other Western countries to ease the conflict have failed because they were 
considered unfair as they often accommodate the interests of Israel, but 
ignore those of the Palestinian people. Haraki Salafist regarded this as 
evidence that Israel and its allies, particularly the US, are united to destroy 
Islam and Muslims.  
Therefore, the Haraki Salafists pointed out, Indonesian Muslims must 
make every effort to fight against Israel through providing financial and 
material assistance, labour, or at least saying prayers for the victory of 
Muslims and the defeat of Israel.12 They also saw jihad as a solution to the 
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2010. 
11“Fitna, Bukan Sekedar Film”, http://wahdah.or.id/2008/04/fitna-bukan-sekedar-film/, 
accessed 11 June 2010. 





Israel-Palestinian conflict. But, they preferred jihad in the form of 
humanitarian aid, such as health services, medicines, and financial aid that 
can be used by Palestinian Muslims to meet their needs in the field, rather 
than involvement in military or combative actions.13  
Through such responses to current global issues, the Haraki Salafi 
faction showed its web visitors, that it was concerned about efforts of those it 
regarded as the enemies of Islam to destroy Islam and Muslims. As with their 
responses to local issues noted above, Haraki Salafists presented themselves 
as the defenders of Islam and the global Muslim ummah and the guardians of 
the purity of Islam and Muslim faith. By doing so, they attempted to attract 
more sympathetic support and legitimacy for their movement in order to 
overcome their lack of moral resources.  
As with their responses to local issues noted above, however, Haraki 
Salafists attempts to use the internet to compensate for their lack of moral 
resources were not evident in their web responses to global issues. They did 
not optimise the web to provide alternative information about global current 
affairs (in total, only 11 issues with 20 articles about these). Again, self-
confidence and feelings of sufficiency resulting from having better access to 
other kinds of resources have contributed to Haraki Salafists’ low use of the 
web to respond to current issues, as a strategy to cope with their lack of 
moral resources.     
Key Issues for Yemeni Salafists 
By contrast, using the internet to respond to current issues as a coping 
strategy to deal with lack of resources was more clearly seen in the web 
practice of the Yemeni Salafi faction. Yemeni Salafists published more articles 
on current local and global issues than Haraki Salafists. 
  
Highlighted Local Issues 
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Within the Yemeni Salafi faction, the local issues to which it frequently 
responded included bombings in Indonesia in the 2000s, popular shamanism, 
and the so-called ‘misguided’ Muslim groups. 
Regarding the bombings in Indonesia in the 2000s such as Bali 
bombings, Makassar bombings, Marriot Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel 
bombings, Yemeni Salafists published 20 articles on their websites. With 
references to Quranic verses and the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, the 
Yemeni Salafists argued that theologically the bombings contradicted the 
teachings and values of Islam, the religion of love and justice for the universe. 
Contrary to the claims of the perpetrators, these bombings were not jihad, 
but rather crimes and terrorising of humanity, because such behaviour did 
not meet the required conditions of true jihad.14  The perpetrators were not 
mujahid (holy warriors), neither are they shahid (martyrs) if they die in these 
actions.15 
 Socio-politically, Yemeni Salafists argued, these terrorist acts have 
greatly disadvantaged Islam, Muslims and all mankind. The bombings have 
damaged the reputation of Islam and Muslims, caused rebellion and 
disloyalty to legitimate rulers, killed innocent people, and created corruption 
and disorder in the world.16 So, these acts were terrorism, which is 
                                                          
14“Peledakan demi  Peledakan…Inikah Jihad?”, 
http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1535, accessed 18 April 2010; 
“Jangan Buang Bom Sembarang Tempat!”, 
http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1516, accessed 18 April 2010; 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1516, accessed 5 April 2010;  
“Sikap Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah-Salafiyyin terhadap Berbagai Aksi Terorisme-Khawarij”, 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1568, accessed 2 April 2010; “Nordin N Stop”, 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1586, accessed 2 April 2010.  
15“Amrozi cs, Mati Syahidkah?”, http://darussunnah.or.id/materi-khusus/amrozi-cs-mati-
syahidkah/, accessed 17 April 2010; “Adakah Bom Syahid dalam Islam?”, 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=426, accessed 3 April 2010; “Jangan Gampang 
Memvonis Mati Syahid!”, http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1320, accessed 2 
April  2010. 
16“Dampak Negatif Aksi Terorisme”, 




theologically, socially and politically wrong.17 Yemeni Salafits asserted that 
Muslims must eradicate the spread of terrorism masquerading as jihad by 
spreading true Islam as exemplified by the Salaf.18          
Another common current issue raised by the Yemenis was local 
paranormal practices and shamanism that received quite wide media 
programming and advertising in the second half of the 2000s. Known as 
orang pintar (‘smart people’), some figures enjoyed popularity and wide 
media coverage as ‘celebrity paranormal practitioners and magicians’ such as 
Gendeng Pamungkas, Mama Lauren, Joko Bodo, and Dukun Cilik (‘Little 
Shaman’) Ponari.  
Yemeni Salafists warned Indonesian Muslims of the danger of these 
un-Islamic practices to the purity of Islam and their faith. According to them, 
these extensive interests in paranormal practices, sorcery and shamanism 
indicated that the Indonesian Muslim ummah was at the crossroad, with 
Muslims experiencing disorientation in their life and losing their ability to 
distinguish right from wrong and good from evil.19 With references to Islamic 
texts that prohibit sorcery and shamanism, Yemeni Salafists argued that the 
paranormal and shamanic practices were shirk, a forbidden belief and 
practice of associating the One God with creatures, and a breach of the core 
Islamic teaching of tawhid (the oneness of God). So, Yemeni Salafists 
considered the paranormal practitioners and shamans kafir (disbelievers) 
                                                          
17“Minyikapi Bom Bali 2- Terrorisme itu Sesat”, 
http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1010, accessed 20 April 2010. 
18“Menyikapi Aksi-aksi Teroris Khawarij”, 
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and Muslims who visit them for advice or consultations commit a capital sin 
and, to some extent, are also considered kafir.20      
In addition, the Yemeni Salafi faction’s effort to be the protectors of 
the purity of Islam was seen in its strong criticism of those it considered 
deviant Islamic groups such as Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah in Yogyakarta. 
Yemeni Salafists regarded the followers of Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah as 
straying from true Islam because they believe in a last messenger of God 
other than Muhammad (whom Muslims believe to be the last messenger of 
God), ignore the Prophet Muhammad’s tradition, and only follow and 
interpret the Quran based on their own way of interpretation, not that of the 
Salaf.21  
The above quite extensive responses to selected local current issues 
indicate that the Yemeni Salafi faction attempted more than the Haraki Salafi 
faction to assert before its web visitors and the Muslim ummah in general 
that Yemeni Salafists were the true guardians of Islamic teachings and 
Muslim faith, who were truly concerned with protecting the purity of Islam 
and Muslim faith from un-Islamic thoughts and behaviours.     
More importantly, by doing so Yemeni Salafists attempted more 
actively than Haraki Salafists to use the internet to respond to local issues as 
a coping strategy to overcome their lack of resources. As explained in Chapter 
Four, the Yemeni Salafi faction had less access to some kinds of resources 
salient to its movement than the Haraki Salafi faction, suffering from the lack 
of moral, human, material and social-organizational resources. Through such 
                                                          
20“Kafirnya Dukun dan Tukang Sihir”, http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=942, 
accessed 1 April 2010; “Waspada Kesyirikan di Balik Ramalan Mama Lauren”, 
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http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1220, accessed 18 April 2010; 





responses to the local issues, they employed the internet as a tool for 
generating more resources. In particular, they attempted to attract more 
legitimacy, solidarity, sympathetic support and even celebrity support. This 
was an attempt to manage with limited moral resources, new recruits and 
followers as they were short of human resources and financial support, to 
deal with their lack of material resources, and networks to cope with the lack 
of social-organizational resources. 
The Most Significant Global Issues for Yemeni Salafists 
Furthermore, Yemeni Salafists’ attempt to use the internet to cope with their 
lack of resources was clearly manifested in their responses to global issues. 
Some global issues occupied their attention significantly so they published 
many articles about them on their websites. These included the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, global terrorism, and the celebration of Christmas and 
Valentine’s Day.  
The Israel-Palestinian conflict was the global issue to which Yemeni 
Salafists gave most attention, with around 40 articles from the total of 140 
articles published on global issues on their websites. To show the devastating 
impact of Israeli occupation on Palestinian Muslims, Yemeni Salafists called 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict “the tragedy of Palestine”, “the tragedy of Gaza” 
and “the great tragedy of the Muslim ummah”.22 They emphasized that the 
conflict is not merely a political struggle, but rather a religious conflict 
because both sides are motivated and fuelled by religious goals. Motivated by 
their religious beliefs, Israelis attempt to displace Palestinian Muslims from 
their homeland and claim it as their promised land. The Palestinian Muslims 
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and Muslims in other countries are also motivated by their religious beliefs to 
wage war against the Israeli occupation of Palestine.23 
Responding to this tragedy, Yemeni Salafists asserted that Muslims 
are obliged to defend their Palestinian Muslim brothers according to the 
Salafi ways.24 Muslim countries and Muslim individuals must make every 
effort to fight against Israeli Jews or hold peace talks with them if 
necessary.25 However, Yemeni Salafists believed the best support for 
Palestine is praying for Palestinians, followed by sending them material and 
financial support through legal and authorized channels.26 They did not 
recommend campaigning for a boycott against Israeli products or staging 
demonstration because Muslims can be trapped in the practice of democracy, 
which, they believe, was created by Jews and therefore needs to be rejected 
by Muslims. The only permissible boycott of Israel is fighting against all 
thoughts and ideas originated and created by Jews, as such ideas are 
regarded as much more dangerous than Israeli manufactured goods.27        
Yemeni Salafists also provided extensive responses to another global 
issue, namely global terrorism conducted in the name of Islam and jihad for 
the cause of Allah. They published around twenty articles on terrorism on 
their websites. Responding to the 9/11 New York attacks, for example, they 
emphasized that from the perspective of Islamic doctrines the attacks were 
                                                          
23“Krisis Palestina bukan Konflik Agama?”,  
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1372, accessed 6 April 2010. 
24“Bimbingan Islam dalam Menyikapi Tragedi Palestina”,  
http://mimbarsunnah.org/bimbingan-islam-dalam-menyikapi-tragedi-palestina, accessed 1 
May 2010; http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=300#more-30, accessed 1 May 2010. 
25“Kewajiban Ummat Islam dalam Menghadapi Krisis di Palestina”,  
http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=289, accessed 27 April 2010. 
26“Fatwa-Sikap & Kewajiban Ummat Islam atas Tragedi Palestina”, 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1374, accessed 6 April 2010; 
http://mimbarsunnah.org/sikap-kewajiban-ummat-islam-atas-tragedi-palestina, accessed 1 
May 2010; http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=294, accessed 27 
April 2010; http://darussunnah.or.id/artikel-islam/manhaj/sikap-dan-kewajiban-umat-
islam-terhadap-tragedi-palestina/print/, accessed 17 April 2010.  
27“Boikot Produk Israel”, http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=485, accessed 25 April 2010; 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=799, accessed 2 April 2010; “Berdemonstrasi 
untuk Palestina”, http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=291, accessed 




not allowed by Islam, and not in line with the Islamic principles. The 
perpetrators were not mujahid and their actions were not jihad because they 
did not follow the rules of jihad as prescribed by the Quran and the Prophet 
Muhammad’s tradition, such as the prohibition of killing non-combatant 
persons, old people, children and women, and destroying houses and trees. 
Rather, they were simply terrorist groups, suicide bombers and the followers 
of evil who masqueraded as Muslims.28  
Through their websites, Yemeni Salafists also asserted that the 9/11 
attackers were not true Muslims because their action caused Muslims living 
in the West to receive unjust treatment, death threats, and to have to flee 
their homes seeking safety.29 More importantly, they have damaged the 
reputation of Islam and Islamic proselytization, making Islam a scapegoat 
anytime a terror attack occurs.30      
The last most common global issue taken up by the Yemeni Salafists 
was the celebration of Christmas and Valentine’s Day. These Salafists were 
primarily concerned with the growing number of Muslim youth in both 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries who are taking part in celebrating these 
two non-Islamic festivals.  
Through thirteen articles published on their websites, Yemeni 
Salafists pointed out that Muslims are prohibited from participating in the 
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celebrations of Christmas and Valentine’s Day in any form including saying 
congratulations to Christians. With extensive references to global Salafi 
authorities such as Al- Lajnat al-Dā’imah li al-Buhūṣ al-‘Ilmiyyat wa al-Iftā’ 
(The Permanent Committee for Scientific Studies and Religious Consultation) 
of Saudi Arabia, Yemeni Salafists argued that Muslims are only allowed to 
celebrate two annual festival days as prescribed in the Prophet Muhammad’s 
tradition and the Salaf way: Ied al-Fitr (a festival day after the fasting month 
of Ramadan) and Ied al-Adha (a festival day on the 9th day of the Hajj month 
of Dzulhijjah). Any other festival days are considered bid’ah (heretic 
practices) so that Muslims are forbidden to celebrate or take part in them.  
In addition, Yemeni Salafists pointed out that celebrating or taking 
part in Christmas and Valentine’s Day  and other non-Muslim festivals is 
regarded as doing tashabbuh (imitating and following non-Muslim ways of 
life) and al-wala’ (loyalty and loving) of non-Muslims, both of which are 
forbidden according to Salafi ideology. Therefore, they urged Muslims to 
maintain ‘true’ Islamic teachings by avoiding the celebration of Christmas, 
Valentine’s Day and other non-Muslims’ festival days.31 By taking this stance, 
Yemeni Salafists aimed to protect the purity of Islam and Muslim faith and 
behaviours from any ideas and practices coming from Jews and Christians.     
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Again, the above extensive responses to the global current issues 
served as evidence that Yemeni Salafists employed the web more actively 
than Haraki Salafists to deal with their lack of moral, human, financial, social-
organizational resources. By providing their perspectives of the issues 
through the publication of a lot of articles on their websites, Yemeni Salafists 
presented themselves as the defenders of global Muslims and the protectors 
of the purity of Islam and Muslim faith from the propaganda of the enemies of 
Islam and any un-Islamic ideas and practices. As with their responses to local 
issues noted above, they attempted to attract their web visitors to give them 
more legitimacy, sympathetic support, and celebrity (moral resources), new 
members and skills (human resources), financial and physical capital 
(material resources), and networks (social-organizational resources).         
 
Key Issues for Jihadi Salafists 
Using the internet to deal with a lack of resources was more evident in the 
Jihadi Salafi faction’s mobilization of the web to respond to current issues. 
Jihadi Salafists published around 180 articles on local issues and around 800 
articles on global issues making them by far the most responsive Salafi 
faction to issues relevant to the Salafi movement in Indonesia.  
The Most Concerning Local Issues 
The local issues to which the Jihadi Salafi faction most frequently responded 
included the cases of Indonesian jihadists. Providing around 30 articles on 
the issue of local jihadism on its website, Arrahmah emphasized that Muslims 
who were arrested or killed by Indonesia’s special anti-terrorist police force, 
which is known as Densus 88, are not terrorists, but rather mujahid 
(jihadists) who fight for Islam and defend Muslims against their enemies.32 
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The Jihadi Salafists’ position on the issue of violent jihad is in stark contrast 
to the stance of both the Yemeni and Hiraki Salafists discussed above. 
Arrahmah supported jihadi figures for their ‘sincere struggles’ for the 
application of Islamic law and the promotion of Islamic teachings in 
Indonesia. It praised those who were imprisoned or killed by Densus 88 as 
shahid (martyrs) including Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who was accused of being the 
leader of the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, the three 
Bali bombers who were executed in 2008, and Dulmatin who was shot dead 
by Densus 88 in Tangerang in 2010.33  Jihadi Salafists’ support for the local 
jihadists was also articulated in their articles condemning Densus 88 for its 
allegedly excessive arrests and uncontrolled killing of jihadists. They even 
urged the Indonesian government to dissolve Densus 88 and reported the 
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special force’s allegedly breach of human rights of jihadists to the National 
Commission of Human Rights.34  
Through these extensive responses, Jihadi Salafists asserted that they 
defend those they regard as defenders of Islam and Muslim. It was at this 
point that Jihadi Salafists differed from the other two Salafi factions. They did 
not limit themselves in their identification of who the ‘true’ holy fighters are. 
For them, those who fight for Islam and Muslims against the enemies of 
Islam, which are commonly identified to be the US and its allies, Jews and 
Christians, both in Muslim or non-Muslim countries, are considered to be 
jihadists. They identified those seen by Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists 
as terrorist groups such as the three Bali bombers (discussed above) to be 
“the true jihadists”.     
The Poso conflict was another local issue to which Jihadi Salafists 
most frequently responded in an attempt to create a perception that they 
were the protectors of the true defenders of Islam and Muslims. By way of 
background, the Poso conflict was a socio-religious conflict between Muslims 
and Christians in the town of Poso, Sulawesi Tengah, which broke out in 2000 
and continued till 2007.35 Through many news articles on its websites, 
Arrahmah contended that Muslims in Poso were victims of the attacks and 
killings conducted by Poso Christians. In response to these attacks, they 
argued, Poso Muslims fought Christians to defend their lives, property and 
religion. Therefore, Arrahmah strongly criticized the Indonesian police force, 
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particularly Densus 88, for unjustly treating Poso Muslims as terrorists, and 
arresting their leaders.36   
Jihadi Salafists took a similar stance on Front Pembela Islam (Islamic 
Defenders’ Front), a hard line Muslim organization that claims to defend 
Islam and Muslim interests. Through its web articles, Arrahmah depicted FPI 
as the guardian of Muslim ummah faith and morality as seen in its protest 
against the Indonesian edition of Playboy and a seminar on and by a group of 
Indonesian gays, and its attacks of those who support religious pluralism and 
Muslim minority groups like Ahmadiyah and Shi’ites. Arrahmah regarded the 
leaders of Front Pembela Islam like Munarman to be the defenders of Islam 
and Muslims, who bravely forbid wrong and fight against immorality.37       
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These extensive positive web responses to local jihadists created an 
image of the Jihadi Salafists as strong defenders of Islam and Muslims. By 
presenting themselves to be assertive protectors of the fighters for Islam and 
Muslims, Jihadi Salafists implicitly attempted to generate more new 
resources in the form of web visitors to sustain their movement.          
 As explained in Chapter Four, Jihadi Salafists had the least access to 
resources among the Salafi factions in Indonesia. They lacked virtually any 
access to any types of resources except cultural resources. Strategically, by 
massively responding to these local issues to create the impression of 
themselves as the defenders of ‘true’ jihadists, Jihadi Salafists seemed to 
compensate for this lack of resources. Through this internet practice, they 
tacitly attempted to generate more solidarity, sympathetic support and 
legitimacy to overcome their lack of moral resources, attract more labour and 
supporters to overcome their lack of human resources, establish new 
networks and infrastructures to deal with their lack of social-organizational 
resources, and financial and physical capital to deal with their lack of 
material resources.    
Jihadi Salafists’ Key Global Issues 
Moreover, Jihadi Salafists’ attempt to use the internet as a strategy to cope 
with the lack of resources was reflected in their mobilization of the web to 
respond to current global issues. As mentioned, Arrahmah, for example, 
published around 800 articles on global issues. The most prominent issues 
included the Israel-Palestinian conflict about which Arrahmah published 
                                                                                                                                                               










around 130 articles. Through these articles, Arrahmah took the view that 
Palestinians are the fighters for Palestinian independence from the Israeli 
occupation. The Israeli government and people, who receive strong support 
from other Western countries, particularly the US, were seen as ruthless 
aggressors that occupy Palestinians’ land and displace the Palestinians from 
their homeland for Jewish settlements.38 Palestinian Muslims were depicted 
as the victims of inhumane treatment by the Israeli government and of brutal 
attacks by Israeli military forces equipped with far more sophisticated 
modern weaponry than is available to Palestinian fighters.39          
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http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/01/17/3089-israel-kembali-serang-sekolah-pbb-di-
gaza.html#sthash.u4wk0OY0.dpuf, accessed 16 October 2010; “Israel Serbu Tepi Barat, 
Tangkapi Warga Sipil”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/07/27/5137-israel-serbu-
tepi-barat-tangkapi-warga-sipil.html#sthash.59PTSy4L.dpuf, accessed16 October 2010; 
“Serangan Udara Israel Bantai Ibu dan 5 anaknya di al Buraij”, : 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/01/17/3088-serangan-udara-israel-bantai-ibu-dan-
5-anaknya-di-al-buraij.html#sthash.1KvyABQV.dpuf, accessed 16 October 2010; “Tel Aviv: 
Pembunuhan Warga Gaza Merupakan ‘Kewajiban’”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/08/01/5201-tel-aviv-pembunuhan-warga-gaza-




Jihadi Salafists viewed the Israel-Palestinian conflict as not simply a 
political conflict, but also a religious one. They regarded the Palestinian 
fighters as true jihadists who wage jihad defending their faith, homeland, 
homes and Muslim compatriots from Israeli military and political attacks. To 
maintain support for Palestine, Arrahmah often depicted Palestinian fighters 
as victorious over Israel soldiers by providing news articles on the success of 
Palestinian mujahid in killing Israeli soldiers such as through suicide 
bombings, and Israel’s difficulties in defeating Palestinian forces.40    
The Jihadi Salafists responded similarly to global jihadists, namely 
Muslims who make every effort including violence and bombings to fight for 
Islam anywhere in the world. Publishing around 120 articles on this issue on 
its website, Arrahmah believed that such fighters are sincere jihadists who 
struggle only to defend true Islam and the interests of Muslim ummah from 
enemies intent on destroying Islam and Muslims. It viewed these fighters not 
as terrorists, but rather mujahid, God’s fighters who guard Islam and Muslims 
from enemies, and shahid, martyrs who died for their religion and Muslim 
brothers and sisters.41          
                                                          
40See e.g.,  “Tel Aviv Keteter, Roket Al Qassam Terus Menghujani Target Israel”,  
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/25/288-tel-aviv-keteter-roket-al-qassam-terus-
menghujani-target-israel.html#sthash.fbfZ8Tz9.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; “Akademisi 
Palestina: Pejuang Palestina Semakin Kuat dalam Menghadapi Agresi Zionis Israel”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/01/01/2930-akademisi-palestina-pejuang-
palestina-semakin-kuat-dalam-menghadapi-agresi.html#sthash.oYm4ZggK.dpuf, accessed 
16 October 2010; “Intifadhah ke-7, Israel Prediksi Kekuatan Perlawanan Kian Besar”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/10/03/325-intifadhah-masuki-tahun-ke-7-israel-
prediksi-kekuatan-perlawanan-kian-besar.html#sthash.XFP4y0HF.dpuf accessed 9 October 
2014; “Israel Akui Aksi Militernya Tak Berdaya Hentikan Perlawanan Palestina”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2007/12/13/1372-israel-akui-aksi-militernya-tak-
berdaya-hentikan-perlawanan-palestina.html#sthash.rUkNLxri.dpuf, accessed 15 October 
2010; and “Israel Kalangkabut, 50 Roket Hujani Sederot dan Sekitarnya”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2007/12/13/1371-israel-kalangkabut-50-roket-hujani-
sederot-dan-sekitarnya.html#sthash.XYtLEtlX.dpuf, accessed 15 October 2010.   
41“Mengenal Fatimah Najjar, Pelaku Bom Syahid Paling Tua”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/27/286-mengenal-fathimah-najjar-pelaku-bom-
syahid-paling-tua.html#sthash.HiYY25Xx.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; “Personality: 





To familiarize its web visitors with these jihadists, Arrahmah 
published many profiles of jihad personalities who fought against enemies in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Chechnya, Thailand, 
the Philippine, Western countries and elsewhere. These included prominent 
figures such as Usamah ibn Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi and some suicide bombers.42 To give religious legitimacy on the act 
of the jihadists, Arrahmah also published articles on the jihad ideology such 
as the importance of jihad, istishadiyyah (martyrdom) and even irhab 
(terrorism) along with quotations from the Quran and Hadis texts, 
accompanied by the Jihadi Salafi interpretation of these.43          
                                                                                                                                                               
insha-allah.html#sthash.vUYGLRlf.dpuf, accessed 15 October 2010; “Selamat Jalan Syaikh 
Abu Laits al Liby Rahimahullah”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2008/02/01/1555-
selamat-jalan-syaikh-abu-laits-al-liby-rahimahullah.html#sthash.kcYtdQZQ.dpuf, accessed 
15 October 2010. 
42“Al Qaidah Serukan Jihad untuk Bebaskan Tanah Palestine”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/12/21/241-al-qaidah-serukan-jihad-untuk-
bebaskan-tanah-palestina.html#sthash.7FTsV4fa.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; “Syaikh 
Dr. Abdullah Azzam”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/565-syaikh-dr-
abdullah-azzam.html#sthash.sbGfJCdQ.dpuf accessed 9 October 2010; “Syaikh Hamuud bin 
‘Uqla Asy-Syu’aiby”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/369-syaikh-hamuud-
bin-uqla-asy-syuaiby.html#sthash.VrjQPHvT.dpuf accessed 9 October 2010; “Syaikh Mujahid 
Abu Mus’ab Az Zarqawi”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/12/10/570-syaikh-
mujahid-abu-musab-az-zarqawi.html#sthash.8IaXYkHA.dpuf, accessed 10 October  2010; 
“Syaikh Usamah bin Ladin”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/569-syaikh-
usamah-bin-ladin.html#sthash.egVB9KVn.dpuf accessed 9 October 2010;  and “Dr. Ayman 
Azh Zhawahiri”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/564-dr-aiman-azh-
zhawahiri.html#sthash.4NxyG8Qr.dpuf accessed 9 October 2010. 
43“Risalah Terakhir Abu Dujanah Al-Khurosany rahimahullah”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/03/01/7069-risalah-terakhir-abu-dujanah-al-
khurosany-rahimahullah.html#sthash.NaOoHwBo.dpuf, accessed 18 October 2010; “Al-
Amaliyyat al-Istisyhadiyyah (Aksi Syahid)”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/12/04/485-al-amaliyyat-al-istisyhhadiyyah-aksi-
syahid.html#sthash.V5VNL6UY.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; “Al-Irhaab (Terrorisme) 
dalam Pandangan Salaf”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/12/26/486-al-irhaab-
terorisme-dalam-pandangan-salaf.html#sthash.V6OnA3Bn.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; 
“Fiqh Jihad Kontemporer”, : http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/24/483-fiqh-jihad-
kontemporer.html#sthash.H2bfGlLr.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; and “Pembagian Jenis 
Syahid”, : http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/11/01/480-pembagian-jenis-




Through their websites, Jihadi Salafists also presented the success 
stories of the jihadi fighters in killing their enemies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iraq and some countries in Africa.44 In addition, jihadists were depicted as 
the victims of their enemies’ attacks and torture when they were arrested 
and imprisoned.45     
A similar pattern of web use was also evident in Jihadi Salafists’ 
responses to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the third most prominent 
global current issue for the Jihadi Salafists. Arrahmah published around 80 
articles on this issue on its website, depicting the Afghanistan people as the 
victims of the US and its allies’ invasion of their country. It presented stories 
of the killing of innocent Afghanistan people by US troops or their allies, and 
                                                          
44“Di Sini, Semua Orang Senang dengan Taliban”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/04/27/4036-di-sini-semua-orang-senang-dengan-
taliban.html#sthash.9W8Te2hJ.dpuf, accessed 16 October 2010; “Pejuang Taliban Rebut 
Kota Afganistan”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2007/02/05/135-pejuang-taliban-
rebut-kota-afganistan.html, accessed 15 October 2010; “Mujahidin Daulah Islam Iraq 
Membunuh 57 Tentara AS di Diyala”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2007/09/13/969-
mujahidin-daulah-islam-iraq-membunuh-57-tentara-as-di-
diyala.html#sthash.XJT6h1bc.dpuf, accessed 15 October 2010; “Jihad Pakistan Mengguncang 
Dunia”, : http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/04/27/4035-jihad-pakistan-
mengguncang-dunia.html#sthash.kgFumT6B.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; “Shabaab al-
Mujahidin “Membanjiri” Kota-kota di Somalia”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/01/27/3195-shabaab-al-mujahidin-membanjiri-
kota-kota-di-somalia.html#sthash.2iirbgHQ.dpuf, accessed 16 October 2010; and “Mujahidin 
Berhasil Membunuh dan Melukai 5 Tentara  Boneka di Chechnya”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/04/01/7385-mujahidin-berhasil-membunuh-dan-
melukai-5-tentara-boneka-di-chechnya.html#sthash.5lyOUGgh.dpuf, accessed 18 October 
2010.  
45“Arab Saudi Tangkap Lima Orang Jihadis Internet”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2008/09/13/2237-arab-saudi-tangkap-lima-orang-
jihadis-internet.html#sthash.m6D0LHkS.dpuf, accessed 15 October 2010; “Ulama Penentang 
AS Ditembak di Depan Masjid”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2007/10/01/1077-ulama-
penentang-as-ditembak-di-depan-masjid.html#sthash.xb5nYkab.dpuf, accessed 15 October 
2010; “Aparat Thailand Tembak Pemimpin Muslim”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2007/01/04/206-aparat-thailand-tembak-pemimpin-
muslim.html, accessed 12 October 10; “Ulama Arab Saudi Ditangkap Karena Serukan untuk 
Serang Israel”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/01/01/2929-ulama-arab-saudi-
ditangkap-karena-serukan-untuk-serang-israel.html#sthash.1ci0L1cZ.dpuf, accessed 16 
October 2010; “Kesehatan Omar Abdurrahmah di Penjara AS Dikabarkan Kritis”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2006/12/20/247-kesehatan-omar-abdurrahman-di-




the difficulties and misery they experienced resulting from the US and its 
allies’ attacks.46 At the same time, Arrahmah provided stories of the failure of 
the US and its allies’ military operation in Afghanistan. Arrahmah projected 
the image that rather than being defeated, the Afghan mujahid (Taliban) drew 
strength from the situation, enabling them to kill many of US or its allies’ 
troops and destroy their military facilities.47          
                                                          
46“Tentara Salibis AS Tembak Ribuan Penduduk Afgan yang Melakukan Unjuk Rasa di Depan 
Basis Bagram”, : http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/08/27/8924-tentara-salibis-as-
tembak-ribuan-penduduk-afghan-yang-melakukan-unjuk-rasa.html#sthash.kf6Fp3ua.dpuf, 
accessed 19 October 2010; “Lagi, Serangan Udara Brutal AS Tewaskan Puluhan Sipil 
Afghanistan”, : http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/07/01/4849-lagi-serangan-udara-
brutal-as-tewaskan-puluhan-sipil-afghanistan.html#sthash.s425I38h.dpuf, accessed 16 
October  2010; “25 Sipil Afghan Gugur dalam Sebuah Serangan Udara yang Menargetkan 
Masjid”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/10/27/9668-25-sipil-afghan-gugur-dalam-
sebuah-serangan-udara-yang-menargetkan-masjid.html#sthash.KfTaOMWt.dpuf, accessed 
19 October 2010; “Kematian Sipil Afgan Meningkat 24 Persen”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/08/01/5209-kematian-sipil-afghan-meningkat-24-
persen.html#sthash.SunyZRWH.dpuf, accessed 17 October 2010; “Dalam Dua Hari, AS Bunuh 
97 Sipil Afghan”, http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/05/27/4373-dalam-dua-hari-as-
bunuh-97-sipil-afghan.html#sthash.2zFewZHI.dpuf,  accessed 16 October 2010.   
47“McChrystal: Waktunya Berbalik Arah”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/01/13/6589-mcchrystal-waktunya-berbalik-
arah.html#sthash.5ryGDOrw.dpuf, accessed 17 October 2010; “Petraeus: Momen Sulit Yang 
Harus Dihadapi di Selatan Afghanistan”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/05/01/7712-petraeus-momen-sulit-yang-harus-
dihadapi-di-selatan-afghanistan.html#sthash.DTHZgwad.dpuf, accessed 19 October 2010; 
“Petraeus: Perang Afghan Kurang Sumber Daya”.  
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2010/09/01/9001-petraeus-perang-afghan-kurang-
sumber-daya.html#sthash.8lc6a4Tv.dpuf, accessed 10 October 2010; “Stanley 
Konfirmasikan Kegagalan Strategi AS di Afghanistan”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2009/09/01/5523-stanley-konfirmasikan-kegagalan-
strategi-as-di-afghanistan.html#sthash.uOTM7168.dpuf, accessed 17 October 2010; and 
“Sebanyak 2216 Tentara Kafir Asing Tewas pada Tahun 2007 di Afghanistan”, 
http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2008/01/01/1438-sebanyak-2216-tentara-kafir-asing-









Consistent with their responses to local issues noted above, Jihadi 
Salafists attempted to establish the image that they were the defenders of 
global jihadists through their extensive responses to global issues. They 
showed their web visitors that they truly defended Palestinian people and 
fighters who were struggling against Israel and support jihadists around the 
world like the Taliban in Afghanistan who fight against the enemies of Islam 
depicted as including the US and its allies.     
This online self-representation provided Jihadi Salafists with 
opportunities to compensate for their limited access to resources noted 
before.  By assertively presenting an online self-image as the defenders of 
those who   protect Islam and Muslims around the world, they indirectly 
attempted to attract new resources, at least from their web visitors. Through 
this internet use, Jihadi Salafists sought to cultivate more solidarity, 
sympathy, legitimacy, and even celebrity support, to compensate for their 
lack of moral resources; new followers, leaders and labour, which is useful to 
overcome their lack of human resources; more financial and physical capital 
to deal with their lack of material resources; and new social networks, 
infrastructures and organizations to cope with their lack of social-
organizational resources.       
Implications for the Salafi Factions 
The important issue here is the extent to which the different Salafi factions 
were advantaged by this particular form of internet use. In keeping with their 
harnessing of the internet as explained in the last three chapters, limited use 
of the internet to respond to current issues seemed to have insignificant 
implications for Haraki Salafists. It did not generate new resources for the 
Haraki Salafists yet, nor has it diminished their ability to maintain their 
existing resources. This is because their main purpose of using the internet as 
a medium was to inform their web visitors, particularly parents or potential 





parents of students, about their learning institutions. They were not 
pressured to generate new resources through web mobilization such as 
soliciting donation for their organizational purposes. As a Salafist of a Haraki 
Salafi learning centre said: 
We only use the internet to provide our web visitors with information 
about the Salaf way and our ma’had, especially our students’ parents, 
such as information about student admissions and other 
announcements related to our ma’had. We do not use it to solicit 
donations or ask for aid and so on.48     
 
Due to this, Haraki Salafists saw no benefit in publishing articles on 
current issues on their websites. Instead, by publishing links to other 
websites they recommended such news websites believed to be trustworthy, 
based on true Salafi way, to their fellow Salafists for credible Islamic news. A 
Haraki Salafi leader argued: 
We also post news about Muslims in Indonesia and foreign countries 
like Afghanistan on our website. However, we do not do it very often 
because there are many websites on news in the Muslim world that 
are in accordance with Salafi way. So, we or jama’ah (community 
members) only need to visit these websites for information about 
current issues.49    
 
Moreover, the above limited use of the internet did not significantly 
impact upon the Haraki Salafists’ existing resources, with the consequence 
that the Haraki Salafists remain the Salafi faction with the best access to 
resources. Students, teachers and administrative staff members of Haraki 
learning centres kept organizing their religious education. A Haraki Salafi 
web administrator further said: 
I have not seen any impact affecting us, which might have resulted 
from our limited use of the web for posting news on current issues. 
Our ma’had (learning institution) operates as usual. This is because, as 
I said, we only use the internet to provide information about our 
ma’had and its activities.50   
                                                          
48Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010. 
49Interview with Ustadh Sadiq, Makassar, 24 October 2010.  





By contrast, the quite extensive use of the web to respond to current 
issues had significant impact upon the Yemeni Salafi faction’s state of 
resources. It enabled Yemeni Salafists to gain more human resources, 
particularly new students and sympathizers, and material ones in the form of 
donations, regardless of how small they were. A Yemeni Salafi teacher 
reported that some new students were stimulated to study more about 
Salafism at his learning centre as a consequence of first reading articles 
published on its website. They believed that counter-information and 
comments provided on the website on current issues, such as on terrorists 
who claimed to be jihadist, were more convincing because they were based 
on the true Islamic teaching. Some new sympathizers were said to have 
donated money and a piece of land to the learning centre after frequently 
visiting the Yemenis’ website.   As a Yemeni Salafi teacher said: 
Thank God, we just admitted new students who said that they were 
interested in deepening their knowledge about the true Salafi way at 
our ma’had after they read our articles on the error of terrorists in 
Indonesia such as Nurdin M. Top. Some new jamaah (community 
members) claimed that they provided financial support to fulfil the 
needs of our ma’had after they visited our website. But, this is not that 
often the case.51   
 
In addition, this Yemeni Salafists’ web use resulted in an increase in 
the number of students learning in the Salafi pesantren. For example, As-
Sunnah ma’had in Makassar attributed to its internet presence a significant 
increase in student enrolments when this field study was conducted. A leader 
of As-Sunnah claimed: 
We have just admitted new students from Sumatera. They said that 
they were interested in studying here after they read articles on our 
website that explained current issues like bombings and terrorist 
attacks according to the true Salaf way. Thank God, the number of 
students has increased from around twenty to fifty students within 
the last three years.52  
                                                          
51Interview with Ustadh Arafat, Bandung, 4 September 2010.  





All this indicates that web use for responding to current issues 
resulted in increased resource mobilization within the Yemeni Salafi faction. 
However, such increases were not powerful enough to close the resource gap 
between the Yemeni Salafi faction and the Haraki Salafi faction. Though they 
received increased human and financial resources through this web use, 
Yemeni Salafists remained less resourced than Haraki Salafists.  
 The claim that, as a result of the Jihadi Salafists’ optimised internet use 
to respond to current issues, they have consequently benefited from this 
strategy cannot be substantiated with concrete evidence due to the difficulty 
in gaining access to this closed and hardline Salafi faction. Nevertheless, some 
preliminary analysis on this issue can be suggested here based on 
observational data. That extensive web use to respond to current issues has 
benefitted Jihadi Salafists can be extrapolated from the fact that their 
websites remain active in providing updates every day. This is only possible 
with continuous financial and human resources that support day-to-day 
maintenance and operation of their websites. The fact that the Arrahmah 
community is able to maintain an active website, for example, may indicate 
that it receives resources in the form of financial support as well as human 
resources from its visitors, sympathizers and followers. Without such 
continuous support, particularly money needed to pay operational and 
technical expenses and web hosting fees, the website would not be able to 
operate daily. While it was not possible to determine the specific amounts 
donated, the website includes an appeal soliciting donations from visitors 
and a statement by the web administrator that all money it receives is used to 
keep the website active in the service of Islam and Muslims.53   
In addition, the positive impact of the web use to respond to current 
issues may be evident in the fact that the followers of Jihadi Salafism are still 
                                                          





able to sustain their activities. They could only maintain their activities with 
financial, human and other kinds of resources, which may be attracted by 
their extensive use of the internet to provide information and counter-
information on current issues based on their Jihadi Salafi ideology.         
Thus, web responses to current issues appear to be a significant tool 
for Jihadi Salafists to generate support, at least to maintain their daily 
activities and keep their websites updated. But, as with the Yemeni Salafists, 
this internet use appears unable to overcome the Jihadi Salafists’ 
fundamental lack of resources, or to close the resource gap with the best 
resourced Haraki Salafists.     
Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that the significance of the internet diverges 
among the Salafi factions due to resource variation among them. Salafi 
factions employed websites to publish articles on both local and global issues 
considered important for the interests of Islam and Muslims in their attempt 
to sustain their movements. Through these web articles, they maintain the 
relevance of their websites, keep their readers updated with new stories, and 
communicate their perspectives on local and global issues facing Islam and 
Muslims in general and the Salafi followers in particular. By doing so, they 
created for the web visitors and Muslim ummah a self-image that they are the 
guardians of the ‘true’ Islam and the defenders of the ‘true’ protectors of 
Islam and Muslims. Through this internet practice, in turn, they expected to 
generate new resources to counter their lack of resources.      
However, the Salafi factions differed in their actual mobilization of the 
web to respond to current issues. Haraki Salafists did not optimise web use to 
respond to current issues; Yemeni Salafists used the web extensively to 
respond to current issues; and Jihadi Salafists optimised the web the most to 




This variation in web use to respond to current issues was closely 
linked to the Salafi factions’ variation in access to offline resources. The 
extent to which the web was used was influenced by the level of resources to 
which a Salafi faction had access. This intra-movement resource difference 
among the Salafists sheds light on why some Salafi factions mobilized the 
internet to respond to current issues as a coping strategy to deal with lack of 
resources and why others did not. As Haraki Salafists had the best access to 
resources among the Salafi factions, they felt confident and self-sufficient, 
with no pressure to optimise the web to respond to current issues. By 
contrast, because they had limited access to various types of resources, 
Yemeni Salafists felt the need to mobilize their web use extensively to 
respond to current issues in their attempt to compensate for their lack of 
resources. Furthermore, as Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources, 
they placed a high level of importance on using their websites to respond to 
current issues as a strategy to overcome this lack of resources.  The less 
resources to which a Salafi faction had access, the more extensively it 
mobilized the internet to respond to current issues. Different degrees of 
access to offline resources created different degrees of need to mobilize the 
internet to respond to current issues. 
Accordingly, this varied use of web has different implications for the 
Salafi factions. Haraki Salafists’ limited use of the web has not generated new 
resources, nor has it decreased their existing resources. It has not altered the 
resource mobilization within Haraki Salafists, keeping them a Salafi faction 
with the best access to resources.  Thus, this web use shows that the internet 
has played an insignificant role for the Haraki Salafi faction in changing its 
resource mobilization.    
By contrast, extensive web use for responding to current issues has 
enabled the Yemeni Salafi faction to generate valuable, although still limited, 
new human and material resources. Likewise, it can be suggested that as they 




Jihadi Salafists were at least able to generate the ongoing financial and 
human resources needed to operate their websites and carry out their 
activities. Thus, web use for responding to current issues was beneficial for 
less well-resourced Yemeni and Jihadi Salafists. Nevertheless, this internet 
practice was not powerful enough to overcome their lack of resources and 
close the resource gap with Haraki Salafi faction.  
Indeed, the significance of the internet was not uniform for Salafi 
factions. For the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction, the internet was not a 
significant tool to generate new resources, nor did their limited use of it 
diminish their existing resources. However, the less well-resourced Yemeni 
Salafists considered that their internet use was an important tool to generate 
new resources, particularly material and human ones. For the Jihadi Salafists, 
the internet enabled them to respond on a daily basis to current issues, 





Table 1 Types of the Current Issues to which the Haraki Salafi Faction Responded 
Local Issues Frequency Global Issues Frequency 
Jilbab 3 Terrorism 5 
Arabs’ roles  2 Decline of the Muslim world 2 
Secularism and democracy 1 Israel and Palestine  2 
Pluralism 1 Valentine’s day  2 
Surveillance of preachers 1 Iraq, US-led invasion  1 
Indonesian Muslims  1 Islamic new year celebration  1 
Sunni-Shiah dialogue 1 Islamophobia  1 
  Football World Cup  1 
  2012 Movie  1 
  Fitna Movie by Wilders  1 
  Global warming  1 
Total 10  19 
 
Table 2 Types of the Current Issues to which the Yemeni Salafi Faction Responded 
Local Issues Frequency Global Issues Frequency 
Aceh Tsunami 2 Afghanistan and Chechnya  1 
Al Qiyadah al Islamiyah 4 The prophet cartoon  3 
Ponari  5 Decline of Muslim world 6 
Mama Lauren  1 Demonstration  2 
Go Green  1 Earthquake 1 
Mother’s Day  1 Suicide bombings 10 
Pirated software  3 Evolution theory  2 
Bali bombings  10 Family planning  1 
Nordin M Top  4 Christmas and Valentine’s day  13 
Makassar bombings  3 Christian calendar  1 
Marriot and Ritz-Carlton bombings  3 Syeikh Rabi’s letter to Pope  1 
  Iraq, US –led invasion  1 
  Islamic banking  1 
  New Year celebration 2 
  Israel and Lebanon  5 
  Israel and Palestine Conflict  40 
  Israel  2 
  Lesbianism  1 
  Life insurance  1 
  TV  3 
  Doraemon  2 
  2012 movie 5 
  Polygamy  1 
  Smoking  8 
  Mobile phone  4 
  Internet  1 




  9/11 attacks 5 
Total 37  140 
 
 
Table 3 Typology of the Current Issues to which the Jihadi Salafi Faction Responded 
Local Issues Frequency Global Issues Frequency 
Polygamy 5 Islamophobia 4 
Forest fire 1 The Prophet cartoon 7 
Dangdut singer  1 Israel and Palestine conflict  129 
Poso conflict  11 Afghanistan, US-led invasion  79 
Bali bombings 4 Disaster  3 
Jihadists 26 Israel  5 
Bush visit to Indonesia  6 Hacking  8 
Liberals  3 Cola  1 
Christianization  3 Hizbullah  1 
Corruption  1 Ikhwan al Muslimun  1 
Densus 88  7 Iran  4 
Economic issues  4 Iraq, US-led invasion  34 
Formalin  1 Islam and Christianity  8 
Front Pembela Islam  9 Islam and Judaism  1 
Islamic law  4 Islam in the west  54 
Kompas and Tibo  1 Islamic economy  1 
TV programs during Ramadan  2 Islamic thought  2 
Warnet and Terrorism  1 Jihadi leaders  33 
Anti-tax on Facebook   1 Turkish archaeologist on jilbab  1 
Celebrity gossips on TV  1 Lebanon  1 
Prita and OMNI hospital  1 Media  14 
TV and KPI  1 Muslim minority  29 
German TV  1 Russian spy 1 
Minority groups  8 Salman Rusdi 1 
Plane crash  1 Suicide bombing  1 
War on terror  2 Death of Benazir Bhutto  1 
Bird flu  1 Terrorism  12 
Condom  1 US and Hizbullah  1 
Dedi Mulyadi’s Religious 
blasphemy  
1 US and Iran  16 
Democracy  2 US and Palestine  1 
Benefits of fasting  1 US and Iraq  47 
Halal vaccine  2 US and Middle East  4 
Muhammadiyah and Singapore 1 US and Pakistan  24 
Pornography bill  2 US and Hamas  1 
The death of Suharto  1 US and Africa  1 
Al Qiyadah al Islamiyyah  2 US and Somalia  5 
Ponari  1 US and Greece  1 
Ulama, not Scientists  1 Women  3 
Buol conflict  1 Jihadi groups  78 
Century bank scandal  1 Al Qaidah  7 




Disaster  5 Bangladesh  1 
DPR  1 Christianity  7 
Energy  1 Decline of the Muslim world  2 
Repentance of the ESQ founder  1 Democracy  1 
Swine Flu  1 Contraception  1 
Gender  1 Feminism  1 
Gus Dur 3 Holocaust  2 
Hacking  1 Iran and Israel  1 
Halal food 3 Israel and Lebanon  1 
Indonesia and Palestine  3 Jihadism  27 
Instant noodles  1 Jordan  1 
Death of a Jemaat HKBP member  1 Malaysia  1 
Islamic politics  1 Khilafah  1 
Islamophobia  2 Middle East  1 
Indonesia and Israel  2 Palestine  1 
Jihad media  3 Identity theft  1 
Jihadism  9 Science  1 
Jilbab  1 Smoking  2 
Quran Memorizers  1 Yemen  1 
Pornography  2 Technology  16 
Religious freedom  1 War on terror  13 
SBY impeachment  1 US and Syria  2 
Suicide  1 Obama  7 
Technology  5 Bush  2 
Terrorism  3 US  10 
Obama  1 Fast food  1 
  Pakistan  22 
  Salafists  1 
  Aljazair  1 
  India  2 
  UN peacekeeping troops  1 
  Swine Flu  1 
  Israel and Sudan  1 
  ICG  1 
  Somalia 6 
  UK  1 
  UK and Sudan  1 
  US and China  1 
  US and Philippine  1 
  US and Israel  2 
  US and Russia 1 
  Iraq and Afghanistan  1 
  Call for prayers in Egypt  1 
  Electronic rubbish  1 
  Israel and Turkey  1 
  Minority in the west  1 
  Red Cross  1 
  Russia and Afghanistan  2 
  Chechnya  1 
  Russia and India  1 
  Tajikistan  1 




  US and Indonesia 1 
  US and Yemen  1 
  US and Wikileaks  2 
Total 180  818 
 
Table 4 Percentage of Local and Global Issues to which Salafi Factions Responded  










Haraki Salafists 10 34.4 19 65.5 29 
Yemeni Salafists 37 20.9 140 79.1 177 
Jihadi Salafists 180 18.0 818 82 998 
Total 227  977  1204 
 
Table 5 Current Issues to which the Salafi Factions Responded (Summary) 
Salafi Factions Local 
Issues 














Haraki Salafists 10 4.4 19 1.9 29 2.4 
Yemeni Salafists 37 16.3 140 14.3 177 14.7 
Jihadi Salafists 180 79.2 818 83.7 998 82.9 
Total 227 100 977 100 1204 100 
 
Note: The number indicates the frequency and total of articles or postings the Salafi factions 










The explosion of new media, particularly the internet, has transformed the 
face of the Muslim world over the last two decades, stimulating increased 
internet use by Islamic movements, in what is popularly known as Islamic 
cyber-activism. Many Islamic movements have passionately adopted the 
internet and mobilised it as a new important resource to pursue their social, 
religious and political goals. Accordingly, many scholars have studied this 
phenomenon by exploring the significance (or insignificance) of the new 
medium for contemporary Islamic movements. Their studies have provided 
important insights into understanding the role and implication of the global 
phenomenon of cyberspace on Islamic activism.  
However, the prevailing accounts have tended to evaluate the 
significance of the internet for an Islamic movement as a unified whole, 
ignoring intra-movement heterogeneity and internal dynamics, even schisms. 
Implicit in this literature is the assumption that an Islamic movement is a 
homogeneous and coherent unit. These studies on Islamic activism and the 
internet can be categorized into two streams: studies that argue the internet 
is extremely significant for Islamic movements; and others that argue it is of 
only limited significance for such movements. In spite of their different 
arguments, both tend to present the Islamic movement under study as a 
uniform, undifferentiated entity whose internet dynamics and changing 
nature are often unquestioned.   
In their attempt to explain the crucial or limited roles of the internet 
for Islamic activism, most previous studies portray an Islamic movement 
under study as a homogeneous unit represented by a single leader, with a 




argue for the significance of the internet for an Islamic social movement, they 
conclude the new media has an undifferentiated significance for a unified 
Islamic movement.  
This un-nuanced approach to the relationship between Islamic 
movements and the internet is problematic at least in two ways. First, it fails 
to read accurately the nature of contemporary Islamic movements as it 
overlooks the variations within each movement in terms of resources, 
constituencies, ideological streams, practice and institutions. Just like social 
movements in general, Islamic movements are in reality far from unitary or 
monolithic entities. Rather, they are dynamic entities with many faces, being 
in constant flow and motion. Second, it is primarily problematic because 
regarding Islamic movements as uniformed entities hinders an adequate 
understanding of the various mediations of the internet’s significance for 
contemporary Islamic movements. In fact, the degree of significance of the 
internet for an Islamic movement is influenced by intra-movement 
difference, complexity and dynamics.  
Furthermore, the prevailing literature has predominantly focused on 
Islamic cyber-activism in the Middle East. Consequently, questions about the 
richness and complexity of the interaction between the internet and Islamic 
movements in non-Arab countries remain relatively under-explored and little 
understood. The dominant focus among scholars, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim, and the public, which is articulated by media, is on the manifestation 
of Islam in the Arab world. Non-Arab Muslims, who in fact constitute the 
majority of Muslims in the world, are often overlooked as on the periphery of 
the Muslim world, compared to the Middle East, which is traditionally 
regarded as ‘the centre of the Muslim world’ from the Orientalist perspective 
(Chapter One). 
 




This study has attempted to fill a gap within the literature by offering a 
pluralistic vision of Islamic activism by uncovering the variable relevance of 
the internet for Islamic groups. It has taken into account intra-movement 
heterogeneity and dynamics, particularly the issues of diverse constituents 
and resources, which influence the extent of the significance of the internet 
for Islamic activism. It has also internationalised studies of Islamic cyber-
activism by expanding their scope of study beyond the Arab world.  
To this end, it has analysed internet use by the Salafi movement with a 
specific focus on Indonesia, analysing intra-movement difference and the 
varied significance of the internet for the movement. In this context, using 
resource mobilizational theory, it has found that resources constitute a 
crucial organizational aspect that defines the variations within the Salafi 
movement, which significantly influence the varying relevance of the internet 
for Salafists. It has sought to answer these key questions: Why did the Salafi 
factions embrace the internet as a new important resource? How did they 
actually mobilize the internet to sustain their movement and achieve their 
social-religious goals? What was the implication of this actual use of the 
internet for the Salafi factions? 
This study has revealed the Salafi movement is not uniform, with 
fragmentation over a true representation of Salafi ideology palpable among 
its proponents. Intra-doctrinal ambiguity and different ways of responding to 
current socio-political issues contributed to these intra-Salafi divisions. 
Three factions were identified from this internal conflict: Yemeni Salafists, 
who represent mainstream Salafism, primarily focus on propagation and 
avoid politics; Haraki Salafists who are politically-minded, but are basically 
engaged in non-violent political activism; and Violent Jihadi Salafists who 
highly politicize and radicalise the Salafi doctrines and are engaged in jihad 
as warfare and violent actions (Chapter Two). As a whole, the Salafists do not 
constitute a terrorist or violent group. The majority are non-violent and non-




This study has attempted to understand why the various Salafi 
factions have embraced the internet as a new important resource. Factions 
within the Salafi movement have differential access to resources and varying 
capacities for collective action. The Haraki Salafists were the best-resourced 
Salafi faction, while the Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources. The 
Salafists as a whole generally had limited access to resources when situated 
within the landscape of Islamic movements or organizations in Indonesia. 
They were poorly resourced, particularly in terms of external legitimacy, 
organizational infrastructure, and constituency (Chapter Three).  
This condition created a rationale for embracing the internet as a new 
mobilization resource for pursuing the Salafi movement’s socio-religious 
goals. In their attempt to compensate for the limits of their organizational 
resources, the Salafi factions turned to the internet to enhance collective 
action and reach a wider audience. The Salafi factions embraced the internet 
and integrated it as a new acceptable resource into their socio-religious 
practices. Their presence in cyberspace is seen in various internet 
technologies, particularly websites, which are operated by Salafi individuals 
or organizations, and accessed and followed by Salafi adherents and activists. 
In this context, this study has argued for moving beyond the medium-centred 
perspective that stresses technological advantages of the internet for its 
users. Rather, it has pointed out that the Salafi embrace of the internet was 
influenced by user-related issues, particularly the extent to which the Salafi 
factions have access to resources. Salafi adoption of the internet was closely 
related to the Salafi factions’ evaluation of how best to bolster or consolidate 
their organizational resources (Chapter Three).  
Since Salafism is a religious movement, theological rationales also 
loom large in legitimating its engagement with the internet. To embrace fully 
the internet as a new resource, the Salafi factions needed more than an 
organisational justification in the form of lack of resources, but also 




manhaj al-salaf (the Salaf method) to give a sacred legitimacy for their 
embrace of the internet and to integrate it into their daily social and religious 
practices. They, therefore, framed this new media technology in a communal 
discourse of the internet. Interestingly, all Salafi factions generally shared a 
positive attitude towards the internet with strong references to Qur'anic 
verses and hadis texts, which were interpreted according to their world view, 
and Salafi ‘ulama. Not only did these factions impute neutrality to the 
internet, but they also regarded it as God’s gift in order to mobilize the 
medium for their religious needs and purposes. At this point, the Salafi 
framing of the internet shows that the Salafi factions were not passive 
receivers or blind rejecters of the technology. Their engagement with the 
internet involved a negotiation with opportunities opened by this new 
medium in articulation with Salafi ideology and beliefs. Thus, the above lack 
of resources combined and supported with this theological legitimacy 
encouraged and motivated the Salafi factions to adopt the internet as an 
important new resource that supports their organizational goals of 
promoting Salafi ideology to a wider audience (Chapter Four). 
This study also analysed how they actually mobilized this newly 
adopted resource for collective action. It identified the types of internet use 
by the Salafi factions, enabling the development of a typology of internet 
mobilization salient to the Salafi movement, described the main nature of this 
typology, and explained the nature of such Salafi internet usage.  
First, the Salafi factions employed the internet as a resource for 
ideological mobilization, namely for constructing, asserting and promoting 
the ideology of Salafism to a wider audience. The centrality of this religious 
ideology was clearly seen in the Salafi factions’ making of manhaj al-salaf a 
key ingredient and element of their web contents. This shows that religious 
ideology played a key role in the ways the proponents of the Salafi movement 
used the internet technology and that ideological propagation constitutes the 




internet to spread and promote Salafism to a wider audience, they did not 
actually utilize this new resource for this purpose to identical degrees. 
Yemeni Salafists and Violent Jihadi Salafists mobilized the internet as a 
resource for constructing the ideology of Salafism more actively than Haraki 
Salafists (Chapter Five). 
Second, the different Salafi factions used the internet as a resource to 
set boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, or between ‘true Salafists’ and ‘Salafi 
imposters’, by conducting hostile intra-‘othering’ practices in their attempt to 
sustain their movement and assert sacred authority. Their claims to be the 
vanguards of ‘authentic Islam’ and their strict literalism and anti-
intellectualism as methods of understanding Islamic texts contributed to the 
Salafists’ hostility  towards ‘the misguided’ other, including ‘misguided’ 
Salafists from other Salafi factions (Chapter Six). 
However, the Salafi factions differed in the degree to which they were 
engaged in this practice of mobilizing their websites as instrumental 
resources for vilifying Salafi factions and individuals considered ‘the other’. 
Yemeni Salafists fully employed the tactics of vilification in this online 
practice of othering, including name-calling, character assassination, and 
verdict giving, which were targeted at the Haraki Salafists and the Violent 
Jihadi Salafists. By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction and the Violent Jihadi 
Salafi faction were less active in utilizing their websites as resources to set 
boundaries. Haraki Salafists partly employed the tactic of character 
assassination, while practicing a very limited use of name-calling and verdict 
giving tactics levelled at the Yemeni and the Violent Jihadi Salafi factions. The 
same was true for Violent Jihadi Salafists who practiced vilification, which 
was targeted at the Yemeni Salafists.   
The Yemeni Salafi faction was also fully engaged in mobilizing their 
websites as resources to practice self-exaltation, another strategy of othering. 
The proponents of this faction attempted to portray themselves as ‘the true 




Prophet Muhammad, his companions and Salaf ‘ulamā`. On the contrary, the 
Haraki Salafi faction and Jihadi Salafi faction did not utilize their websites for 
practicing online self-exaltation strategy of othering (Chapter Six).  
Third, the Salafi factions mobilized the internet to create local and 
global links with like-minded individuals or organizations. In creating these 
linkages, each Salafi faction reflected its local and global connections as well 
as its ideological affiliation. Instead of establishing strategic linkages aimed at 
organizing collaborative alliances for collective action, the Salafi factions used 
links as resources simply to identify, recognize and endorse the websites of 
like-minded Salafi factions and individuals based on factors related to 
content of the target web and attributes of the target web producers such as 
credibility, authority and ideological affinity of the linked websites.  Yet, the 
Salafi factions mobilized their websites to create these linkages in different 
ways. The resource-poor Yemeni Salafi faction mobilized their websites to 
create many more links than the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction. The 
Jihadi Salafi faction created no links on its websites (Chapter Seven).  
 Fourth and lastly, the Salafi factions mobilized the internet to respond 
to current issues by providing alternative information and their perspectives 
on those issues. Each Salafi faction employed websites to publish articles on 
both local and global issues considered important for the interests of Islam 
and Muslims in their attempt to sustain their movements. Through these web 
articles, they maintained the relevance of their websites, kept their readers 
updated with new stories, and communicated their perspectives on local and 
global issues facing Islam and Muslims in general and the Salafi followers in 
particular. By doing so, they created for the web visitors and Muslim ummah 
a self-image that they were the guardians of the ‘true’ Islam and the 
defenders of ‘true’ Muslims. However, each Salafi faction varied in its actual 
mobilization of the web for responding to current issues. Haraki Salafists did 




web extensively to respond to current issues; and Violent Jihadi Salafists 
optimised the web the most to respond to current issues (Chapter Eight).    
The above findings have revealed that although each Salafi faction 
adopted the internet as a new important resource to achieve their religious, 
social, and organizational interests, the factions did not actually mobilize it 
for these purposes in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi 
factions (Yemeni Salafi and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions) tended to mobilize 
the internet more actively than the resource-rich ones (Haraki Salafi faction).  
This variation of internet use was closely related to the different states 
of resource availability among the Salafi factions. This intra-movement 
resource difference among the Salafists sheds light on why some Salafi 
factions mobilized the internet as a coping strategy to deal with lack of 
resources and why others did not. Realizing that they had limited access to 
resources (moral and cultural resources) and being aware of the potential of 
the internet, the less well-resourced Yemeni and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions 
were motivated to use the new medium to overcome their lack of resources 
and sustain their movement. By contrast, as they had good access to various 
types of resources (moral, cultural, social-organizational, material and 
human resoiurces), the Haraki Salafi faction felt confident and self-sufficient, 
with little pressure to optimise the internet as a new resource to pursue its 
social and religious purposes. Therefore, the resource-poor Yemeni Salafists 
and Violent Jihadi Salafists factions mobilized their websites more 
extensively than the resource-rich Haraki Salafists in order to fully engage in 
online practices of promoting the ideology of Salafism, setting boundaries 
between ‘us’/’true Salafists’ and ‘them’/’Salafi imposters’, creating linkages, 
and responding to local and global issues.     
This study has also tried to analyse the implication of the above 
internet use for the Salafi factions. The varied use of web among the Salafi 
factions had resulted in different implications for each faction. Haraki 




decrease their existing resources. It has not altered the resource mobilization 
within Haraki Salafists; they remain the Salafi faction with the best access to 
resources.   
By contrast, the extensive web use to promote the ideology of Salaf 
supremacy, set boundaries, create linkages and respond to current issues 
enabled the Yemeni Salafi faction to generate valuable, though still limited, 
new resources, particularly human and material ones. Likewise, as they 
mobilized the web most to publish articles on current issues on a daily basis, 
Violent Jihadi Salafists were at least able to generate the ongoing financial 
and human resources needed to operate their websites and carry out their 
activities. 
 Nevertheless, these impacts were not powerful enough to overcome 
the Yemeni Salafi and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions’ lack of resources and 
close the resource gap with the Haraki Salafi faction. The Salafi factions’ use 
of the web merely reproduced, rather than altered differences in the capacity 
of resource mobilization among the factions, maintaining resource inequality 
among them.  The many links created by Yemeni Salafists on their websites, 
for example, did not translate into a closing of the gap with the Haraki Salafi 
faction in their ability to mobilize more resources. The absence of links on 
Jihadi Salafi websites also contributed to this online reproduction of 
differences in resource mobilization among the Salafi factions.    
 In addition, this study has shown that the above internet uses had 
varied significance for different Salafi factions. All Salafi factions adopted the 
internet and developed the shared narratives of the new media, but they 
differed in the issue of how they actually mobilized the adopted new media 
due to their differences in resource availability. Accordingly, the significance 
of the internet is not uniform across the Salafi movement in Indonesia. 
Rather, each Salafi faction’s use of the internet was influenced by offline 




Thus, the internet enhanced more the presence of less well-resourced 
Salafi factions in cyberspace than that of the well-resourced faction.  For the 
resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction, the internet was not a significant tool to 
generate new resources, nor did their limited use of it diminish their existing 
resources. But, the less well-resourced Yemeni Salafists considered their 
internet use an important tool to generate new resources, particularly 
material and human ones. For the Jihadi Salafists, the internet enabled them 
to respond on a daily basis to current issues, maintaining and sustaining their 
movement, despite limited resources.  
For the poorly-resourced the Yemeni Salafi and Violent Jihadi Salafi 
factions, the internet adoption was a coping strategy to deal with their lack of 
moral, material, human, and social-organizational resources and sustain their 
movements. However, for the well-resourced Haraki Salafi faction, the 
internet adoption was not really a strategy to deal with the lack of resources 
and to survive, but rather as a kind of additional, peripheral means to 
maintain the movement. Then, the internet was a helpful tool for resource-
poor Yemeni Salafists and Violent Jihadi Salafists to sustain their movement, 
but it was not powerful enough to close the resource inequality between 
these two and the resource-rich Haraki Salafists.  
There are some general points to be made here. Rather than thinking 
about an Islamic movement as a unified entity, this study has sought to 
understand it in the reality, as a diverse, even fragmented unit, in terms of 
constituency and resource availability and not just ideology.  
Analysis of internet use and its significance for Islamic activism cannot 
be isolated from intra-movement dynamics and differences. In order to 
understand better the significance of the internet for Islamic activism, there 
is need to analyse the intra-movement dynamics within an Islamic 
movement, identifying internal schisms and different access to resources 
among the contending factions, and demonstrating how these influence the 




Based on its analysis of the Salafi movement in Indonesia and its usage 
of websites through online observation and interviews with Salafi leaders 
and web administrators, this study has argued that the significance of the 
internet for this Islamic movement is not uniform, but is rather dependent 
upon intra-movement complexities and dynamics including internal 
fragmentation and the differential state of intra-movement organizational 
resources. The significance of the internet as a resource for an Islamic 
movement thus varies enormously across intra-movement factions 
depending on access to other resources.  Analysing the different state of 
resources among the Salafi proponents sheds light on why some Salafi 
factions mobilize the internet as a coping strategy and others do not. As 
exemplified by different Salafi factions, the more resources an Islamic group 
had access to, the less it used the internet and gained its benefits; the less 
resources an Islamic group had access to, the more it mobilized the internet 
to sustain its movement.  
 This study suggests that the significance and consequences of the 
internet cannot be understood by treating it in isolation from offline contexts 
of its users. Here, it fits into current studies of religion and the internet, 
which Heidi Campbell (2011) calls “the third wave of research on online 
religious community” that “moves towards opening up the investigation from 
just mapping life online to considering how online-offline interaction and 
integration point towards findings about life in an information-dominated 
culture” (p. 240-241).     
Moreover, global macro approaches to internet studies have tended to 
emphasize the uniqueness of the internet and what the internet can and will 
do, and conversely largely ignored the role of the actors,  the netizens.  By 
contrast, this study contributes to that stream of studies of the internet and 
society where the actions of users, rather than their tool (the internet), are 
the primary focus. It  adopts a user-perspective to the understanding of the 




Bakardjiva (2005) and Hill and Sen (2008). The issue of agency is therefore 
central to this study as it focuses on what the users can and will do with the 
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